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PREFACE 
On May 15 and 16, 1942, the staff of the Department of Account­
ing had the pleasure of welcoming members of the accounting profession 
to the Fifth Annual Institute on Accounting at The Ohio State University. 
Registration statistics reveal that 257 people were registered at the 





It is gratifying to the department to note that in this, the first con­
ference held since our entrance into the war, the accounting profession, 
despite increased drains on time and energies, considered the program of 
such value that attendance was close to the 1941 figure. The department 
is also deeply appreciative of the very busy men who appeared on the pro­
grams of the various sessions. 
It is the hope of the Department that this Fifth Annual Institute on 
Accounting sent the accountants present back to their varied tasks with a 
clearer understanding and an added impetus to face the many difficult 
problems of the profession today. 
The Department of Accounting 
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OPENING REMARKS 
By ABNER J. STARR, C.P.A.y 
Lyhrand, Ross Bros, and Montgomery, Cincinnati; 
President, The Ohio Society of Certified Public Accountants 
Students, fellow practitioners and friends of the profession of account­
ing, it is a privilege and pleasure to welcome each and every one of you 
to this the Fifth Annual Institute on Accounting sponsored by The Depart­
ment of Accounting, College of Commerce and Administration, The Ohio 
State University. % 
It has been my privilege to attend the four previous accounting 
conferences, and I consider myself fortunate indeed in having been per­
mitted to hear so many excellent papers and discussions, to become associated 
and acquainted with the leaders of our profession, and to have been given 
an opportunity to discuss my problems with my accounting friends. 
The program for this Conference has been designed to cover some of 
the problems brought about by this World Wa r I I  . The sessions this 
morning will deal with the future of American business and the future 
prospects for the accountant; the sessions this afternoon will cover informa-
tion-gathering for price control, and profit limitation; this evening you will 
learn about the relationship of government and business; and on Saturday 
morning we will have two excellent talks on the control and allocation of 
labor costs and expenses under abnormal conditions. 
The plan for this morning provides for presentation of the talks or 
papers by the two speakers and then you will be given an opportunity to ask 
questions from the floor. May I suggest that each of you make notes 
during the progress of the talks so that we may have a lively discussion 
period. 
Those responsible for the arrangement of this program have been 
extremely fortunate in securing speakers who are recognized leaders in 
their respective fields. 
Our first speaker is one of the country's outstanding economists. He 
received his Ph.D. degree from Yale University, and after teaching at 
several institutions he became a member of the faculty of The Ohio State 
University and has been one of the mainstays of the Department of 
Economics for many years. He is the author of Our Economic System and 
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numerous articles and papers. He has served numerous times with various 
Government agencies, and returned last fall from a period of service as 
Consumers' Counsel for the National Bituminous Coal Commission. 
It is a pleasure to present Dr. H. Gordon Hayes, who will speak on 
the subject, "What's Ahead for American Business?" Dr. Hayes. 
WHAT'S AHEAD FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS? 
By DR. H. GORDON HAYES, 
College of Commerce, The Ohio State University 
The briefest answer that I can give to the question which has been 
assigned to me is that there is something different ahead for business. We 
may all hope that it will not be very much different during any one short 
space of time. Certainly the idea of change is in the air. This, however,, 
is nothing new in American history. There has never been a time during 
the years that white men have been on this continent that men of prophetic 
disposition could not declare that an age of transition was upon them. Th e 
titles of two books of about 40 years ago, The Old Order Changeth and 
The New Era, could have been used appropriately during any of the 
decades of our history. 
Carl Sandburg says of the Civil War, "Death was in the air. So was 
birth." This was likewise true when the business men in the colonial days 
were struggling for a redress of grievances before the British king, and also 
in the early days of the 1800's when steel was displacing iron, and 
machinery was finally pushing toward museums the tools that had been 
devised long before the beginning of the Christian era. Death and birth 
were also in the air during the Jacksonian period, when public schools were 
established, when the one-man one-vote for whites carried the principles 
of the Declaration of Independence nearer to realization, and when plans 
for reforms and what we now call Utopian socialism caught the imagination 
of many. Similarly, in the post-Civil-War decades, when the tremendous 
outbursts of railroad construction and factory building meant the creation 
of a new economic base, and later as the small business man felt the pincers 
of the new goliaths of industry and through the granger movement and in 
the Sherman Law insisted that something be done about it, another new 
era was upon the American people. 
The Spanish-American War was expressive of new stirrings in the 
consciousness of the nation and helped everyone to see that a new day had 
dawned. The coming of the automobile in the early years of the present 
century, and the formation of the United States Steel Corporation in 1901, 
and later consolidations, marked the new century as something different 
from what had gone before. Our entrance into the first World War was 
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another new venture for us, and here we are now, deep in the most gigantic 
•struggle of force and ideas that the world has ever seen. 
But while every year, or at least every decade, in our history may be 
properly designated as a period of transition from accustomed to unac­
customed paths, it appears that this is unusually true of this particular 
time. Certainly, as the first World War took its course during 1914, 1915 
and 1916, one did not hear discussions to the effect that a different 
economic order was in process of creation. The war was conceived to be 
merely another war, but today men say that a new world is being made. 
But just exactly what is to come cannot be foretold. 
Certainly, no one, even as late as the period from 1910 to 1915, could 
have foretold the Russian Revolution of November, 1917. As one looks 
back over the history from 1915 to 1917 in Russia, it appears that the 
coming to power of the revolutionary group was in goodly part a matter 
of accidents. If this or that factor had been altered, the results might have 
been far different. T  o be sure, we can, from the vantage point of today, 
trace the trends that led to one-sixth of the world's surface being socialist, 
for history is never discontinuous, but likewise, if the Romanoffs had not 
fallen, and capitalism had continued in Russia, we could similarly note the 
sequence of events that led to that result. 
Further, as one thinks of the world conflagration which Hitler has set 
by igniting the mass discontent of an economically weary people with fagots 
from his frustrated soul, one can find additional reasons for humility in 
prophesy. There was nothing inevitable about his coming to power. Indeed, 
but for the single factor of the senility of President von Hindenberg in 
January, 1933, the entire human race might now be following the ways of 
peace rather than those of war. The presidential assent to Hitler's becom­
ing Chancellor of the Reich expressed the cunning of a band of intriguers, 
.not the considered judgment of the hero of Tannenberg. 
The course of human events, as I see it, moves in a. given general 
direction during a given period of time, and general results can be forecast. 
But while we can tell our general direction, and may be correct in regard 
to the goal that will presently be reached, we cannot tell what fork of the 
road will be taken, nor what calamity may overtake us on the way. I 
•emphasize this as a hedge against what is to follow. 
I  I 
As scholars have sought explanation for the course of past events, 
they have reached diverse conclusions. Thus, we have the economic, the 
geographical, the religious, the ideological, and even the gun theory of 
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historical interpretation. It appears to me that we are on much safer 
ground if we interpret history in terms of a movement towards consistency 
on the part of the various elements that contribute to the totality of our 
institutional life. 
At any one period of time, there is strong pressure to make the 
various elements of life consistent with each other. The economic arrange­
ments, the political institutions, the general ideology as expressed in 
religious, political, and social ideals, are almost of necessity in harmony 
with each other at any particular period of time, or are in the process of 
becoming so. Thus, as we think of the days of the beginning of our national 
life, we find marked consistency among the almost universal self-dependent 
agricultural industry, the ability of an individual to protect himself and his 
family with his fire arms, the notion that all men are created equal and 
endowed with the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and 
the dominant religious notion of the direct relationship between the individual 
and God. It is somewhat difficult to see how any one of these strands 
in our national life, with the others given, could have been different from 
what it was. They are all part of a single pattern. Jefferson's dictum,, 
"the best government is the government that governs least," had its validity 
in each of the many facets of our national life. 
Today, it seems to me, strong forces are working to make our econ­
omic arrangements consistent with the other major forces in our life. Th e 
explanation of this, as I see it, follows. 
I l  l 
What are the principle aspects of our life today that affect the problem 
before us? I shall call attention to three items: ( i  ) technology, (2) 
ideology, and (3) organization. 
Technologically, as everyone knows, the face of the world has been: 
sharply altered during the past hundred years. The general situation in 
respect to this is the prevalence of large-scale industries, which means that 
there are relatively few owners, or, more realistically, relatively few man­
agers, and that their decisions determine the volume of production at any 
one time. Even such a matter as not liking the man in the White House 
may so influence decisions as to have a disastrous consequence on the lives 
of millions of persons. The new technology means also that our life is 
increasingly industrial rather than agricultural. Th e applications of science 
have severed ever larger portions of the population from the soil. This 
movement was arrested during the great depression, but has been resumed 
under the stimulus of war prosperity. Less than one-half of the agricultural 
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workers of, say, 1940 was apparently sufficient to produce the entire 
agricultural output. Another important aspect of the new technology, 
which along with the second point is really a corollary of the first, is that 
there is now a high degree of economic interdependence as compared with 
the preceding decade. We are increasingly all members of one economic 
body, the whole of which suffers from injury to one. 
The ideological situation to be noted now is of tremendous importance. 
One cannot well overrate the importance of the ideas in men's heads in 
accounting for the present, or in attempting to forecast the future. As men 
think, so are they. I shall make five points in respect to this aspect of our 
life. 
First, the outlook of men today is increasingly matter of fact. This is 
closely related to the technological development. Veblen's idea that as 
folks move from agriculture to industrial work their attitudes become 
more matter of fact and less mystical, as a result of their having the 
materials with which they work more closely under control, is apparently 
being confirmed. 
Th e continued presence among us of superstitions and the vogue of 
astrologers and other denizens of the mumbo-jumbo land indicate that 
the fifth decade of the twentieth century is not yet out of the woods of 
mysticism and into the clearing of science, but, unquestionably, we see more 
clearly than heretofore. Attitudes are increasingly rationalistic. This is 
of tremendous importance in respect to the operation of our economy. 
Th e notions that since we can build factories, we can keep them running, 
that since we can prevent epidemics of diseases, we can prevent mass 
unemployment, that instead of accepting what the fates may send, we may 
build our own house, help immeasurably in accomplishing these things. 
Another important strand in our present thinking is the idea that it is 
advisable to cooperate increasingly with our fellow men rather than attempt­
ing to go it alone. This cooperation is increasingly taking the form of 
mutual aid through the agency of government. We have had long practice 
in this, as witness the public schools, public highways, and the post office. 
More recently, the guarantee of bank deposits and of deposits in Building 
and Loan Associations, the control of the stock market and of agriculture, 
and the social security setup, indicate a marked extension of the old idea 
of mutually sharing each other's burdens. The war effort marks, obviously, 
a great extension of this spirit of cooperation through the government. The 
fact, too, of our present extensive experience in government activity cannot 
but greatly deepen the idea in the social consciousness that other difficulties 
that may arise may be subjected to redress by cooperation through the 
government. 
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A third aspect in the current thinking is a strong and vigorous 
egalitarianism. The notion of the founding fathers of the equality of men 
has never been as vital a part of our thinking as it is now. The church, the 
school, the press, the radio and the movie have all contributed important 
elements in giving us the attitude that all members of our society are, of 
right, partakers of the bounties of our joint economic product. The four 
secular agencies to which attention has just been directed have, through 
education and advertising, greatly strengthened this notion. 
The press and the radio through the advertising of goods, and the 
school and the movie through displaying a way of life that depends upon 
the goods of modern industry, have quickened the desires of those in the 
lower-income groups and have made them increasingly anxious to partake 
of the fruits of our economy. And nowhere throughout our society has it 
been emphasized that certain of our products may properly be used only 
by certain persons and not by others. Nowhere have the advertisers, either 
of goods or of a way of life, expressed the idea that certain persons may 
not have electric refrigerators, or automobiles, or plumbing, or vitamin-
charged foods, or may not attend the movies. A footnote should perhaps 
be added that in some sections of the country there has been some prevalence 
of such a discriminating attitude in respect to negroes, but the impact of 
the war has strengthened the anti-discrimination feeling which has long 
been gathering strength. Certainly, in general, the fact of mass production 
has given us democracy in consumption such as the world has never seen. 
The telephone in the home of the poorest workman carries the human 
voice as well as does that in the palace; and the electricity, gas, and water 
sold to the poor are not inferior in quality to that sold to the rich. Th e 
cheapest new automobile is practically as good as any that a Vanderbilt can 
buy. Any young man with a week's wages may array himself in garments 
that make him practically indistinguishable from those who were fed with 
golden spoons. Indeed, even the spoons are more and more alike. 
Consider in this connection our Founding Fathers, who loved the 
common man with a good deal of passion for that time, but who set them­
selves off from most of humanity with wigs, knee breeches* and silk 
stockings. Roosevelt and Bricker do not do that. 
A fourth element in the current ideology is an increasing regard of 
ownership, or management, as a trusteeship for the society as a whole. 
In all of the discussion which has recently taken place concerning the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey not having developed the Butyl 
Rubber process, including the widely distributed defense by President Farish, 
not one word has appeared, so far as my observation has gone, to the effect 
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that the rubber process was the private property of a private concern, to be 
used only as private interest dictated. The entire line of defense by the 
Standard officials and by others who defended them was that their conduct 
was in the national interest. Indeed, all the big business men who have 
been caught fraternizing with the Nazis have made the same excuse: it 
was all for the public good. This attitude, even if we somewhat doubt its 
sincerity, is, I submit, of great import. No longer ago than the spring of 
1937 the sit-down strike in the General Motors plant was denounced on 
the basis of the analogy of a housemaid's barricading herself in the kitchen 
and refusing the family access thereto, unless her terms were met. Our 
thinking has changed since that time. 
The fifth and last point which I shall make in respect to our general 
state of mind is the prevalence of a give-and-take attitude. This, indeed, 
is nothing new. Since the beginning of this nation, we have submitted 
to debate the various problems that have arisen, and on the basis of com­
promise have effected adjustments. Our failure to settle peacefully the 
slavery question is the only case in our history in which we have not followed 
the policy of the council chamber and the ballot box, and only a little more 
understanding on both sides would have enabled the democratic process to 
have worked in that instance. 
Most fortunately we are not encumbered with the Marxian nonsense 
that violence is necessary in order that change may be effected. There are 
a few among us who peddle this social poison, but, fortunately, they are and 
always have been an insignificant element in our population. We have 
no doctrinaire position that government control, for example, is good for 
its own sake. We meet our problems as they arise, one by one. We do 
not go hunting for them. 
The third important factor in the present situation is the matter of 
organization. We are still fortunate, as we have been since the beginning 
of this country, in having two political parties, and in having each of them 
represent a cross section of the entire nation. This has led to complaints 
in many quarters to the effect that the choice between he parties was merely 
between tweedledum and tweedledee. But this is a most fortunate situ­
ation. Under this arrangement we have made steady progress in respect 
to the promotion of justice and well-being, without the violent jerks in our 
society that might come if the parties represented sharply diverse classes. 
In respect to the general organization there is, however, a new 
element that must be considered. This is the increasing power and strength 
of the labor unions. We now have something more than 10 million people 
in the major organizations, and it is possible that this number may be 
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considerably extended within the next few years. This gives us an addi­
tional organizational factor that must be reckoned with in any attempt 
to forecast the course of business. The experience which the trade unions 
are having cannot but make them increasingly effective in deciding the 
course of industry. Particularly, their current strength makes it less 
probable, as indeed do many of the other factors to which attention has 
been called, that we shall in the future permit unemployment to reach 
proportions at all comparable to those which prevailed in the 1930's. 
IV 
All in all our present life is highly cooperative—highly collectivistic— 
because of the underlying technical base, the temper of the times, and the 
organizational means which we utilize. All these factors, as already em­
phasized, are mutually supplementary, but they are not wholly consistent. 
Business is somewhat out of line, although it has already been greatly 
modified. Further change may confidently be expected. 
Large-scale industry, the modern corporation, and especially the hold­
ing company are, of course, all aspects of highly cooperative or collective-
forms of conduct. Beyond the single firm or corporation the new co­
operative aspects are increasingly apparent. These are evidenced not so 
much by cases of compulsion, as when the public through the government 
requires a manufacturer to install safety devices or to deal with a trade 
union, but rather by instances of desire by business men themselves, as when, 
for example, the bituminous coal operators petition Congress to abolish the 
capitalistic free market in their product and substitute therefor a system 
of coal prices to be formulated by bureaucrats in Washington. There is an 
increasing amount of such legislation, both state and national, as everyone 
knows. Even the fair hours and wages law and state minimum-wage laws 
have had their sponsors among business firms. Likewise, this cooperative 
spirit is seen when business men join in research, in setting standards, or in 
eliminating price competition without the benefit of legislation. Thurman 
Arnold would call this last item by a different name, but however selfish 
it may be, the spirit is essentially cooperative, not competitive. Particularly, 
then, the increase in the scope and power of government in relation to 
business must not be interpreted as a movement by certain elements in the 
population against the business group as a whole, but rather as a means by 
which business units themselves seek the aid of the body politic. Business 
men, to an ever increasing degree, do not walk alone. 
The significant temper of the new age, as compared with that which 
has prevailed heretofore, is strikingly seen in the conduct of war. Why 
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wasn't the Civil War brought to a close sooner? Why weren't enough 
soldiers and sailors drafted and enough guns and mortars and gunboats 
made to finish the job in short order? Why were only 119,954 men 
drafted, and why did 73,607 of these send substitutes, leaving only a little 
over 46,000 drafted men to serve in the country's cause? Why did the 
total military expenditures for the North amount to less than $30 per year 
per capita? While the total number of Union troops engaged in the North 
was something more than two million, or almost 10 per cent of the popula­
tion of the North, one must remember that many of these soldiers served 
for only 30 or 90 days. W e got on with the job very slowly. 
The explanation of this turns partly upon the small economic surplus 
then as compared with now. Not much could be spared for war. But the 
more important item was, it seems to me, the high degree of individualism 
which then prevailed. The men of that day were less identified with the 
nation as a whole, were more self-centered, were less patriotic, if you please, 
than are their descendants today. They were willing as a group to spend 
some effort, to make some sacrifice, but only a limited amount. 
Th e total war of today is part of the present collective spirit. This 
spirit has been dominant in the long experience of the human race but was, 
as now appears, temporarily set aside during the century or two that lie 
just behind us. 
Th e condition of business in this war period today contrasts sharply, 
of course, with that of any preceding time in the history of our country. 
Private ownership in business is practically gone for the duration of the 
war. Th e production of a large number of items of goods has been stopped 
entirely, and, through the exercise of priorities, prohibition of sales on 
credit, and regulation of prices, the entire economy is being channelized 
into an all-out war effort. Thousands of small business units, including 
road-side merchants of various sorts, and resort keepers, are suffering 
greatly, but the collective spirit which brings this about will give aid which 
in an earlier time would not have been forthcoming. These new regula­
tions, it may be emphasized again, have not been so much imposed upon 
business as requested by business, in order that the war may be brought to a 
successful conclusion. W e have turned almost full circle from the 
individualism of the late 1700's and the early 1800's to the collectivism of 
today. 
This war experience will have lasting effects. It cannot but deepen 
the philosophy of cooperation which has long been under way. This will 
come, in part, because of the additions to the knowledge of the technique 
of government participation that are being made daily. Part of the phil­
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osophy of cooperation necessarily must be the faith and confidence that 
tasks may thus be accomplished. As experience fashions new tools and 
adjusts them to the hands that are to use them, they become an essential 
part of the philosophy of life. 
In the post-war period that will immediately follow the destruction of 
the military power of the Germans and the Japanese, the controls which we 
shall have established in respect to business will not, of course, be relaxed 
at once. They will be retained, so far as need be, in order to bridge the 
gulf back from war production to production for purposes of peaceful living. 
Even the matter of the price controls, which are just now becoming ef­
fective, undoubtedly will be retained until our factories shall have got back 
to peacetime production, in order that we may avoid a disastrous price 
rise, such as took place in 1919 and the first part of 1920. 
Business will be confronted in the post-war period with a large volume 
of deferred demand, because of the shortage of goods which will have 
developed, and, also, because of the large volume of funds which will be 
available as a result of the purchase of war bonds. Business will also be 
strengthened in that period by the need to supply food and other necessities 
of life to the millions of persons who will be released from the tyranny of 
Hitler. Another factor not to be overlooked is that we will, in the post-war 
period, continue the manufacture of armaments. W e will not assume 
when this war is over that the Germans will ever after follow the ways 
of peace. Also, we will carry forward public works as needed to furnish 
employment for those who will have been released from the armed services, 
and from the production of military goods. W e can, I am confident, expect 
to bridge the gulf back to the pursuits of peace with relatively little difficulty. 
W e need merely to exercise some of the good sense and wise judgment 
of which we are collectively capable. 
V 
In indicating the probable conditions in respect to business in the long 
run, after the immediate post-war adjustment, one should have even more 
reservations than in making prophecies in respect to the short run, because 
of the added opportunities for the accidents of history to appear. But, at 
present, there is reason to believe that the degree of economic interdepend­
ence will continue to increase, even if industrial plants should become 
somewhat smaller. The technical advances that seem to lie ahead indicate 
more, rather than less, specialization. This, with the democratic elements 
noted above, which should certainly be expected not to become less strong, 
suggest further increases in the degree of cooperation. This means less 
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autonomy on the part of individual business firms or, in other wordsT 
increased control by groups of corporations, by labor organizations, and by 
the people, generally, through the government. 
One may expect this to mean, among other things, that restrictions 
upon output will be lessened, that there will be less hiding behind patents 
to the detriment of the public, and that payments by business both to officers 
and to equity owners will be more modest than the returns with which we 
are familiar. In short, the profit motive will be watered down. These 
things, and more, we can take almost as much for granted as we can the 
ripening of crops. 
The big problem, however, is whether private business, as we have 
known it, can keep the conveyor belts going. Chronic unemployment and 
periodic mass unemployment must be avoided. If private business cannot 
avoid holocausts such as that of the 1930^, it is as certainly doomed as was 
Feudalism when a richer way of living beckoned the serfs away from the 
manor. And business during the 1920's, it must be remembered, made 
its own bed for the 1930'$. New Dealers and their like had no part in this. 
This dogmatism is warranted despite capitalism's having survived 
many periods of unemployment, for it is increasingly apparent that mass 
unemployment is nd more excusable than are typhoid fever or smallpox 
epidemics. What was the matter during the 1930's? Certainly there was 
no reason in physical conditions for our lack of production. We were well 
supplied with the best equipment that man had ever seen; we had adequate 
raw materials; and everywhere able men and women were crying their 
hearts out for an opportunity to run the materials through the machines 
and bring forth goods for the sustenance of life. The economic ritual, 
the taboos, must be held responsible for the loss of $200 billion of goods 
and services and for the untold human suffering and degradation that 
resulted from the unemployment of that time. Taboos are harder to ex­
orcise than are germs, but our conquest of epidemics should give us courage 
to believe that it can be done. Professor Boda has given us hope on this 
score by pointing out that monkeys will not starve to death in a coconut 
grove. W e can relearn the lesson that we lost along the way. 
Unemployment has been unknown during the more than 20 years of 
the socialistic regime in Russia, and analysis does not indicate any reason 
for the appearance of unemployment in any country where government 
ownership is dominant, nor where collective controls have been extended 
as far as they have in Germany, nor as far as they are here in our present 
war economy. Not only has unemployment become indefensible, since it is 
clear that only states of mind are responsible for it, but it cannot be per­
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mitted on a large scale, because of the increasing national danger, not only 
of revolution within but of aggression from without, when men are idle. 
Formerly, when one nation was thrown into depression, all other nations 
were in the same boat; but today with ever larger segments of the world 
economy innoculated against the virus of mass unemployment, national 
survival itself impels a people to prevent the occurrence of this malady. 
The fundamental reason for depression is our dependence on the profit 
criterion in determining whether employment shall be provided. It comes 
about that the opportunity for profit declines periodically to the point that 
capital building is halted. This gives us idle men, increases the difficulty 
of producing at a profit, leads to further dismissal of employees, and so on 
down the tragic spiral. Another phrasing for this is that the lack of 
opportunity for profitable investment leads to the hoarding, or the non-use, 
of money, and this forces men to be idle. Economists have struggled for 
over a century with the problem as to why profit opportunities disappear. 
Weather, health, mistakes as to lines of production, inflation, speculation, 
rigidity of prices, of wages, and of the rate of interest have all, with other 
phenomena, been offered in explanation of the periodical disappearance of 
profit opportunities. 
VI 
It seems to me that the trouble lies in savings. This is an old, but very 
disreputable, idea. It has always been anethema to economists, churchmen, 
and other keepers of the country's conscience. The way to both riches 
and to sainthood has lain along the road of frugal living. The saver, and 
not the wastrel, has been the ideal held before the youth. And savings, as 
anyone can see, built the railroads, steel mills, and automobile plants. 
Without saving, man would still be chasing rabbits naked and catching them 
by hand, when he was lucky. Even so, I feel that good old savings bring 
on unemployment. This, too, if I understand him, is Keynes' position in 
his General Theory
 y the most talked about and most influential book in 
economics ever to be written by a school man. 
The matter is, I believe, easily demonstrable, even in the few minutes 
at my disposal now, although well-trained accountants with a minor in 
economics could not be expected to accept it wholeheartedly at once, and 
especially not if they had economics as a major. It will have to ripen in the 
wood. The analysis is, simply, that the whole capitalistic spirit and the 
religious ethic stress the importance of saving. Persons with large incomes 
will not spend what they have available. In 1929, it should be recalled, 
the upper 3 per cent of the income receivers had, according to the Brookings 
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Institution, more than 33 per cent of the total money income of the nation. 
This was before taxes. After taxes, the upper 3 per cent had an even 
larger proportion. The concentration of income has not been so marked 
since, but distribution is, and always has been, most unequal, as everyone 
knows, and this, in this age, has meant large savings. 
Not only have the upper-bracket people wished to save and really 
been compelled to do so, but persons in all the lower-income groups have 
felt the need to save in this uncertain world. This has resulted not only in 
what we may call original saving, but also in the saving of the income from 
savings. This means the compounding of savings. It means accumulation 
at compound interest. This is impossible in a finite world. Attempts to do 
this could not but bring a collapse such as has occurred periodically 
throughout the life of capitalism. 
Th e well-known computation that a penny put at 5 per cent interest 
to compound at the time of Jesus, would by now amount to a sum equal 
to the value of a ball of gold the size of the earth, at the pre-Roosevelt 
gold price, shows the absurdity of trying to build a continuing economy 
on such a foundation. Compounding is impossible in this finite world, 
whether it be of savings, or animal or vegetable life. Death is necessary 
and inevitable among things that procreate, and so is bankruptcy in an 
economy based on the practice of saving the income from savings. Pros­
perity, however, does not need to wait upon bankruptcy in order to turn 
into depression, for merely the portents of bankruptcy—an unfavorable 
outlook for a continued increase of sales, after the compounding has con­
tinued for a few years—is sufficient to halt investment, create unemploy­
ment, and force bankruptcy throughout the system. After enough of the 
weaker ones have been killed off—after the claims of savers to income have 
been so reduced that savings are greatly curtailed—the society can go for­
ward on another attempt to do the impossible, particularly if it is lucky 
enough to have inventors come along with plans for low-cost production 
that will induce investment and thus draw idle money out of hoards and idle 
men away from the relief line. 
This brief sketch, which is so brief that perhaps I should not have 
introduced it at all, helps to explain a great many things; that is, the 
propensity to save the income from savings—the insistence of savers on 
having more and more factories and their refusal to buy more than a few 
of the goods that come out of these factories—helps us to see why there is 
such tremendous pressure in our society to sell. T  o be sure, sellers of goods 
may be expected to try to set their prices at the buyers' resistance point, 
thus making sales difficult; but this is not sufficient, it seems to me, to 
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account for the selling pressure that is so characteristic of our economy. 
The fact is that the poorest 90 per cent of the people, with, say, 70 per cent 
of the national income, are constantly being pressed to buy more than 
70 per cent of the product. As recovery follows depression, they can do 
this with the help of credit. This is the prosperity phase of the cycle. But 
soon the credit limit is reached, and that honeymoon is over. 
The chronic market impasse, which culminates in periodic depressions, 
also helps us to understand the pressure to sell abroad and not to buy abroad, 
or why a protective tariff has always been a major part of national policy 
under capitalism, despite the beautiful logic to the contrary which the econ­
omists built on a false major premise. England's free-trade policy, it should 
be noted, fell in that unusual period when she had such a jump on the other 
nations that she was in no danger of having to accept imports equal to 
the goods and services sent out. She was, without a tariff, able to get 
other nations to take the goods to which her savers were entitled, but 
which they would not take and which the poorer groups could not buy. 
As the other nations caught up, England's tariff went up. 
The market impasse which comes from attempting to save the income 
from savings also helps us to understand why we benefit from calamities 
such as fires and floods and why our economy functioned so splendidly in 
1941. During that year we produced more than $13 billion of war goods, 
including lend-lease materials, and put a million and a half men under 
arms and yet closed the year better provided with food, clothing, housing, 
automobiles, cigarettes, candy, books, entertainment, and Christmas presents 
than ever before, despite still having four million workers unemployed. 
W e were spending our way to prosperity, despite the doctrine of otherwise 
sensible men that that cannot be done. W e were showing ourselves what 
our economy could do if the market jam could be kept broken. It was 
broken because men had received $13 billion for producing things that 
were not for sale. Buying power exceeded goods for sale. If it had not 
been necessary to increase greatly our war effort, we could verily have 
spent our way to the economic heaven of well being, if the war would have 
lasted long enough. 
VII 
If the major economic difficulty is, as it has been stated here, that 
the propensity to save the income from savings gives us a chronic condition 
of under-utilization of men and equipment, which is alleviated only occa­
sionally when the luck of new inventions makes large investments profitable 
and when installment sales and other forms of consumer credit including 
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loans make possible a period of prosperity but carries us inexorably toward 
depression, there are certain lines of procedure that recommend themselves. 
1I) Taxes should be heavy enough upon large-income receivers, and 
upon corporations, to siphon into the hands of the government a large 
portion of the funds that would otherwise be saved. The present heavy 
taxes should be continued in the post-war period. Care must be taken that 
these sums are not paid back at once to the large-income receivers through 
the redemption of government bonds, but the bonds of the small-saving 
group should be redeemed in as continuous a stream as possible. The tax 
funds received should also be used in the purchase of food for the sub­
standard groups, in providing generously for medical and dental care for 
the poor who need it, and in carrying forward various educational and 
cultural programs. This is, in large part, merely an extension of present 
practices. 
(2 ) The general principle of collective social security should be so 
extended that the need for individual savings to guard against the proverbial 
rainy day will be greatly reduced. We have already traveled far along 
this road of mutually bearing each other's burdens which our ancestors 
entered on in their first fire and life insurance ventures. 
(3) The planning mechanism that we already have, such as the 
National Resources Planning Board, the appropriate section of the War 
Production Board, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, should be 
charged with increasing responsibility for determining the lines of invest­
ment that the country as a whole is to follow. All proposals for investment 
beyond a designated sum should have to be cleared through the national 
planning council. Approved projects could be financed with funds that 
the sponsors would otherwise have paid in taxes or by government funds 
derived from taxation. We have already had considerable experience in 
this, particularly in relation to the present war effort. 
(4) Projects financed with government funds should be operated by 
private enterprise, under lease agreements, such as is now being done in 
many fields of war production. 
(5) When new and more efficient projects are launched, the govern­
ment should subsidize the firms put at a competitive disadvantage; or it 
should buy them out and close the plants, rather than permit the slow 
lingering death which has been the concomitant of progress throughout our 
history. There will no longer be need for bankruptcy if the savings diffi­
culty is solved. 
From some such a program, we can, I believe, make our investment 
more orderly and less wasteful than ever before, make more possible the 
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utilization of our industrial capacity, or in other words, approach nearer 
to continuous full employment, and eliminate depressions. We would thus 
be accomplishing the long-sough t-f or results, not by any radical alteration 
in our practice but merely by the extensions of devices to which we are 
well accustomed. 
Business, to be sure, would be altered somewhat; but this, too, would 
not be anything new in our history. Business leadership would continue 
to serve us as in the past, but it would serve us better. Economic incentives 
would still prevail, and, with the elimination of the log jam of too many 
goods trying to get through too narrow a stream of buying power, American 
business men would really be able to lead us into the land of economic 
plenty and security. 
The times are portentous. The generative power of the new pro­
duction techniques will not be denied. The sons of men will not continue 
to live placidly in poverty and insecurity. The scourge of war and the 
threat of revolution cannot be allayed until a better economic life is provided. 
We cannot go back; we can only go forward. With pride in the achieve­
ments throughout our century and a half of history of democratically 
adjusting practices to new conditions, we can with confidence meet the 
present challenge, although it exceeds in gravity any which men now 
cliving have ever experienced. T  o paraphrase Brandeis, we shall guide 
by the light of reason; we shall let our minds be bold.' 
CHAIRMAN STARR: Dr. Hayes, I am sure that this applause demonstrates 
very forcibly what the audience thinks of your excellent, thought-provoking paper, 
and I am sure that we shall hare many questions for you during the discussion 
period. 
The next speaker on our program is from the University of Michigan. I 
think, perhaps, that having one of the speakers on the program this morning from 
Michigan might be in the nature of an appeasement program for the football 
game of this fall. 
This expert is an exception. He has devoted some time to teaching and 
has written several textbooks on accounting. Several years ago he gave up his 
public accounting practice in Chicago to go with the Tennessee Valley Authority. 
Some months ago lie left that position to go with the War Production Board, in 
Washington, as Advisory Consultant. For many years he has served as Editor of 
The Accounting Review} and he will have a very influential part in drafting the 
various tentative statements in accounting policy advanced by the American 
Accounting Association. 
Our speaker has always been known as a man whose thinking was several 
years ahead of current practice. He will talk to you on "What Is Ahead for the 
Accounting Profession?" It's a pleasure to present Mr. E. L. Kohler, Editor, 
The Accounting Review, 
WHAT IS AHEAD FOR THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION? 
By E. L. KOHLER, Editor, 
The Accounting Review
 y Washington^ D. C; Administrative Consultant> 
War Production Board 
I feel influenced by the last speaker to remark that what I have to say 
is by no means of the degree of importance as the items of which he 
spoke to us. I can't compete with that stimulating paper of his. However> 
I should like to relate what I have to say to a remark that he made at the 
outset of his paper, when he mentioned that Veblen had commented on 
the change of attitude on the part of people as our economy became more 
industrial in character and less agricultural—namely, a decline of the 
mysticism that has somehow always plagued the human race, and an in­
creased matter-of-fact attitude. When applied to the field of accounting, 
particularly auditing, I think that attitude is rather easy to trace. 
Practically all of what I have to say today can go under that segment 
of the previous speaker's outline of the things that we face immediately, 
because we of the accounting profession have with us most of the-problems 
Dr. Hayes has presented, or will have them before we get through with 
the present national emergency. 
The heavy hand of war has fallen on professional accountants. It has 
brought to them new responsibilities, new liabilities also, and I earnestly 
hope, as I know you do, that they will not be remiss in meeting them.
refer of course to new work loads, accompanied by rapidly dwindling staffs. 
A number of professional accountants have urged group action in requesting 
deferment of staff members who have attained a certain rank, just as 
business enterprises, deemed by them to be no more essential to the war 
program, have moved to defer industrial employees needed to maintain 
the operating effectiveness of manufacturing plants. Other accountants 
have resorted to the use of unskilled help and to the institution of programs 
for rapid training, designed to offset at least in part the dangers attendant 
on such a program. Others have curtailed their audit programs or have 
refused to undertake new assignments. 
In suggesting to my fellow accountants that they take the utmost 
advantage of their present opportunities, I hope I shall not be accused of 
wanting them to profit unduly in an emergency as grave and portentious 
as the one we are now in. Accounting is said to have been the only pro­
 I 
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fession that profited by the last war, not so much because of the increased 
emoluments of its members, but from the greatly increased recognition of 
the necessity of the services that accountants render. The effects of that 
recognition were lasting and may still be measured, and the same thing 
can happen again. However, I refer to something of greater social sig­
nificance: the ability of the accountant to spread his needed services more 
thinly without any major loss in effectiveness. That this is now a prime 
necessity is something that has been forced home on many of us. In the 
time allotted me on this program I want to examine with you a number of 
possibilities in this direction. 
The draft, along with the increased need for accountants in war 
industries, has depleted the staffs of many firms to what appears to be an 
impossibly low level. The past season has been a nightmare to the profession 
and the most difficult period the profession has ever weathered. Yet, next 
year it will be still more difficult, for the needs of the armed services will 
have increased greatly and the present scale of exemptions, undoubtedly, 
will have to be lowered. It is almost imperative, therefore, that constructive 
effort be devoted immediately to the problem of carrying on the work of the 
profession and maintaining its high standards of performance by the adop­
tion of methods designed to make the greatest possible use of the professional 
skill that remains available. 
Under the pressure of war conditions, no changes can be expected 
in the character of the coverage in annual engagements. Annual balance-
sheet audits, following the pattern of the Committee on Audit Procedure* 
of the American Institute of Accountants, will still be in demand and will, 
within limits, be supplied. And in accordance with those standards a detailed 
audit of the transactions over a limited portion of any one year will 
ordinarily be regarded as essential. Nevertheless, an important amount of 
time can be saved by the adoption of a number of expedients. They deserve-
to be examined carefully. 
First, in view of the fact that the younger and less experienced 
members of the profession will not be in the picture, dependence must be 
had on an older, more experienced staff. But even if the detailed-audit 
portion of the engagement be eliminated, these older staff members must 
still spread themselves thinner. The first expedient that comes to mind 
relates to working papers. Much time can be saved if they are reduced to> 
the absolute minimum. Previously unthought-of savings in time will sug­
gest themselves by combing over the previous season's working papers for 
the purpose of eliminating nonessential analyses and operations. It is quite 
possible that many of you have done this in individual instances. I  n 
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ordinary times the trend, as everyone knows, is to do no less than was done 
last year. Perhaps one of the firm's principals years ago asked for the 
analysis of a certain account and a member of the staff was sent back to 
the job, already concluded, it was thought, in order to secure the additional 
information. Almost every junior accountant, and certainly all of you 
who have reached or passed the senior stage, knows what this means. The 
thing to do now is to ask: Is this schedule necessary any longer? What 
purpose can it possibly serve now? Why not eliminate it entirely? A good 
•set of working papers, like the ideal short story, should contain no element 
that does not lead directly to the conclusion. Useless working papers should 
be cut out anyway; and there is no time like the present to make strenuous 
efforts to see that none are prepared in the future, and that even slightly 
informative papers be reduced In number, certainly in detail, if not excised 
•completely. 
Many accountants feel compelled to analyze certain accounts for 
purposes of continuing a long-continued story carefully developed over a 
period of years. By way of example, I might cite an argument, in which 
I had a hand years ago, over the bad-debt reserve of a large retail establish­
ment. The books were so kept that the analysis was a truly monumental 
job. It involved not only references to original entries but to the accounts 
written off in a half-dozen offices. Careful digging by a senior and a junior 
would yield the desired results, but it took two weeks of continuous work. 
Th  e analyses had been beautifully done in the past and a good deal of 
•satisfaction must have been experienced when a summary prepared from an 
inch-thick sheaf of papers was found to tie in perfectly with a pre­
determined total. But inquiry revealed two things: First, that once the 
summary had been perfected, no one reviewed or obtained any information 
from the detail; and second, that a summary of the debits and credits in the 
reserve had been prepared regularly in the client's credit department, which, 
with a couple of hours' test-checking and summarization, would have served 
.any possible audit purpose. 
This illustration suggests two other injunctions: ( i  ) Make the maxi­
mum use of the client's routine analyses and summaries, and (2) have 
the client's accounting staff prepare regular and special analyses. Careful 
attention to this possibility has yielded remarkable savings in time. In fact, 
carried to the extreme, it would be possible to have the client prepare all 
the working papers, including the worksheets supporting the financial 
-statements, leaving to the outside auditor only a review and testing of the 
papers handed him. Some of you may be familiar with instances in which 
this procedure is followed. It is quite common, of course, to have limited 
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sections of the papers prepared by the client's staff, especially detailed 
analyses of certain accounts, and summaries and analyses of branch-office-
accounts. But the ordinary procedures in this connection deserve careful 
restudy in most cases; the auditor, upon review, will find agreeably surpris­
ing savings in the time of his staff. 
I know that some firms regard any material aid by the client's staff 
as an improper shifting of responsibility. Th e work of the auditor cannot be 
reduced to the level of a checker and inspector, they say; under such 
conditions he cannot see how accounts function, and when he examines 
summaries only he may fail to observe generic sorts of mistakes in accounts. 
Erroneous methods of keeping accounts may be missed entirely. However, 
I have been unable to sympathize with this point of view, emergency or na 
emergency. When pressed for details, some accountants will cite horrible 
examples; but upon dissection these, as a rule, have been found to reflect 
no intelligent review of the work prepared by others. A part of the answer 
to this rigidity of attitude can be found by observing the detail work done 
by the average none-too-skilled junior. He may prepare reams of work­
sheets and miss all the points. But in no case can the absence of a sensible 
review of the work done be excused. I should greatly prefer seeing-
accountants strengthen their approach to the whole review problem with 
this lesson of experience in mind: That a wise review by an accountant 
of long standing is worth many times the analytical work of an unsophisti­
cated assistant. 
I am afraid, too, that some of the reticence on the part of auditors 
to accept the work of others can be found to lie in the need that they feel 
to retain an aura of mystery over their work. A part of this they have-
inherited from their predecessors, who used to be employed only where cash 
shortages had occurred and confidential investigations had to be made. 
Another part of it has been retained even by the most self-searching, self-
critical auditors. They feel that a goodly share of the value of an outside-
auditor lies in the very lack of knowledge by a client's staff of what he is. 
doing. If that staff feels that its every act is not likely to be probed by an 
auditor, or is to be probed by an auditor no longer mysterious, a restraining" 
influence of great value to the client will have been irretrievably lost. T  o 
me this is a most unfortunate viewpoint. I would much rather see this 
type of auditor working constantly to improve his examining methodology 
to the end that keen observation and insistence on a strict system of internal 
controls be established as a more-than-adequate substitute. As a matter 
of fact, the wrong-doer has more to fear from an intelligent auditor whose 
methods are openly known by the client's staff, for he knows that one who 
deliberately mystifies others is himself easily misled. 
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A closely allied problem to which inadequate attention has been paid 
by auditors is the maintenance in the client's office, as the result of regular 
procedures of the client, of papers, analyses, and records which, where 
questions arise, are as available as the auditor's own worksheets. Why carry 
away, by an elaborate process of copying, details that will be by no means 
as important as the original records themselves? Of course the obvious 
answer is that a certain minimum build-up of papers is essential to the 
independent conclusion so vital to an accountant's certificate. Lawyers 
will suggest the absence of evidential data in scanty working papers. Some 
accounting firms have spent long hours with their attorneys in discussing 
and then establishing minimum file requirements. But the exigencies of 
the present situation require a greater degree of realism than some of these 
early discussions with which I am acquainted have revealed. The pos­
sibilities here are very great; they demand more time than I can give 
them here. Further explorations and a fresh slant on the need for and 
the character of audit evidence are essential. 
One important method of reducing audit time lies in the further 
development of the permanent file. This device has not been covered in 
textbooks on auditing, but it has become thoroughly established in the 
audit procedures of many firms. Essentially, the permanent file is an 
aggregate of working papers covering items of continuing interest.. Built 
up over a period of successive audits, the permanent file and the working 
papers having primary value only in the current audit together constitute 
the accountant's record behind his published results. Ordinarily, the 
permanent file consists of sections in which are gathered summaries of capital 
stock, each surplus and surplus-reserve account, dividend records, funded 
debt and debt-discount accounts, a fixed-asset and depreciation history and 
tabulation, organization charts, official personnel, minutes, and other 
matters reflecting background and performance which will serve as a 
substantial added basis for the auditor's present conclusions and as an aid 
and time-saver for the members of his staff charged with responsibility 
for future audits. 
In some instances the permanent file serves as a sort of a general 
ledger to which are posted at leisure certain details of the current working 
papers. In these cases the file is usually not permitted to leave the office, 
and it has value primarily as a case history, not as a time-saver for the field 
staff. Elsewhere the current file is required to be complete, with respect 
to such items as capital stock, in order to satisfy the auditor's conviction 
that each adult record be completely self-contained. In both situations, a 
little relaxation of the auditor's rigid attitude will be found to be extremely 
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ihelpful in the present emergency. Let the current file and the permanent 
file be taken together as the audit record for the current year; under such 
a plan no current papers would appear on capital stock if that account 
remained unchanged during the audit period, except perhaps some comment 
indicating the method by which the auditor has satisfied himself that, in 
fact, no change has occurred. 
At this point I should like to suggest another topic for detailed invest­
igation: the substitution, in working papers, of more narrative for tabular 
material. I do not mean to suggest tedious discourses on systems of 
internal controls or elaborate treatises on such things as the form and filing 
of cash records, but the use of brief descriptive material showing the 
client's method of compilation, particularly operating peculiarities and 
deviations from standard practices, which the auditor has observed, and 
some measure of their effect on final results. 
The study of and the auditor's dependence on methods of internal 
control have long been emphasized but not as fully as they deserve. By 
insisting on rather than mildly suggesting the adoption of stricter methods 
of internal control, the auditor can save himself much future work. He 
can also suggest and participate in establishing improved work programs 
for the client's internal-audit staff, and even provide for his receiving extra 
copies of their reports. A review of these reports and occasional talks 
during the year with the client's audit staff may be a fully adequate substi­
tute for the customary detailed-audit portion of the annual audit and will 
strengthen the arm's-length attitude which such a staff should adopt 
towards the organizational units they examine. Moreover, the internal-
audit staff can be extremely useful during the audit period, and its studies, 
observations, and reports at the year's close can be made to dovetail with 
the outside auditor's work so as to minimize the latter's time on the job. 
Finally, I want to suggest a field by no means fully explored, but one 
which has been gradually developing over the past ten years. This is what 
has been called, for want of a better name, the procedural audit. Th e 
•procedural-audit area is a fascinating one and I believe it can and should 
be made a most useful and essential part of every audit engagement, even 
in normal times. The bane of an employing auditor's life, as everyone 
knows, is the offseason period when he must seriously curtail his staff. Why 
cannot the auditor have, instead of a swollen staff at the peak season, the 
•same staff throughout the year? The answer usually given is that the 
natural business year needs wider adoption, or that everyone wants their 
reports too promptly after December 31 . A better answer is that no one 
apparently has figured out a way of spreading the work over the calendar 
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year. The procedural audit, however, once its value is established, can do-
much to spread the work. 
I should like to distinguish here between what I am calling a procedural 
audit and the ordinary type of interim audit. I am suggesting the partial 
substitution at least of the one for the other. Interim audits are of course 
common enough; they are offseason examinations of accounts, often cash, 
inventories, changes in classification, the basis for quarterly statements, 
inquiries into methods of internal check, frequently system work. These 
checks may serve to reduce the detailed-audit work at the end of the year 
and may be of value to the client, especially where internal audits are 
limited. 
In contrast to an interim-audit, a procedural audit is in effect a 
searching examination into the system of internal controls of a business 
enterprise. By the term "system of internal controls," however, is meant, 
something more than what is found under that heading in an auditing 
textbook. The examination is one of the business as a whole: its organiza­
tional pattern, its operational methods, the ways in which its business 
policies are established and enforced, the nature of its top-staff organization 
and the methods by which the top staff is interrelated with and controls 
the work of the rank and file of the organization, the means of delegating 
authority and the success attending such delegation, internal and external 
reporting practices, and so on through the gamut of observations of how 
the business is conducted. The object to be obtained is not a knowledge 
of the organization for its own sake, but in its relation to the significance 
of the accounts. Of course it is no more than trite to say that a business 
may be observed through its accounts since every operation is fundamentally 
designed to be relected for better (in the ruthless-profit days) or for worse 
(in these latter socially minded days) in the profit-and-loss account. But 
accountants have not so readily embraced a necessary corollary to this 
proposition: that it is the organization that makes the accounts which reflect 
the organization. If an auditor knew precisely how the accounts had been 
built up and maintained, and could somehow satisfy himself through a 
knowledge gained by other than ordinary audit procedures of the accuracy 
of the accounts, his audit work would be simple indeed. The procedural 
audit offers at least a partial solution. Undertaken during the summer 
season by the senior staff, the procedural audit builds up over the years 
a surprisingly precise knowledge of how the business functions and what 
the weak points are; it makes the accounts and financial statements much 
more credible and revealing documents, even before the formal balance-
sheet audit, and sharpens the need, if any, for report qualifications. It 
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makes unnecessary extensive reviews of procedures and organizational 
relationships at the end of the year, and gives practical assurance on many 
points that so often clutter up working papers and take the auditor's time 
while the annual audit is going on. At the same time, the auditor has 
established for himself a larger sphere of activity, from which, I know, many 
of the profession would now shrink. But the plain fact is that the financial 
statements to which the auditor subscribes, with or without qualifications, 
can be no more than the story of a good, middling, or bad organization 
which he is trying to portray to third persons. The larger field is in fact 
already his. 
That concludes my formal remarks, but I would add one more point. 
That point is this: looking forward to the future of accounting, nothing is 
more important than the need for attention by professional accountants to 
matters of government. Most accountants lean heavily in the other 
direction—away from government—but the last speaker has emphasized 
with a great deal of force that government and business cannot remain in 
the same detached, carefree relation to each other that they have main­
tained in the past. 
Certainly we have a very natural relation with government and 
business. At the present time the organization with which I am now 
associated is dealing in thousands and tens of thousands of transactions each 
day with private business, trying to keep private business going, trying to 
speed up private business in furthering the war effort. That work, in itself, 
is opening up a vast new field of possible future relationship between 
government and business, perhaps on an entirely different basis than has 
heretofore been conceived. As I look at it, that development can be, to a 
great extent, in the hands of accountants, because I have always felt that 
accountants, through their ways of exploring the field in which they have 
more than a speaking acquaintance, have made use of techniques (and 
undoubtedly will, in the future, continue to develop those techniques to a 
higher degree) that make for the translation of the very formidable and 
difficult into something that is lucid and understandable by the common 
person. 
I think that at the present time one of the difficulties of our govern-
ment—I mean not only the Federal Government but also state and local 
governments—is that the nature of its operations can't be understood by the 
average individual without a lot of hard work on his part. Methods of 
organization such as the City-Manager plan, of course, do make the 
operations of government more observable than they otherwise would be, 
and to the extent that that plan or a similar plan can be developed in other 
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governmental fields the plans of government and the methods by which it 
operates would be more understandable. 
The accountant has found, as a result of long experience, that the 
more open a corporation's accounts have been, the more they have been 
exposed to the public view, the more they have been investigated, then the 
more likely the corporation's officials have a heightened sense of their social 
obligations. This has been more and more apparent during the last few 
years. 
Why shouldn't the same reasoning apply to government? It does; 
and one of the great difficulties with government at the present time is its 
accounting. An adequate system of accounting either does not exist or it 
exists in such a form that it does not lend itself to results that can be 
interpreted by enough people. One of the worst offenders in this respect is 
the Federal Government. There has been a lot of talk in recent years and 
quite a few articles have been written on the subject of governmental 
financial statements. The Bureau of the Budget has been charged with 
an order, and the Treasury has been charged with the responsibility of 
developing over-all financial statements for the Federal Government. 
One of the Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury, about a year ago, 
told me that one day he was wandering around the main Treasury Building 
in Washington and happened to go down in the basement. On the ground 
floor he found about sixty people, who had been working there for years 
without, apparently, any knowledge on the part of the executives of the 
department as to precisely what they were doing. He made inquiry there 
and found that what they were trying to do was to develop a Federal 
balance sheet, and that they had been working for over ten years on the 
problem. However, his knowledge of accounting was not great enough 
to enable him to answer the question I immediately asked—whether they 
were preparing a balance sheet ten years old, or whether they were working 
on methods by which balance sheets could be prepared some time in the 
future. I never have been able to find out what that group had ac­
complished. It may still be there for all I know. 
But if you will examine such statements as are extant on Federal-
Government operations and Federal-Government financial position, you 
will find this sort of thing: the only regularly issued financial statements 
are in the budget documents submitted once a year to the Bureau of the 
Budget. It seems absurd, of course, that financial statements should only 
appear when the government bureaus and departments are asking for more 
funds. You will also find that nothing approaching a Federal balance 
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sheet is anywhere near in sight at the present time. It is not possible to 
develop such a-thing at the moment. 
Now it is true that the Treasury issues a daily report of cash on hand 
and other related items; it is true also that Treasury reports every month 
on the government's financial position show the combined balance sheets 
and operating results of Federal corporations. There are some fifty corpo­
rations whose assets and operating statements are combined into a single 
conglomerate statement, but none of the interdepartmental items are cast out 
in the process, so that you have only a grossing of the assets and a grossing 
of liabilities, and, of course, duplication on both sides as a result, with some 
of these items running into the billions. 
In 1937, in his annual report, the Comptroller General of the United 
States prepared a balance sheet. Those of you who happen by some accident 
to follow The Accounting Review will probably recall some sour remarks 
that I made there regarding that balance sheet shortly after its appearance. 
It was a most atrocious misleading statement, showing on the one side certain 
items of cash, and containing no receivables except those that had fallen 
into the possession of the Comptroller General, and probably were worth­
less, because he never gets hold of accounts receivable until they have been 
regarded as bad by the various agencies. On the other side of the statement 
was the funded debt of the United States, none of the nonfunded debt at 
all—that was not even mentioned—and no other current liabilities except 
certain items under the direct control of the Comptroller General. And 
what do you suppose the difference between the liabilities and the assets 
was called? National deficit of the United States, without any qualifica­
tions! Under that scheme of accounting—or juggling, for it was not 
really accounting since the items were picked from various sources and were 
not under any common control—you would get more liabilities than you 
would assets. If you don't include fixed-asset items in a balance sheet, 
if you omit the thousands of other things the Federal Government possesses, 
the principal item on the balance sheet will be funded debt; and in that 
particular case, of course, there was an excess of liabilities over assets which 
was called the National Deficit for the year 1937! 
That was the only balance sheet of the Federal government for that 
year, and none has been produced since—by the Comptroller General or 
anyone else. 
Now, it may follow, by a logic that is by no means as abtruse as it 
might seem, that as accountants become interested in governmental affairs, 
the clearer and more sensible governmental operations will become. I think 
there is a direct relationship. What is needed at the present time is the 
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same kind of analysis showing what is happening in the Federal Govern-
ment 's operations as has been so necessary in the affairs of private business. 
Just how to attain that desirable state of affairs, I haven't the slightest 
idea; I don't know what the program should be, but certainly it will come 
about in some way, some time. 
Right now accountants can do no more important a job, especially in an 
emergency like this, than to demand clearer statements of governmental 
operations and, at the same time, to be equally insistent upon better perform­
ance on the part of governmental agencies. T h  e one cannot be accomplished 
without the other. 
CHAIRMAN STARR: Mr. Kohler, your comments certainly were most vital 
to the practicing accountant, and we appreciate greatly the suggestions that you 
have given us. 
For the next twenty minutes we will have a discussion period. The period 
will not be limited to questions but will also include any comments that any of 
you care to make. 
DISCUSSION 
M R  . VICTOR H  . STEMPF (Touche, Niven & Co., New York): If I may 
deal first with those things about which I presume to know a little, I should like 
to offer a few comments on Professor Kohler's statements about our auditing 
procedures during these difficult times. What he referred to as "procedural 
auditing" I think would be more commonly understood by most practicing 
accountants as interim-examination, which naturally is procedural in character, 
because it deals with accounts at interim periods of the year, rather than with 
specific balances which appear in the financial statements at the year end. 
I think that that principle is well recognized by the Institute's Committee 
on Auditing Procedure. It is one of their definite recommendations. 
Th e major problem in these times is naturally going to be inventories. 
Certainly in those industries involved in war production, inventory is the one 
big problem; and there our main objective should be more and more to bring 
about effective, reliable, perpetual inventory control, subjected to what I choose 
to call staggered count, or stagger test, throughout the year. This means that 
when the year end comes around we may eliminate completely, so far as the 
company is concerned, a complete physical inventory and, so far as the auditor is 
concerned, anything which deals with test counts or observation of inventories 
at that date, all of that having been done through the year. 
If corporations are so set up that they have internal auditing staffs of 
their own that are doing the staggered testing and adjusting of inventories 
throughout the year, then the independent auditor's job should be to have its 
representatives accompany those internal auditors and to observe the work which 
is being done and to challenge items themselves, if they deem it necessary to do so. 
Thereby, it will be possible to build up throughout the year an impression which 
we hope will indicate that the company's representations concerning inventory 
at the end of the year are definitely credible and acceptable. 
Mr. Kohler made a correct statement, insofar as the Institute's Committee 
DISCUSSION 3  1 
is concerned, when he said that there shall be no let-down in the standards of 
examination, that work which is done must be well done. It may be necessary 
to reject work, to do fewer audits. In these times that selection naturally must 
be based upon doing those audits which relate to the war effort. The work being 
done must be well done, whatever its character, but there are one or two other 
factors which may expedite our work. 
Reference was made to the natural business year. We know for a fact that 
the Treasury Department reports that for the year 1940 some 35,000 additional 
taxpayers filed on a fiscal-year basis. I think that is an encouraging transition. 
It is piling up each year. 
The Institute's Committee on Auditing Procedure, the Institute's Commit­
tee on Public Information, the New York Stock Exchange, and the S. E. C. are 
all going to do what they can to persuade clients, taxpayers, and reporting corpor­
ations to adopt their natural business years. The S. E. C. has been importuned 
to grant extensions of time within which to file 10-K reports, extensions of say 
120 or 80 days with respect to listed companies; the Stock Exchanges have been 
asked to suggest to corporations that annual meetings be deferred, postponed, or 
adjourned, and that the requirements for the issuance of financial statements 
20 days before the annual meeting shall relate to the adjourned meeting dates, 
rather than to the official annual meeting dates. 
Various devices of that kind will enable some spreading of the work. 
Then one more point which I should like to clarify a bit, if Mr. Kohler 
will forgive me. He referred to the external auditors accefting data prepared 
by the client. I think he lent an implication which he did not intend. I think 
that it is fundamental that the relationship of the independent auditor and his 
client be such that the independent auditor accepts nothing—he receives every­
thing and he assays, tests, samples, checks any material which is presented to him, 
to satisfy himself that the representations are acceptable and reasonably accurate, 
but he does not permit the client's staff to prepare for him something which he 
automatically includes in his own conclusions. 
I think that we should extend to a maximum degree the preparation by the 
'client of clerical data from which the checking is done. The corporation, as 
Mr. Kohler suggested, might well prepare a complete set of papers, but that does 
not mean doing the audit for the independent accountant; it is simply preparing 
the media which will expedite the work of the audit. The material is then 
subjected to such testing as the auditor in his discretion considers necessary and 
desirable to satisfy himself that the company's representation may be relied upon. 
And then, if I may be pardoned, Dr. Hayes, I should like to mow a little 
hay. I remember three statements that you made, that impressed me particularly; 
one was the reference to the Jeffersonian policy that that government is best 
which governs least; the second, that monkeys will not permit themselves to 
starve in a coconut grove; and the third, your conclusion, which I should refer 
to as a soft Utopian dream. 
I think that we have to reconcile those first two. That is the job for the 
post-war period, undoubtedly. I am still a staunch believer in rugged individual­
ism and free enterprise, and the greater the degree to which we can return to it, 
the better, and I think the Jefferson philosophy supported that idea. Then, that 
we cannot permit monkeys—or people—to starve amidst plenty is a foregone 
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conclusion and is one of the flaws and errors in our ways during the last fifty 
years, at least in our country, and that situation must be corrected; and to the 
degree that we require government policing to prevent that, I am fully in accord 
that such government policing should be provided. 
I disagree with the inference that I drew from your statement, and which 
also may be drawn from Stuart Chase's recent book, The Road We Are Traveling, 
from which I think I could quote directly; he says that £if at the conclusion of the 
last war we were unable to retreat to free enterprise, when the victors themselves 
desired it, how will it be humanly possible to do so at the conclusion of this 
war? I doubt it; it is a closed book.' 
I resent that word, "retreat." It is not a matter of retreating—it is a 
matter of retaining the things that are good in free enterprise and in our American 
way of life, which have enabled the marvelous development and increased national 
wealth and prosperity and improved standard of Jiving of the general average of 
our people since this country of ours was founded. 
I think the good things that have evolved out of the system of free enter­
prise in that period should be retained to the fullest extent. We should not cast 
them overboard, and I think that one of the principal emotional factors—and I 
noticed that both of the previous speakers used emotional words—was the very 
fact that a man had to work for what he got out of life. I think that when 
you provide a soft, Utopian plan, under which a man may do or not do what 
his conscience and his fellowmen demand of him, we are bound to step backward. 
We need some incentive, some compulsion, something that drives us to do a job, 
and I think that free enterprise has given us that compulsion. The minute you 
remove completely the profit motive, or reduce it to such an insignificant factor 
that it lends no attraction, you are taking away the most important driving 
influence that has brought new development, new discovery, new enterprise, 
new risk in our American way of life. 
Stuart Chase makes another statement in his book, a rather scanty admission 
on his part, and this is on the point of idle capital, of available new investment. 
H e says that if the post-war period would bring us a new type of plane which 
can be safely and easily flown, and purchased at a price attainable by the great 
majority of people, then perhaps we may see something equivalent to that which 
the automotive industry did for us during the I92o's, and the period before that. 
But there again he throws in a doubt; he does not believe it. 
I think that viewpoint involves a defeatist complex, which is akin to an 
analogy I have used before, that famous item of the man who resigned from the 
patent office in the '8o's or '9o's because he thought that the days of new 
inventions were past. Certainly none of us believes that the days of new 
inventions are past; certainly all of us believe that we still have technological 
frontiers; certainly there is no reason for casting away our system of free 
enterprise if we can finally get our jigsaw puzzle all pieced together, when we 
clearly see the true interrelation of all these many conflicting and divergent forces 
that have brought about these periods of depression. 
I am a rather poor economist, but I don't understand the danger that lies 
in savings, because, after all, what are savings? We are not talking about the 
type of savings which the Belgian, or the French or the Chinese peasant indulged 
in, of burying his silver or odd pieces of gold in the ground and not working 
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them. It seems to me that our savings in this country have always been put to 
work, perhaps at negligible rates of interest, perhaps at as low as one half of one 
per cent in net yield; but every penny that is saved that goes into the banks, that 
goes into savings accounts of any kind, certainly goes into employment, creation 
of new capital goods, employment in actual industry. That money is not idle, 
it is being used; and I think that the reason for idle capital during the New Deal 
years is not that there were not new possibilities of venture, but still that 
fundamental and emotional factor of confidence—the fact that the majority of 
businessmen in this country distrusted the New Deal philosophy, that the New 
Deal organization was filled with too many "pinks" and too many gentlemen with 
new ideologies, that the profit motive had been removed, that they were invited 
into a poker game where the Government took fifty per cent of the winnings, 
and the fellow who held the hand stood all of his own losses. 
I agree fully with Dr. Hayes that high tax rates shall have to be maintained 
after this war, just as I believe, on the other hand, that, in periods of depression, 
instead of increasing tax rates, tax rates should be reduced to a very minimum, 
even though they run into apparent current Federal deficit, in order to stimulate 
investment and use of money in such periods. Per contra, as we get into an 
inflationary period, a period of too rapid expansion, the tax rate should be raised 
as a restraining influence upon that too rapid growth which immediately throws 
a monkey wrench into the intricate complications of all of our economic relations, 
resulting, for example, in a temporary over- production of goods which buying 
power cannot absorb. 
I am enough of a collectivist to believe that in our post-war period we 
probably shall retain very high rates of estate taxation; that we are probably 
going to make it increasingly difficult for the so-called idle rich, but even that 
will have to be tempered by some sort of control which will not cause sudden and 
abrupt throwing on the market of securities held in estates. Collection of estate 
taxes should be spread over a period of five or ten years with adequate protection, 
but we should continue high estate taxation. But we have got to reduce our 
taxes on individual income, at least to the point where there is the temptation 
and the urge to use and to take advantage of the profit motive. Otherwise, we 
might as well pack up and go fishing, and raise our little garden patch of vegetables, 
instead of struggling and striving. While we can all approve and endorse an 
ideology of service to our fellowmen, we are willing to do that only within 
reasonable limits. The thing that really gives us the driving urge and the real 
advance in our material wealth, I think, is the full development of the profit 
motive and free enterprise. 
DR. HAYES: I would like to comment, if I may, on what Mr. Stempf has 
just said. I agree with Mr. Stempf in regard to some of the things that he has 
to say about private enterprise. No one can look about and not appreciate that 
private enterprise has served us splendidly in the past. But I call your attention 
to Mr. Stempf's emphasis upon the matter of the profit motive, to his suggestion 
that without the profit motive folks would not carry on, that folks would otherwise 
become loafers on the job. I wonder, now, if you folks agree with that. I 
would suggest that, if my hunch is right, there are possibly not more than two, 
or three, or four within the sound of my voice who have anything to do with 
the profit motive. I mean that you are not actuated by the profit motive. You 
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folks are paid, as I am, a salary. I cannot conceive of any human society in 
which you will not have differences in reward in order to stimulate effort, but 
the so-called profit motive does not necessarily apply. 
I was interested in what Mr. Stempf had to say about the matter of savings. 
His first point was that savings were never hoarded, and if he is right on that, 
there is no point to what I said on that subject; but again, if he is right on that, 
then it seems to me that we would never have unemployment. And, furthermore, 
I call your attention to the fact that he didn't talk more than half a minute 
beyond that until he mentioned the idle money during the early days of the 
New Deal and explained why it was idle, which is just my point as to where all 
the difficulty lies. 
Certainly, as I tried to say in my paper, we need to make progress, we need 
to make progress slowly, we need to disturb our present institutions just as little 
as we possibly can. But I insist that what we must do is to get rid of depressions. 
Mr. Stempf suggested that we could do that if economists would only find out 
what causes them . . .  . As I suggested, economists have been working on that 
for 150 years, and we just came through one of the worst depressions we have 
ever seen. I feel, gentlemen, that as surely as the sun will rise tomorrow, if 
nothing is done to correct our economy, we will have a depression during the 
1950's or the 1960's that will make that of the 1930's look like one back in the 
1830's. 
M R  . STEMPF: Mr. Chairman, I am entitled to a moment of rebuttal. 
CHAIRMAN STARR: We would like to hear from Mr. Kohler first, if you 
please. 
M R  . KOHLER: Mr. Chairman, I have just one statement to make regarding 
what Mr. Stempf had to say about my remarks. Mr. Stempf misunderstood 
what I was referring to. I was trying to describe what is involved in a procedural 
audit—an audit designed very largely to replace the conventional interim audit. 
CHAIRMAN STARR: We will give you one minute, Mr. Stempf. 
M R  . STEMPF: Dr. Hayes has rightly taken advantage of me, but he failed 
to mention the fact that when he spoke of savings he was speaking of his Utopian 
plan, that we should prevent savings. When I mentioned idle money I was 
referring to a temporary period of depression. Under normal conditions as 
our economy revolves— 
DR . HAYES: Depressions are normal; that is exactly my point. 
M R  . STEMPF: Savings are not idle; they go into new investments. The 
thing that has built this country has not been our existing industry but the 
continuing crop of new industries, new developments, and particularly in respect 
to that new industry it is essential that we have confidence in the existing order 
of things, confidence in the rightful use of the profit motive to tempt capital 
into hazardous new ventures. 
CHAIRMAN STARR: I would like to continue this discussion on into the 
afternoon but I am informed that luncheon will be served at the Faculty Club 
promptly at one o'clock. We will, therefore, adjourn this session. 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
By GEORGE DAVERIO, C.P.A. 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio 
The topics to be discussed this afternoon are of unusual importance. 
When I heard the President of the United States give his fireside chat some 
weeks ago, I was particularly impressed by the order in which he mentioned 
the seven principles which he said constituted our national economic policy. 
You may recall that the first two items which he mentioned as being of 
utmost importance in establishing a national program for the war effort 
on the home front were: First> "W e must, through heavier taxes, keep 
personal and corporate profits at a low, reasonable rate." What does that 
mean? Profit limitation. Second, "W e must fix ceilings on prices and 
rents." What does that mean? Price control. These are the two topics 
on our program this afternoon. 
While these items appear as numbers one and two in the President's 
program, he said, 'the important thing to remember is that each one of 
these points is dependent upon the other, if the whole program is to work/ 
That in itself, I think, is proof of the importance of the items which are 
to be discussed here this afternoon. 
The first subject to be presented is, "Information-Gathering for Price 
Control." The speaker is a man who has firsthand information on this 
topic. Under normal circumstances, he is Professor of Accounting at the 
University of Michigan. He has left his pursuits there from time to time 
to engage in government service. From 1933 to 1935 he served with the 
NRA. In 1938, he was a consultant on Distribution Costs in the Depart­
ment of Accounting. He is now President of the American Accounting 
Association; Director of the Washington Chapter of the National Associ­
ation of Cost Accountants; and is a member of the Michigan Association 
of Certified Public Accountants. He is at the present time Director of 
Accounting for the Office of Price Administration. 
It gives me great pleasure this afternoon to present to you Dr. Herbert 
F. Taggart, who will discuss for you "Information-Gathering for Price 
Control." Dr. Taggart. 
INFORMATION-GATHERING FOR PRICE CONTROL 
By HERBERT F. TAGGART 
Director of Accounting, Office of Price Administration, 
Washington, D. C. 
I am here today in a dual capacity. When Russell Willcox sent me 
the invitation to come, he said it was because I was President of the 
. American Accounting Association. 
I am here also as a representative of the Office of Price Administration. 
First, I should like to say a word or two about the American Account­
ing Association, and to present to you my greetings in that capacity. I have 
only one desire in regard to my administration of the high office to which 
the American Accounting Association elected me, and that is that the 
Association continue its unbroken record of unworldliness and imprac­
ticality, which I think represents its principal function. I had the pleasure, 
a few weeks back, of listening to one of the two or three top academic 
accountants in the country make slighting remarks concerning what he 
called a certain group of academic accountants with whose views he did not 
•entirely hold. Such aspersions do not worry me in the least. The pioneer 
has ever been impractical and visionary. What would really worry me 
would be the cessation of such attacks. The Association may well be 
accused of not performing its function if ever it becomes wholly practical. 
It has long been my desire to be present at an Ohio State University 
Institute on Accounting. Prior to today it has never been possible. I have 
looked at the programs of these meetings and I have marveled at the 
-energy, and the excellent taste of the people who are responsible for them. 
Until this year, they have made not a single mistake in the people they 
have chosen to participate. It is with exceptional pleasure, therefore, that 
I bring the official greetings of the American Accounting Association to 
this splended Conference. 
Now for the activities of the Office of Price Administration. As I was 
going to work the other morning, down Pennsylvania Avenue, I saw a 
gentleman giving a lady a bath—in fact, two gentlemen were engaged in 
that operation. I hasten to say that the lady was a large, heavy, cold, stone 
lady, sitting on a pedestal out in front of the Archives Building. On the 
foot of the pedestal a motto was carved in the stone, a motto at which I 
"have looked a great many times. The words are these: "What is past is 
prologue." 
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As near as I have been able to decide, the meaning of that motto is,. 
"You ain't seen nothin' yet." Possibly that applies to the activities of the 
Office of Price Administration, and to the topic announced for my address, 
Information-Gathering for Price Control. 
I should do less than my duty by the Office of Price Administration 
if I did not introduce my talk by some mention of the General Maximum 
Price Regulation. Probably all of you have read about it in the paper; 
some of you may have been more intimately concerned with it than that-
I am sure all of you will be more intimately concerned with it as time 
goes on. It is without question the largest single piece of economic admin­
istrative legislation ever attempted. It covers all prices of all goods and 
services, with a few specific exceptions, and also excepting those commod­
ities which have been previously covered by specific price regulations. That 
is a good deal of ground—literally, all commodities from safety pins to 
battleships. As the General Maximum Price Regulation stands at the 
present time, it actually does include the price of battleships. Nobody can 
sell a battleship for anything above his March prices. W e are in the process 
of devising a supplement to the General Maximum Price Regulation, which 
will exempt battleships and tanks and airplanes and a considerable number 
of ordnance items, and which will modify our control of Government pur­
chases of quartermaster materials and the like. 
However, broadly speaking, the General Maximum Price Regulation 
does now, and will continue to, cover the price of goods and services 
purchased by the Government of the United States as well as by civilians. 
The Regulation covers a wide variety of services—in fact, practically 
all services except personal services, such as hair cuts and beauty-parlor 
treatments, and professional services, including, I am sure you will be 
relieved to know, the services of public accountants. We are not fixing 
accountants fees. However, we do control, or will control, the price of 
laundry services, dry-cleaning services, repair services on shoes, on auto­
mobiles, and on houses, industrial services of all sorts, such as textile finishing 
and machineshop services. 
I want to call your attention to a few of the things that the accountant 
ought to know about the General Maximum Price Regulation, things 
which your clients or your employers probably will be asking you, and for 
which we hope you will have some of the answers. 
The first item is the basis for determining maximum price. In 
general, with respect to those commodities in which the seller dealt during 
March, 1942, the maximum price is his highest price during that month. His-
highest price ordinarily would be the price at which he actually made 
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deliveries during March, or at which he rendered services. However, if 
he were offering to deal in commodities or to render services during March, 
but actually made no deliveries or rendered no service of a particular kind, 
then his highest price during March is the price at which he offered to do 
these things—his listed price, his catalog price, or his posted price. 
If the commodity being priced is not the same commodity or service 
as in March, he may still be able to price on the March basis, if the 
commodity or service is "similar" to a commodity or service which he was 
offering in March. Our definition of "similar" is one which we hope will 
solve a considerable number of problems of pricing which would not be 
solved by the rule with regard to the March prices for the same commodity 
or service. 
Finally, if the seller sold neither the same commodity nor a similar 
commodity, he is permitted to use the maximum price of his nearest 
competitor. We have already had a number of amusing experiences with 
this provision. For example, a certain chain drug store operator who, since 
March, had opened an outlet in a new neighborhood, came to the local 
office of the Office of Price Administration and asked what his maximum 
prices would be. He was told that they would be the maximum prices of his 
nearest competitor. He replied, "That certainly is no help to me. I can't 
find out what the maximum prices of my nearest competitor are—my 
competitors won't speak to me, let alone tell me what their prices are." 
In that case, at least, the Office of Price Administration is going to have 
to offer a more practical method of pricing. 
If commodities or services cannot be priced under any of those 
provisions—if they are brand new, for instance—then there must be 
another basis for pricing. In such case, the General Maximum Price 
Regulation permits the seller at retail or wholesale to use a markup pro­
cedure, which is based on the markup of the fastest selling item in the same 
general class of merchandise or service. 
Normally, the fastest selling item frequently carries a relatively low 
markup, and that was well understood by those who drafted this regulation. 
It was one means of keeping inflation at bay, because we recognize that if 
provisions for pricing new commodities were overly generous, we would 
have an extraordinary number of new commodities; if the seller found that 
the pricing on old commodities was too tight, it would not take him long 
to discover new ones. Quite deliberately, therefore, the pricing provisions 
for new commodities are less than generous, in order to close that potential 
loophole. 
Manufacturers who have a new commodity to price are directed to 
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apply to the Office of Price Administration for the privilege of pricing the 
commodity, stating what it is, and indicating why it cannot be priced by 
any other method. If the Office of Price Administration is sufficiently 
impressed, the manufacturer will receive information as to the basis on 
which his pricing can be done. It is evidently necessary, if price control is 
going to work, to maintain strict control of the pricing mechanism, and 
•exceptionally strict control of new commodities. Since no one pricing 
formula would serve for every manufacturing enterprise, a considerable 
number of formulae will be developed to take care of the needs of various 
lines of industry. 
So much for the pricing methods. 
The General Maximum Price Regulation contains a number of 
record-keeping, posting and reporting provisions with which the accountant 
should familiarize himself. I am not going into the details of those pro­
visions, except to point out that, obviously, it is necessary that the seller 
maintain such records as will enable the Office of Price Administration to 
determine whether or not maximum prices have been ascertained properly 
and are being adhered to. 
At the retail level the Regulation singles out a considerable list of 
commodities called, "cost of living commodities," which must be marked 
in such a manner that the customers can always see what the maximum 
prices are. One item of some interest to the accountant is the provision that 
if the store has issued sales slips to its customers, it will be necessary to 
continue that procedure. Furthermore, if the storekeeper has not cus­
tomarily given out sales tickets, he must be prepared to do so on demand. 
In a regulation as sweeping as this, covering sellers at all levels of 
•distribution, by uniform rules, there are bound to be inequities and hard­
ships of one kind or another. That, too, has been recognized in the 
Regulation. W e have distinguished three broad categories of difficulties 
of this sort. 
One category is something that, for want of a better name during the 
course of the discussion of the Regulation, we called "anomalies." This is 
illustrated by the case of a store which was holding a sale throughout the 
month of March, closing out various items, and which may have made no 
sales except at these special prices. It would be unjust to insist that the March 
price remain that store's maximum price. The Regulation provides for 
relief in cases of that sort, or in cases where price wars were going on, 
or where special introductory sales were being held, or where for any 
other reason a particular merchant selling at retail was caught by this 
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General Maximum Price Regulation in an abnormal position in regard to 
his own operations, not in regard to his competitors'. 
In other words, if a merchant operates a cut-rate store, the Regula­
tion is going to leave it a cut-rate store; if he operates a high-priced store, 
the Regulation permits the high prices to continue; but where a mer­
chant is caught by the Regulation in an abnormal situation as regards 
his own normal operations, then the Regulation provides machinery for 
remedying those difficulties. 
Treatment of this form of difficulty is going to be decentralized just 
as far as possible. Regional and state branches of the Office of Price 
Administration will make the decisions in individual cases. It is not going 
to be necessary for a storekeeper who was having a special sale on fur 
coats in the month of March to come to Washington to have a personal 
interview with Mr. Henderson in order to remedy his plight; he will 
not need to go through complex legal procedures; his remedy is going 
to be just as close to his home town as we can put it. 
The second major category of difficulties resulting from a regulation 
of this sort goes under the odd name of the "squeeze." That expression 
was invented in Canada, at the time Canada put in its over-all pricing 
regulation, and the term invented by the Canadians has taken hold south 
of the border. The remedy for the "squeeze" is the "roll back." 
Th e explanation of these remarkable expressions is as follows. 
Typically, retail prices do not advance as fast as wholesale and manu­
facturers' prices. The retailer, frequently, does not advance his prices 
as rapidly as his replacement costs increase, especially if he has an inventory 
of low-priced merchandise. For many years accountants and trade asso­
ciations have been preaching to retailers that that is bad business; that 
prices should be increased as soon as replacement cost goes up. However, 
that good advice continues to be ignored, and as a result many retailers 
were caught in March with prices established several months back. In 
extreme cases current replacement cost is actually higher than the March 
retail selling price, and in many cases, replacement cost does not allow 
a normal markup. That is the "squeeze." The Canadians brought 
retailers, wholesalers and manufacturers together for a species of collective 
bargaining. The basic assumption of this process is that the established 
retail price will remain unchanged. The proceeds of a sale at retail must 
pay the retailer, the wholesaler, and the manufacturer. This procedure 
is reported to have been reasonably successful, and we hope that a similar 
procedure will remedy a good many such cases in this country. The 
INFORMATION-GATHERING FOR PRICE CONTROL 4 3 
General Maximum Price Regulation provides for the collection of infor­
mation necessary to take care of the roll back. 
A third category of hardships consists of all other kinds of hardships 
which may be created by the General Maximum Price Regulation. This 
Regulation, like all others, provides a procedure by which any seller can 
petition for an amendment to the Regulation to cure any inequity with 
which he is confronted. There is no assurance that he will be relieved, 
since his ills may be incurable, but he has the right to petition for relief 
and to have his plea given a sympathetic hearing. 
Against the background of this sweeping control of the entire price 
structure of the nation, we may consider the information-gathering 
activities of the Office of Price Administration. Under this order the 
importance of information-gathering becomes pretty clear. Let me cite 
just a few of the questions that confront the Office of Price Administration 
in connection with the administration of this and the other regulations. 
First: What are the goods and services? At first glance, this may 
seem a surprising question. However, this regulation covers all goods 
and services except those specifically excluded, and we have begun to 
hear about a great many goods and services which we never heard of 
before. In the same manner, the NRA brought to light an astonishing 
number of obscure trades and industries. One method of determining 
what the goods and services are is to issue requests for catalogs and 
descriptive literature. The files of some of the Commodity Branches in 
Washington are jammed with catalogs which furnish a background of 
information concerning kinds, styles and varieties of goods. This collec­
tion is doubtless not duplicated in any purchasing department in the 
country, because no purchasing department could possibly be interested 
in as many different kinds of things as we are. 
Another question is: What are the existing prices? That question 
includes terms, conditions of sale, discounts, allowances, etc. For its 
answer the O P A has acquired endless quantities of price lists, discount 
sheets, and price histories, including both those customarily issued by sellers 
and those made up at the special request of the Office. 
The third question: What are the distribution channels? How are 
these goods sold? How do they reach the ultimate consumer? Such 
information is obviously necessary if we are to have any conception of 
the propriety and probable effect of a price action. 
Fourth: What are the customary margins of the manufacturer, the 
wholesaler, and the retailer? This must be answered in connection with 
the "roll back," or in connection with any effort to set prices in proper 
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relationship at various levels of distribution. In part, this question may 
be answered by the price lists and discount sheets previously mentioned. 
Fifth: What are the costs and the profits? T  o the accountant, of 
course, that is the most important question. We are required by the 
Emergency Price Control Act to take a look at increases and decreases 
in costs and profits during and subsequent to the year ended October I, 
1941. We have made extensive studies already and we expect to make 
still more extensive studies of costs and profits to carry out that require­
ment of the law. We would do it, of course, even if the law did not 
require it, because our actions could not possibly be intelligent without 
that information. 
Sixth: Where are "roll backs" going to be necessary? Adequate 
answers to the preceding questions will take care of this one. 
Seventh: How can the "roll backs" be carried out? Where is the 
slack, if any? If the retail price of an article is $1.00, that dollar must 
be enough to pay all of the people involved. Now who is getting more 
than his necessary share? Who, therefore, can give up a little to the 
others? 
Eighth: What are the supplies of goods? We have accumulated 
information with regard to inventories, productive capacities, and facilities, 
for the purpose of knowing what are the supplies of goods, in whose hands 
those supplies are located, and what are the expectations of additional 
supplies. This information is necessary, of course, for rationing as well 
as for price-control. 
Th e final question: How is the program working? Information of 
that sort, of course, is an essential basis for continuing action. 
You may be interested in knowing something about the machinery 
for information-gathering, both within the Office of Price Administration 
and outside of it. So far as the O P A staff is concerned, two divisions 
are chiefly responsible for gathering information. One is the Research 
Division- Its function is to make broad, fundamental, economic studies 
necessary for supplying Mr. Henderson with material to present to con­
gressional committees, and others legitimately interested in our activities, 
and necessary for the formulation of the long-term policy of the Office of 
Price Administration. The Research Division make studies of national 
income and its distribution, of wage policies, of taxation and public finance, 
and of all other features of the economic picture. 
Th e Research Division works chiefly with information from secondary 
sources, such as that gathered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau 
of the Census, and other public and private agencies. The Accounting 
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Division, on the other hand, is the chief gatherer of information from 
primary sources. This Division actually covers more ground than its name 
would seem to imply. It is composed of three branches. The largest is 
the Accounting Operations Branch, which conducts cost studies of products 
and services. In this branch there are at present something like 125 
accountants. 
A substantially smaller branch is the Financial Reporting branch, 
whose function it is to explore all sources of financial information, both 
within and outside of the Government. Financial data are obtained from 
the Treasury Department, the Federal Trade Commission, and private 
financial services, such as Moody's and Standard Statistics. The Financial 
Reporting Branch supplies the Research Division and the Commodity 
Branches with information concerning individual companies and broad 
segments of trade and industry. 
It is in the Financial Reporting Branch that the work of operating the 
new general financial reporting plan of the Office of Price Administration 
will be carried on. I will speak somewhat more in detail about that plan in 
a moment. 
The third branch of the Accounting Division is, in some ways, the 
most interesting. It has, in some respects—as you will agree, I think, after 
I have described it—one of the most important jobs in the Office of Price 
Administration. This is the Questionnaire Branch. That is not a good 
name, but it is as good a name as we could think of. The functions of 
the Questionnaire Branch, as I have listed them here, are six. In the first 
place the Questionnaire Branch gives technical assistance to all of the 
other divisions and branches of the Office of Price Administration in the 
drafting of questionnaires and report forms. There are, in the Ques­
tionnaire Branch, trained statisticians and economists who have had long 
experience in drafting questionnaires in such a way that, with good luck, 
they will bring back the information that we want, in the most economical 
form. 
The second function of the Questionnaire Branch consists of seeking 
other government sources of information. If a Commodity Branch pro­
poses a questionnaire intended, for example, to ascertain the sources of 
supply of raw materials, it is one of the duties of the Questionnaire Branch 
to find out whether the Bureau of Mines, the Wa r Production Board, 
the Tariff Commission or some other governmental agency already has 
the required information. Not only does this procedure save government 
and industry considerable amounts of time and money, but it frequently 
gets the information much more rapidly than could be done by sending 
out an additional questionnaire. 
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The third function of the Questionnaire Branch is to inquire into the 
mutual interests of other government agencies in the information which 
may be needed by the Office of Price Administration. If, for example, 
we need to make a study of the supply of copper scrap, in view of the 
bearing of supply on price, it is evident that, for other reasons, the Wa r 
Production Board and the Bureau of Mines will have an interest in the 
same problem. In such a case, the Questionnaire Branch would determine 
the interests of the other agencies and arrange to serve them either by 
the proposed questionnaire or by some modification thereof. 
Th e fourth function of the Questionnaire Branch is in many ways 
its most important one. It has the power to approve or disapprove, for the 
entire Office of Price Administration, the issuance of questionnaires and 
report forms. The exercising of the power to disapprove saves industry 
from an even greater burden of government paper work than now exists. 
It has long ceased to be particularly funny to say that people in business 
are much too busy getting out government reports to pay any attention 
to getting out the goods. The burden has become enormously heavy,, 
and it is not becoming any lighter. The Questionnaire Branch is aware 
of that problem, and I venture to say that more questionnaires have been 
suppressed than have been permitted to go out. The existence of the veto 
power is also a strong weapon for compelling simplicity and economy in 
the questionnaires which are approved. 
Th e fifth function of the Questionnaire Branch is the clearance of 
questionnaires with the Division of Statistical Standards of the Bureau of 
the Budget. The ultimate veto on questionnaires throughout the govern­
ment belongs with the Bureau of the Budget, and for a very good reason. 
For example, someone recently proposed the use of a little report form. 
In appearance it was not formidable; it asked only a few questions; most 
of them could be answered by properly placed check-marks. The first 
concern of the Questionnaire Branch, however, was not with form and 
content, but with personnel and equipment for handling the returns. They 
wanted to know how much the project was going to cost. The proponents 
had given no thought to those matters. They knew that they wanted 
the information but they had not concerned themselves about the cost. 
Rough estimates indicated that that one small questionnaire would cost 
about four million dollars. It is thus entirely fitting that the Bureau of 
the Budget should have the final say on questionnaires. Each questionnaire 
involves the expenditure of funds, and for enonomy's sake the several 
information-gathering agencies of the government must be coordinated. 
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Finally, for certain types of questionnaires, the Questionnaire Branch 
carries on the functions of tabulating and reporting on the results. 
Our machinery for information-gathering also involves the extensive 
use of resources of other government agencies—to name only a few of 
them, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Tariff Commission, the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Bituminous 
Coal Commission, the Bureau of Mines, the Treasury Procurement 
Division, the Department of Commerce, especially the Bureau of the 
Census, and many others. 
A word or two about the general financial reporting plan will 
conclude my remarks. Doubtless many of you already have received 
Forms A and B, either as members of the American Institute of Account­
ants, or as the representatives of business enterprises. The forms are the 
result of a period of incubation, extending over a year or more, and are 
•our idea of what we have to have in order to carry out the congressional 
requirement to take a look at costs and profits. These forms are going 
out to something like 20,000 American corporations in the fields of manu­
facturing, mining, construction and distribution, and we hope that the 
results will be of very considerable value. 
Always after I finish talking about the OfEce of Price Administra­
tion, I find that I have left many questions unanswered. Some of them 
I can anticipate. I shall do so very briefly: 
The first one is: Isn't the information-gathering activity of the OPA 
rather burdensome on industry? The answer is, of course, in the affirma­
tive. The only rejoinder is that, obviously, if the OPA is to carry out its 
function, it must have reliable information. You would not want us to 
fix prices without knowing anything about the commodities, about the 
state of the industries, about the probable effects of our actions. There 
is only one way of making those determinations, and that is to get the 
information, and the only good source of information is industry and trade. 
The second question which is always asked is this: Isn't the General 
Maximum Price Regulation going to be rather hard on some sellers, no 
matter what your machinery for relief is? Th e answer to that, of course, 
is yes. It is hardly possible that so sweeping a regulation could avoid 
causing hardships. The only consolation is the hope that the good of 
the many will recompense the sacrifices of the few. 
The third question is: Will price control prevent inflation? The 
answer to that is: No, not by itself. The other six parts of the President's 
;anti-inflation program are equally necessary. Th e other six parts, some of 
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which were mentioned by the Chairman, are: credit control, put into 
effect by regulations of the Federal Reserve Board; wage control; tax­
ation; the control of farm prices; the mopping up of excess purchasing 
power by the purchase of wa r bonds; and rationing. 
T h  e final question is: Wil l price control work? 
T  o answer that would require me to be a prophet, which I do not 
pretend to be. I know one thing, however, and that is that whereas 
hundreds of reasons can be adduced to show that price control will 
not work, there is only one reason why it will work, and that is because 
it must work. 
CHAIRMAN DAVERIO: Thank you, Dr. Taggart. 
I would like to comment upon the remark that Dr. Taggart made regarding 
the burdensomeness of reports. I happen to know a little bit about that; and 
I want to assure him that he is not being misled when he is told that it is a 
tremendous burden upon industry. I am very happy to know, however, that he 
has some type of machinery set up to limit, at least to some extent, the question­
naires that are coming out to us. I think more effort probably could be spent 
on that particular division of work, and I think Dr. Taggart and his associates 
would do a real service to business if they would be even a little more strict 
than they are at the present time. 
Those of us in industry have one primary objective in mind—to win the 
war. We are going to do it by production. Many of us are working extra 
hours every day. In our particular company we are engaged in setting up 
several new accounting organizations to handle the new manufacturing plants 
which we expect to put into production within the next six or seven months, 
and that is taking about all the energy we can spare. I can assure Dr. Taggart 
that we in industry will greatly appreciate any relief he can give us from reports 
and questionnaires which in some cases seem to us to be needless. 
The next topic, gentlemen, is another one of the keystone programs of 
the present administration, and that is "Profit Limitation." You heard a little 
discussion—very informal—about that this morning. 
Profit limitation involves something that is very serious. The President 
and the Secretary of the Treasury realize that the wheels of production will not 
run too smoothly unless they are lubricated by some incentive, as Mr, Stempf so 
ably explained this morning. The President recognized this in his recent 
Fireside Chat, when he said, "Profits must be taxed to the utmost limit consistent 
with continued production." Those few words are significant, because he realizes, 
as well as anybody else that the profit motive must be retained, even though 
restricted and limited. Business men are patriotic, there is no question about 
that, but those men in industry who are responsible for constructing new war 
plants, with stockholders' money, must answer to the stockholders for each 
expansion program. Secretary Morganthau also recognized the need of the profit 
motive, in his testimony before the Ways and Means Committee a short time 
ago, when he presented his 1942 tax program, including excess profits tax of 75 
per cent, and a normal tax of 5 5 per cent. It so happens that particular program 
would tax some of the income of some corporations to the extent of 88^4 P  e  r 
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cent, leaving to the corporation only n j  4 per cent. The Secretary suggested 
that Congress, in the new tax law, provide for a post-war refund of, say, 8 per 
cent, so that the maximum tax on this particular additional income will not exceed 
80 per cent. 
Well, I don't think the Ways and Means Committee has voted upon that 
particular proposal yet, but when it does, we are hopeful that, in the interest of 
the war effort, it will recognize the problem and give it some consideration in 
drafting the first 1942 tax bill. 
The gentleman who is to speak upon "Profit Limitation" this afternoon is 
well qualified to discuss the matter, both from an academic and from a practical 
business standpoint. He is a graduate of Northwestern University, and a Certified 
Public Accountant in the State of Illinois. From 1925 to 1929 he taught at 
Northwestern University and at the Ohio State University. Following this, he 
went to the National Association of Cost Accountants as Assistant Secretary. From 
1932 to 1935 he was associated with James O. McKinsey and Company. He 
then went to Kroger Grocery and Baking Company, for three years, as Assistant 
General Manager of Operations. Then, for three years following, he wab Director 
of Personnel for Marshall Field and Company. From 1940 to the present time 
he has been associated, as a partner, with McKinsey, Kearney and Company, 
engaged in management consultation work in Chicago. 
It gives me great pleasure to present to you this afternoon, Mr. Mason 
Smith, who will discuss for you the subject of "Profit Limitation." Mr. Smith. 
PROFIT LIMITATION 
By MASON SMITH 
Partner, McKinsey, Kearney and Gomfanyy Chicago 
Need for Consideration 
The daily press is replete with references to priorities, ceilings, re­
straints, and rules under which American business is attempting to operate 
to achieve a maximum and risky production effort. One section of this 
general subject falls in the realm of our discussion this afternoon. Like 
many of the matters referred to above, this subject raises problems, the 
solutions for which seem relatively easy in the layman's eyes, but which 
we as business men know are much more difficult. The subject of "profit 
limitation," therefore, deserves the consideration of this meeting for reasons 
of the following type: 
1. There has already been, through the operation of the tax laws, 
a considerable amount of profit limitation in force under existing legislation. 
Tax legislation is now up for consideration and revision, and this subject 
is but a part of such consideration. 
2. The amount of profit earned out of the war effort is of interest 
to the Government, because it represents a sizable source of income 
through taxation to help finance the war program. 
3. Any discussion of profit limitation is of immediate interest to the 
individual business man, because he has depended upon profit in building 
his own financial policies. 
From the point of view, therefore, of immediate concern this subject 
deserves our consideration. 
In addition to its interest for us as a short-run matter, we are con­
cerned, also, because of its long-range effects. For example, we are 
interested first in the effect of small profits on the future of private 
enterprise. We are interested, secondly, from the point of view of the 
maintenance and development of the manufacturing plant and facilities 
of the nation, and finally, we are interested from the point of view of its 
effect on the capital structure of American business, which will be required 
to wrestle with the problems which follow the war. 
Factors to be Considered 
There are many approaches which we could make to a problem of this 
kind, and most of them might form the basis of an interesting discussion. 
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However, we cannot take the time here this afternoon to consider this 
subject from all the points of view under which it could be considered. 
For example, we could spend a pleasant time in arithmetical exercises point­
ing out the application of a series of assumed bases of profit limitation 
in companies having varying capital structures and handling contracts of 
varying degrees of risk and length of life. If such an approach would not 
please you, we could spend some time in discussing the political aspects of 
a program of profit limitation. This being an election year and the subject 
before us being one of great political significance to the masses of voters, 
we might turn this meeting into a good old-fashioned debate upon the 
political aspects alone. Thirdly, we might examine a number of proposals 
that have been made, some of which have been reported upon in various 
types of services which come to each of you from day to day. I propose 
to do none of these. I propose to answer few if any questions. If, in the 
course of these humble remarks, we can clarify and challenge our thinking 
on this subject along somewhat broad lines, perhaps the afternoon will have 
been well spent. 
I believe there are a few basic factors which we ought to consider 
carefully before we plunge into a discussion of this subject. You will notice 
the topic is "profit limitation." Th e first of these factors, therefore, which 
seems worthy of discussion is, "What do we mean by profit." W e will take 
that matter up later. 
The second of these factors which I believe merits consideration is the 
traditional function of profit in a capitalistic system. In other words, all of 
you business men may have thought of profits in a variety of ways, which 
• we will discuss later. 
The third set of factors which I believe deserves consideration is 
certain basic assumptions, which, for the purpose of this discussion, I am 
adopting. These assumptions are: 
1. That the requirements of the war economy are of a passing 
nature. Since the subject of profit limitation is but one part of the general 
subject of financing the war, much of what we may think, do or say will 
have little interest once the peace has been achieved. 
2. That one of the basic things for which we as Americans are 
fighting is the preservation of a workable system of private enterprise. If 
we adopt any other assumption it seems to me that we haven't much to talk 
about. 
3. That there exists in the economic cycle created by a war the 
need for preservation of as sound a relationship as possible between the 
amount of capital provided for a business through owners or suppliers of 
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venture capital and through creditors. You will notice that I said the 
economic cycle created by war, because we have, broadly, not only the need 
of financing the war but also the need for providing a financial cushion 
for the reconstruction period to follow. If you will accept with me, 
therefore, these three basic assumptions, at least we will be in the same 
universe of discourse, insofar as this meeting is concerned. 
Profits 
Profits are defined by Mr. Webster as follows: "The excess of 
returns over expenditure in a given transaction or series of transactions. 
Excess of income over expenditure, as in a business or any of its depart­
ments, during a given period of time. The word profit includes any 
benefit or advantage accruing from the management, use, or sale of 
property, or from the carrying" on of any process of production, or from 
the conduct of business." 
W e as accountants and business men know that there is considerably 
more to this definition than meets the eye. We know that when we talk 
of profits we are talking of an amount which is a combined computation 
of fact and estimate. We know that the only time any business enterprise 
can be truly said to have made a profit is at the time of its dissolution. All 
profits for interim periods are of necessity estimated to some degree- W e 
know, further, that when we speak of profit we are speaking of a relation­
ship. Tha t relationship may be to invested capital or to sales. Our 
experiences in the utility business over the past thirty years have shown 
some of the difficulties of thinking clearly about profits in relation to invested 
capital. W e are somewhat more clear in our thinking when dealing with 
profits as relating to selling prices. Most of the present discussion of profit 
limitation at its present stage of development, however, deals with the 
relation of profit to total cost value of specific contracts. It would be 
academic to take your time to go through the various factors which make 
such a consideration untrustworthy from the point of view of such matters 
as relative risk, relative length of time, the amount of capital supplied to 
finance the contract by owners, etc., etc., etc. For the purpose of our 
discussion, therefore, we are thinking of profits in the somewhat traditional 
sense as performing the following functions: 
1. The provision of a sufficient incentive to attract venture capital 
into business. 
2. T  o provide funds for retention and reinvestment in maintaining 
and/or expanding a business. 
3. T  o provide a cash return to owners in the form of dividends. 
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One further function may appear to some of you in the provision of 
funds for the retirement of debt, but I am including that under point 2. 
A war program, of course, upsets many traditions, and surely some of the 
traditional functions of profits are upset. It seems to me, however, that 
more emphasis could well be placed on some of these functions, even in a 
war economy, than are now being placed upon them in the discussions which 
are coming out for popular consumption. 
War Program 
Let us consider the war program, and its financial requirements, in 
terms of current needs and long term consequences, and see if the role of 
profits can be properly placed therein. Th e basic requirement of the war 
program is production. We have all seen instances of greatly expanded 
production by companies who are not financially able to handle the trans­
action. W e have seen plants which, two years ago, employed two or three 
hundred men, and are now employing between two and three thousand. 
W e have seen inventories jump many fold. This of course all goes back, 
in most instances, to the basic requirement of the war program—namely, 
production. 
The financial requirements of this production program are broadly of 
two types: 
1. Expanded plant and physical facilities. 
2. Expanded working capital. 
Since the war program is, we hope, temporary and transitory in nature, 
and since many of the facilities provided range all the way from those 
having no utility after the war to those of high transferability to peace 
pursuits, this financing is often done at great risk. Traditionally, financing 
of projects requiring great risk has been done by going concerns out of 
earnings, or by new concerns through the sale of securities of an equity 
nature. It seems to be the belief of the present administration, not only now 
but for the past eight years, that risks are reduced by being spread and 
underwritten by the Government. Hence, our war program is set up, 
fundamentally, on a basis of expecting little or no provision of venture 
capital by owners, either through the sale of new securities or reinvestment 
of earnings, and relatively large provision through loans directly or 
indirectly provided by government agencies. Th e inevitable result, there­
fore, of such a program is to reduce the relative stake in private enterprise 
which is held by venture capital, and to increase the relative stake held by 
creditor capital. 
If we cling to one of our basic assumptions that we want to come 
through this war with a workable system of private enterprise preserved, 
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it is obvious that such a program will have great difficulty in providing 
the required capital structure of ample safety to achieve this result. It is 
typical of depressions, and we may assume there will be some kind of 
depression after the war, that businesses tend to fall into the hands of 
creditors as they exhaust their ownership capital and fail to meet the 
requirements of creditor contracts. This risk is present in our present 
situation and a mere spreading of it through government agencies does not 
eliminate it, but merely obscures it in the people's eyes. We may expect, 
therefore, if we continue on our present basis that we will find ourselves 
after the war with such a thin margin of capital provided by owners that 
the process of "creditors taking-over" will be greatly accelerated. Since 
the creditor, ultimately, is the Government, we need not emphasize the 
«nd result of such a program. 
This may be a rather black picture and you may be throwing up your 
mental hands at this point and attempting to erase it from the slate.
submit that if we do this we cannot come through this ordeal with sufficient 
•stability and permanence in our American system to preserve the system 
of private enterprise for which we have been fighting, at least in part. But 
you may ask, what has all this to do with profit limitation? I would like 
to devote the rest of our time to that exploration. 
It is evident that there is and has been a need for a greater amount 
and a greater margin of owner capital in American business. Owner capital 
will come only if it is available and, according to Mr. Henderson, it now is 
in considerable abundance and only if there is some expectancy of safety 
of principal, and some earning power. You may find that the present 
state of security markets is ample evidence that new venture securities 
could not be sold. Perhaps they could not under the present rules of the 
game, which have increased the difficulty of such sale during the past 
•several years, but even if no new venture securities were sold, a substantial 
amount of the financing required for the war effort could be provided 
through reinvested earnings. The present plan, however, through high 
taxation, draws off these earnings and depletes the capital of business, 
requiring either the introduction of new venture capital or new creditor 
capital. If some way could be found, therefore, by which it would be 
possible to reinvest earnings in the war effort, it is obvious that, while the 
tax income of the Government would go down, so, also, would its needs 
for lendable funds which it is securing from taxation. 
I do not pose as a tax authority or a tax expert. In fact, I know very 
little about present tax laws, for the simple reason that I consider taxation 
a matter that you had better know all about or nothing about. A little 
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learning in this field is a dangerous thing, if you are working as a pro­
fessional man for clients who have tax problems. I offer the following-
program, therefore, in the hope that it has some merit from the practical 
point of view of providing funds for financing the war effort, on a basis-
which would tend to cushion the aftermath of a peace reorganization to 
follow. I base the proposed program on the following: 
1. A very large proportion of the country's plants is now devoted 
to war production. Thousands of firms are or shortly will be deriving all 
of their profits substantially from such war effort. 
2. Th e earnings of these companies at the present time are devoted 
mainly to: 
a. Paying high taxes which are, in turn, loaned back to industry by the 
Government as creditor capital. 
b. Retained in the business to help internally finance the war effort. 
c. Retained to provide some reserves to help the business survive after the 
war. 
d. To pay modest dividends. 
3. Th e present tax laws do not make sufficient discrimination be­
tween earnings realized from the war effort and from so-called normal 
pursuits, primarily from the point of view of the use which the business 
makes of these earnings. Neither the average-earnings basis nor the 
capital-invested basis, upon which excess profits are computed, sufficiently 
discriminate between these two types of profits. 
4. If the tax law now coming up for consideration and passage could,, 
in some way, recognize the essential difference in the source and use of 
earnings between the war effort and the non-war effort, there could be 
a provision for the retention of earnings with adequate tax relief for those 
companies engaged in the war effort, thus reducing the necessity for 
inordinate amounts of creditor capital. 
5. Such a program, of course, would require the adoption of the 
necessary set of rules, regulations, and principles to guide the taxing 
authorities in providing a judicial discrimination between earnings derived 
from the war effort and those derived from so-called normal business. 
You may say that such a set of rules and regulations would be difficult of 
interpretation and application. I suggest that if this stumps you, consider 
the confusion which is now arising over the recent price-ceiling order of 
the Office of Price Administration. 
6. This provision in the law could be handled in such a way that it 
would tend to drive funds from non-war to war industries. One of these 
provisions might be a penalty which would tend to place a limit on profits 
above those needed to finance the war effort, provided that war contracts. 
56 ACCOUNTING INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 
contained adequate safeguards in their allowed-cost sections to reimburse 
business for the extra strain that is being placed on plants to turn out war 
materials. 
7. This program assumes, of course, that adequate controls would 
be imposed to keep any company from making and keeping exhorbitant 
profits from the war effort. It would, therefore, be necessary to include 
the following types of controls: 
a. In the case of materials made for the war, for which there is of 
necessity little or no competitive bidding or for which there are a limited number 
of producers, specific limitations of profits would be required. These limitations 
should take into account such matters as relative risk, length of time and form 
of contract, the amount of funds supplied by owners and by creditors, etc. It 
seems to me that unless such factors are taken into account, it would be quite 
possible for a company with a relatively low capitalization to earn quite exhorb­
itant profits for the owners, yet earn but a limited rate of profit on the total 
contract. Another company, taking that same contract but having a large owner­
ship equity, would earn rather modest profits for the owners. 
b. The profits earned from the war effort or from normal business and 
retained by business to prosecute the war effort would of course represent addi­
tional net worth at the close of the war. It might be considered unsound to allow 
such businesses to retain all of that surplus after the war. I submit, however, that 
it is not any more unsound to do that than to allow the earners of high wages to 
build up personal capital funds to pay off mortgages on homes and in other ways 
substantially to improve their financial condition solely as the result of war-time 
bidding for their services. In either event, the stockholders, in one case, or the 
wage earner, in the second case, are being subsidized by the returns made from 
war production. 
c. It would probably be necessary to include, therefore, in such a proposal 
some program of control over these war-produced surpluses. Broadly speaking, 
such a program should include a provision to allow the corporation to utilize that 
part of the surpluses necessary to re-establish its business on a peacetime footing. 
I am referring to such matters as the cost of changing product designs, due to 
obsolescence created by wartime inventiveness or the lapse of time, the rehabilita­
tion of dealer and distributor organizations, where these are required, and the 
shifts of personnel from wartime to peacetime pursuits. This provision, also, 
might allow the use of such surplus above that required for rehabilitation for the 
purpose of the development of new products or services. It is obvious that the 
war has created and will create new materials, and new uses for old materials; 
that it has stimulated the invention of items, some of which have broad peacetime 
applications. In my opinion, one of the major contributions which American 
business can make to the peacetime recovery will be the aggressive development 
and promotion of such new ventures. Financing of such development should be 
left, I believe, to as large a degree as possible, in the hands of private business. 
It may be argued, however, that surpluses left after the rehabilitation job is done 
should be subject to tax to provide the funds for the Government for its many 
requirements of general rehabilitation. 
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Advantages of Proposed Program 
War is a risky business. No program calling for the financing of it 
can eliminate risks entirely. I believe, however, that the proposed program 
has the following advantages: 
1. It tends to reduce the gross amount of the Government debt, 
because it provides financial requirements through venture capital instead 
of governmentally loaned or underwritten creditor capital. There is no 
question in my mind concerning the desirability of the reduction of 
Government debt. 
2. It would require, obviously, a more general participation in 
financing the war effort. The present and proposed method of taxation 
is, in effect, a very definite type of profit limitation. In fact, it acts to drain 
off working capital in such large amounts that many small businesses 
cannot live without unsound borrowing. Such a program would require 
some lowering of reductions on individual incomes and might require a 
sales tax, both of which would be socially beneficial, and would tend to 
increase public consciousness of the hardships of the war effort. 
3. Such an enlarged participation in the war financing would act as 
a more effective brake on inflation than any plan of pure profit limitation. 
Large excess spendable funds in the hands of the masses, coupled with 
the shrinkage of available consumer goods, presents a most serious infla­
tionary threat. Such a threat cannot be materially lessened without some 
plan of enlisting it in the war effort. 
4. The plan would tend to apply the inventive and managerial brains 
of American business more assiduously to war production. Conditions of 
the past several years, largely because of the difficulty of building small 
businesses in the American way of reinvestment of earnings and the 
sale of venture securities, have definitely stunted the inherent inventiveness 
and developmental powers of hundreds of small business men. I could give 
you many examples, but I am sure that your own experience will provide 
you with an ample number. In short, I believe that if these small business 
men could feel that the fruits of their efforts in producing for the war at 
great risk could, at least in large part, be retained by them to pay off 
loans during the war, and to help them build useful peacetime businesses 
and provide a broad base for employment after the war, they would be 
much more ready to enter upon the wartime expansion which many of 
them are capable of managing. 
I talked to one small businessman, not later than Tuesday night this 
week. He is so far behind that he doesn't know which end he is on. He 
said, "How do I go about it to supply the necessary working capital? I 
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can get the plant, but I have to put out all my chips to get the working 
capital to finance this war production, and when I make the money, who 
gets it? I don't. I don't get enough to do a decent job on my loan." 
Incidentally that brings up another point. If you get around in 
business and see different companies, you hear time after time, "Well, why 
not spend the money? It's a 20-cent dollar, it's a 30-cent dollar, it's a 
40-cent dollar." Sloppy thinking, bad thinking. You cannot run businesses 
thinking about expenses in that way. Why are we thinking about them in 
that way? It is very obvious. 
5. Th e plan would tend to create corporate surpluses which would 
be available, in part, for two general purposes: 
a. For financing the job of business revival and rehabilitation after 
the war. 
b. For financing the job of business expansion or for a source of 
taxes to give the Government required funds for general rehabilitation. 
Conclusion 
We have examined the role of profits as we have traditionally known 
them and have stated their place in private enterprise. We have reviewed 
briefly the present program of war financing which is based on the funda­
mental assumption that the Government must take away in taxes and then 
lend back to business. We have indicated how this plan will lead, inevitably, 
to an unsound post-war financial condition, because of the diluted equity 
of owners and the expanded equity of creditors. W e have indicated a way, 
in the proposed tax law, to limit profits from non-war industries and non-
war parts of industries, and to put a premium on retained earnings for war 
work, thus tending to drive funds towards that end. W e believe that a 
provision of this type deserves more fundamental consideration than the 
matter of profit limitation taken alone. We think that such a provision, 
properly applied, can provide the funds for some significant part of the war 
effort, on a basis which will not put us in the position of winning the war 
only to lose the peace of private enterprise. 
CHAIRMAN DAVERIO: I would like to express our appreciation to the two 
speakers of this afternoon for their excellent contributions to the Institute 
program. 
Let us proceed, now, with the question and discussion period. Either of the 
speakers is open to any questions, suggestions or comments you may wish to make. 
DISCUSSION 
M R  . HARRY E. HOWELL (Controller, The Grinnell Co., Providence, R. I . )  : 
In reference to Mr. Mason Smith's talk, I haven't any questions, because I think 
he said he would not answer any, but I do feel that these gentlemen here probably 
have not made up their minds on a matter as new and as important as this. I 
would like to take the position of the devil's advocate and point out that some of 
the assumptions upon which Mason has based his presentation have already been 
settled on a distinctly opposite basis. I think the American people, before and 
after we entered the war, and on a number of occasions have expressed, along 
with many other peoples in the world, the thought that if we ever came into some 
cataclysm of this kind again that we did not want private enterprise, any small 
groups, or large groups for that matter, to profit—to use popular language, "No 
war millionaires." I think it was realized that war brings disaster and loss to 
everybody. The fact that private capital is not being invited into the expansion 
of facilities for production of war goods is not so much the result of the tax 
plan as it is the result, I believe, of the expressed will of the people being carried 
out by Congress. 
Now the question that interests me so much is: Why is it that stability in a 
post-war period is attributed purely to financial strength? As accountants we 
know that probably the reserve so loudly called for would not be funded and 
would not be financial strength, but book reserves, but even assuming we had 
the financial strength, I question whether it is wise for business to say: You leave 
it to us, let us have some profits and we will guarantee this transition from the 
war to the post-war period and we will see that there is no unemployment. I 
believe it is unwise, because nobody can measure the extent of that job. 
I think that what will make private enterprise survive this post-war period 
is an environment which is satisfactory to it—one in which the people will 
believe that private enterprise is the right thing to have—and that environment 
will be much more healthy, much more satisfactory, if business is able to show 
that it pursued the war effort loyally and patriotically and did not make war 
millions out of it. 
We have seen the extent to which business was criticized because it was 
held responsible for failure to find employment during the depression; I believe 
it is a terrific undertaking to assume such a responsibility in exchange for retention 
of profits now. I do not know what the answer is, but it seems to me that there 
will be such terrific dislocations of markets, products and world competition that 
we may need new concepts of business and government financing; that one step 
would be for businessmen to permit the Federal government to do what they do 
themselves—that is, forget to balance their budgets once in a while—in other 
words, to abandon the continual drive to balance the budget annually. I believe 
one method of doing it might well be to let the debt at the end of the war stay 
frozen for a period of years and immediately slash all taxes to a very nominal 
amount, and let that tax program stay fixed for a reasonably long period of years. 
That will encourage the return of capital to business, and it might encourage 
it into new lines, new channels, and new inventions. 
S9 
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I feel that we cannot succeed, in most of the decisions that we are making 
today, if we ignore two fundamental premises. It is very easy to argue about 
these matters and bring about an even balance of argument if we ignore two 
fundamental principles of which we must never lose sight. The first is that 
everything we are doing today has solely one purpose—that is to win the war 
quickly and completely. The second is that the manner in which the war is to 
be won was decided by the people before we entered the war: first of all, that 
there would be a practically universal conscription of man power; and second, 
that those who were left, corporations or individuals, were not going to get any 
extra profits out of this war over and above what they made under ordinary 
peacetime occupations. 
I think that if we keep those principles in mind, we might get a little differ­
ent point of view, possibly, than the one which has been expressed. 
M R  . SMITH: It is obviously a sound avowed purpose that no one is to 
profit out of this war, but we seem to be a little late in applying that purpose 
to a couple of elements in cost. I have been hiring some men recently for a 
client. I hired one for $9,000 a year, who is worth about $325 a month in 
peacetime. I had to hire a works manager, and a man who had never made 
more than $12,000 in his life asked for $30,000. 
If we are going to set the rules that no one is to make excessive war profits, 
let's not leave the lid off on wages, salaries, and farm prices, and then adopt tax 
laws and take steps which I believe are fundamentally going to leave many 
businesses pretty close to bankruptcy because of the very high creditor equity 
which will exist after the war. 
I have some figures here, for instance, revealing trends that have just started 
to show a little in the published figures. Here are three companies picked at 
random, at the end of 1937 and the end of 1941: 
Company A—percentage of creditor equity at the end of 1937, 9 per cent; 
at the end of 1941, 20 per cent. Current ratio had gone from 8 to 1, to 
3.5 to I. 
Company C—percentage of creditor equity in 1937, 7 per cent; in 1941, 
18 per cent. The current ratio had gone from 8 to 1, to 3.8 to 1. 
Company D—the percentage of creditor equity at the end of 1937, 37 per 
cent; at the end of 1941, 58 per cent (the company will be in a lot further 
than that, up to 75 per cent, before very long). The current ratio for 1937, 
1.9 to 1; for 1941, 2.5 to I. 
It seems to me that a loan is a contract; when you do not pay it, somebody 
walks in and takes over. It may not be a direct government loan, but back of the 
scenes we all know what happened in 1932-33. Who bailed out the banks? The 
Government. Who will bail them out again? The Government. 
As I see it, you have something really very definite to preserve here, if 
you can, and it can be done without profiteering at all. Put it this way: Here 
is a company I happen to know about; it is engaged in the production of essentials 
for the war, which the Government buys for our own armed forces and for lend-
lease. The Government wants it to expand its operations. The company paid 
the Government $6,000,000 in taxes at the end of 1941; it is going to have 
to go out and borrow some money anyway, to finance working capital require­
ments, but it is going to have to borrow $6,000,000 more than it might have had 
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to borrow if it had not paid the tax. Those funds are going to be used for the 
prosecution of the war, to finance the company's inventory, not the plant.
submit that it is much more healthy for that company to finance its increased 
production with $6,000,000 of retained earnings than to be forced to borrow 
$6,000,000. But to follow the illustration through, suppose the war went on 
for three years, and it retained $6,000,000 a year for three years, it would 
have $18,000,000 in surplus. Let's assume that the war stops in November. 
If it does, they are in bad shape because their inventories are seasonally high 
at that time. When lend-lease and military requirements are removed, prices 
will probably drop. If they do, that $ 18,000,000 wouldn't last long in absorbing 
the inventory loss. But let's assume that it takes only $12,000,000 of the 
$18,000,000 to reestablish that business and absorb that loss; they would have 
$6,000,000 left. They can either have $6,000,000 syphoned off in taxes for 
the general good at that time, or they can take that $6,000,000 to promote 
the sale of some new food product which is definitely for the public good. 
Suppose, for example, that they found out how to make a dehydrated soup which 
could save consumers money and cut transportation costs. I would let them have 
part of that $6,000,000 to develop that product and put it over. You would 
say: No, the war subsidized that development. I would reply that it subsidized 
the payment of mortgages on the homes of workers who make the soup. I don't 
see any difference. 
CHAIRMAN DAVERIO: Are there any more questions or contributions? 
M R  . GEORGE R. WHIT E (Owens-Illinois Glass Co., Toledo): I would 
like to ask Dr. Taggart this question: If consumers are going to have considerably 
more income, as they probably will, and fewer places to spend it, then, as I 
believe many English economists feel, we are going to have to have rationing. 
DR . TAGGART: That is an easy question to answer. Of course we are. 
There isn't any doubt about it. We are already rationing certain commodities 
where scarcities already have attained a high level, and there is very, very little 
doubt but that rationing in some form or other will be extended over a consider­
able area of necessary consumer goods. 
I doubt if we shall ever ration certain commodities which are common 
parts of our every-day existence—we will simply let the supplies run out and 
then forget about them—but the commodities that are essential are going to have 
to be rationed as soon as the condition arises that calls for rationing. That is one 
of the President's seven points, as a matter of fact. Without that, the development 
of the Black Markets would be even more inevitable—if there are degrees of 
inevitability—than is true even with rationing. 
M R  . A. J. BUCKENMEYER (Surface Combustion Co., Toledo): Mr. Taggart, 
what is the price basis for custom-built industrial machines, each machine being 
in the same class, but different as to size, shape, use and design? I might add, if 
the procedure is to set sound practice by a markup on estimated cost, will the same 
markup ratios result in compliance? 
DR . TAGGART: The custom-built machinery industry, as well as other 
custom-built industries, presents very difficult problems of price control. That is 
recognized in the case of machinery by a special regulation which is intended to 
solve the problems of prices in that area. 
The second part of your question, I think I failed to get. 
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M R  . BUCKENMEYER: I said that if the procedure is to set the ceiling price 
by marking up estimated cost—that is the usual procedure on that type of 
equipment—would using the same markup ratios result in compliance? Is that the 
method that would be used, and if that is true, how about the labor element in the 
costs? 
D R  . TAGGART: The general provisions of the machinery regulation take the 
manufacturer back to his October I to 15 level as to material costs, labor costs 
and profit margins. The formula is intended to apply the October 1 to 15 profit 
level to the direct costs as of that date. That sounds like carrying the machinery 
industry back pretty far. However, a considerable portion of the machinery 
industry has been covered by orders and freeze letters of the Office of Price Ad­
ministration since that date, so that the regulation simply carries forward a method 
of pricing which has been established over a number of months. To the extent, 
of course, that the October 1 to 15 basis is an impossible one, some method of 
relief will be available. 
CHAIRMAN DAVERIO: If I may, I would like to offer a few comments on 
this question of profit limitation. We haven't heard much about the subject I 
am about to mention, because the problem was created by a comparatively recent 
piece of Federal legislation. Whether you are a private accountant or a public 
accountant, it is going to be of tremendous importance to you within the near 
future. This particular legislation was in the form of a rider attached to and 
made a part of a $19 billion appropriation bill, signed by the President on April 
28, and concerned the subject of re-negotiation of war contracts. It will not 
affect small business much, because it has to do with contracts in excess of 
$100,000, between private contractors and the United States government— 
either the Department of War, the Department of the Navy or the Maritime 
Commission. 
For the benefit of those of you who have not encountered it, I will present 
merely a thumb-nail sketch of the provisions of this particular rider. I think 
you will readily appreciate the problems involved. 
One: It is limited in its application to contracts of $100,000 or over, upon 
which final payment had not been made by April 28, 1942, the date the bill 
was signed. 
Two: Those contracts subject to the law, which were executed prior to 
April 28 must be re-negotiated by the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of the 
Navy or the Maritime Commission and the contractor, if in the opinion of the 
Secretary—Secretary of War, for example—an excessive profit was made by the 
contractor. 
Three: Those government contracts executed subsequent to April 28 must 
contain a re-negotiation clause which provides for the determination of profit 
on that particular contract as soon as reasonably possible. 
Four: The definition of the word "re-negotiation" is most important. 
It is defined as including the fixing of a new contract price by the Secretary,, 
providing he does not arrive at some kind of agreement with the contractor with 
respect to a reduced price. In other words, if you have a contract for a million 
dollars and the Government examiners decide that you make too much profit, 
they can come into your place of business and say, "How about reducing the 
contract price to $900,000." If you say, "I don't think it is right," they can 
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still say, "In our opinion it is right," and that will be it. You will, of course, 
have the right to a court review of their determinations. 
Five: The amount by which the contract price is deemed by the Secretary 
to be excessive may be withheld from the final payments on the contract. If he 
deems $100,000 was the excess in the instance I mentioned, he can withhold 
the last $100,000 payment on the contract. You will then have to sue the 
government for that $100,000 if you feel the retention is unjustifiable and 
prove your case before the courts. If the final payments have been made 
on the contract, then the Secretary is charged with the responsibility of collecting 
the excess from the contractor. 
Six: The Secretary may require the contractor to furnish such financial 
statements as he deems necessary for the determination of the amount of profit 
earned on each contract. This, to a large number of industrial concerns, may 
present a tremendous problem, because their accounting and cost systems do not 
accumulate costs and expenses by contracts. 
Seven: The War Department may use the services of the Treasury 
Department, with the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, which means 
that, more than likely, the Bureau of Internal Revenue will have the task of profit 
determination. 
Eight: The Act is effective for three years after the war is terminated. 
So, gentlemen, there you have a statute which has no definition whatever of 
excessive profits, it has no standard which the Secretary of War can use in 
determining excessive profits. It leaves the contractor likewise in a state of 
hopeless suspense. 
We in industry have a tough problem, because, if this bill is continued in 
effect, we may not know our true position as to profits on government contracts 
until three years after the war is over. 
You public accountants, charged with the responsibility of issuing certified 
statements, likewise, have a tough problem. 
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This is indeed a very happy occasion for the College of Commerce. 
As I stand here and look over this room I see the faces of many men who 
have been here to a long succession of Institutes on Accounting. It is 
very gratifying indeed to see you back again. Then, as I look over the 
room, I also see many new faces, and I profess I hope that your stay 
here will have been profitable and pleasant and that you, too, will come 
back again and again. 
There is another reason, too, why the College is particularly happy 
this evening, and that is because the two gentlemen on my right are my 
immediate predecessors in the deanship in this College—Dr. Hagerty, the 
first dean, and his successor, Professor Ruggles. The homecoming of 
Professor Ruggles, and the presence of Dr. Hagerty, and of all these 
good friends makes us very happy indeed. 
I well realize the many burdens that lie on you men these days.
know of the tremendous pressures under which you are having to work, 
with an enlarged job on the one hand and limited personnel on the other, 
and I suppose you are involved in the very difficult task of trying to induct 
newcomers into your staffs and to make accountants out of them in too 
short a period of time. 
All of which suggests a story which I heard recently, of a man 
working in a war plant, who was required to work to very close dimensions. 
He was very much impressed with the fineness of the work which he was 
doing; he met a friend on the street and he said,  " I am working in such-
and-such a war plant, and do you know, we have to work to very close 
tolerances. Just today I was working on a job in which I was required 
to keep within a tolerance of two-ten-thousandths of an inch." And then 
he said to this fellow, "Do you realize how small a ten-thousandth of an 
inch is?" 
And the fellow said, "  I know it is very small." 
"Well," he said, "about how large do you think a ten-thousandth 
of an inch is?" 
And he said, "  I don't know exactly how large, but how many ten-
thousandths of an inch are there in an inch?" 
6? 
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And the other fellow said, "Oh I don't know exactly, but there 
must be millions of them." 
Well, I suppose you are having your troubles. This man will have 
to take that fellow off the street and try to make a mechanic of him, and 
I suppose you people will have to wrestle with newcomers on your staffs, 
to whom the multiplication table is a weird and wonderful thing. You 
are all having a lot of trouble; you are all very busy, and it is especially 
gratifying that you will come back and see us and spend some time with 
us in the midst of your very busy lives. 
And now I have the pleasure of presenting some of the gentlemen 
at this table. 
(The following were introduced:) 
MR. WILLIAM F. MARSH, Past President, The National Association of Cost 
Accountants. 
DR. HARVEY H. DAVIS, Vice-President, The Ohio State University. 
DR. STUART C. MCLEOD, Secretary, The National Association of Cost 
Accountants. 
MR. JACOB B. TAYLOR, Chairman, Department of Accounting, The Ohio 
State University; Director, Department of Liquor Control, The State of 
Ohio. 
DR. JAMES E. HAGERTY, Founder and first Dean of the College of Com­
merce, The Ohio State University 
MR . VICTOR H. STEMPF, Member of the Council of The American Institute 
of Accountants. 
MR. CARL E. STEEB, Business Manager, The Ohio State University. 
MR. HARRY E. HOWELL, President, The National Association of Cost 
Accountants. 
MR. C. HOWARD KNAPP, Past President, The National Association of Cost 
Accountants. 
DR. HERBERT F. TAGGART, President, The American Accounting Associ­
ation; Director of Accounting, Office of Price Administration. 
MR . ABNER J. STARR, The Ohio Society of Certified Public Accountants. 
DR. HOWARD L. BEVIS, President, The Ohio State University. 
Back in 1913? when I was a youngster, a beginner on the faculty of 
this University, there came to the Ohio State University campus a young 
professor by the name of Clyde O. Ruggles. He immediately won his way 
into the hearts of everyone in this community. He was with us for a 
considerable period of years, then found his way to the deanship of the 
School of Commerce at the University of Iowa; then the call of Ohio 
proved too strong and he returned to the Ohio State campus, was first 
Chairman of the Department of Business Organization, and subsequently 
succeeded Doctor Hagerty in the deanship, thus becoming the second dean 
of the College of Commerce and Administration. 
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In 1913 he had rare enthusiasm, great vigor, and a great capacity 
for friendship; in 1942 he has those same enthusiasms, just as much vigor 
as far as I can see, and he still has that great capacity for friendship. 
He left us a few years ago to become a professor in the Graduate 
School of Business Administration at Harvard University. From time to 
time he has come back and given us the pleasure of his presence here. 
Many of us have seen him from time to time, quite frequently, at various 
meetings. He is always the same; he is always our friend, and we hold 
him in the deepest affection. I want to present Dr. Clyde Ruggles, of 
Harvard University, formerly very much of The Ohio State University. 
IGOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 
By DR . C. O. RUGGLES 
Professor of Public Utility Management and Regulation 
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration 
Soldiers Field, Boston^ Massachusetts 
I was asked to discuss with you Government and Business. When 
your Committee gave me the subject, I commented to one of them that 
 could remember when it was Business and Government. There has 
been a marked change since the turn of the century with regard to govern­
ment control of business, as we all have seen. 
I am very much interested in the field of accounting, and always 
have been, because my interest is in a field that calls for a maximum use of 
accounting. My interest has been for a great many years in the public 
service industries, and I do not need to tell a group of accountants that 
that is an area in which regulation will be of very little significance if we do 
not have excellent accounting systems. 
Tonight I want to review with you something of the development of 
what I would call Government and Business. I would like to point out 
how hard it was for Americans to come to government regulation of 
business. For a great many years, down until within fairly recent times, 
the people of this country were very much afraid of any extension of the 
public control of industry and business. The period of marked antipathy 
to government regulation of business extends from about the time we broke 
with the mother country until the panic of 1873 and the depression years 
that followed. An outstanding Supreme Court decision separates these 
two periods, and I will discuss it a little later. 
Another and more recent period—again, if you please, one identified 
with a depression—brought a marked surge forward in regulation. We 
have had in this last period a striking development of government regulation. 
Since the depression of the logo's we have had men in the government 
who have had blueprints for both short-run and long-range planning, 
and they have been ready and anxious to go to almost any length in regi­
menting American business. 
Also, we have had in this same period a great many American business­
men who were, apparently, born a little too soon to be able to adjust them-
•selves to new conditions, and they have stood out against much of this new 
regulation that is fair and reasonable. 
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Both of those groups remind me of the traveling man who was going-
down through Oklahoma, and when the train stopped at the station so long^ 
that he couldn't imagine what it was all about, he got out of the train and 
walked down the platform to the end of the train. There he found that 
the natives of the city had all come in to meet the train and the trainmen 
were visiting with them, and it seemed to be a very jovial neighborhood 
party. He looked across the railroad track and saw a dog sitting over in 
the field with his nose pointed heavenward, howling and howling, and he 
turned to one of the natives and said, "What's the matter with that dog?" 
The man looked at him in disgust and said, "Don't you know?" 
And he said, "No, I don't know." 
"Well," the native said, "he's sitting on a cactus." 
So the traveling man said, "Well, for the love of Mike, why doesn't 
he get off?" 
And the native said, "He wants to howl." 
Unfortunately, there are many persons connected with regulatory 
agencies and likewise in business who do not approach this very important 
problem of the relation of government and business in any other humor 
than that they want to howl. Neither of these groups will make a very 
important contribution toward intelligent and effective regulation of 
business. Given time for a better understanding of the issues involved, 
the American public is quite likely to ignore the extreme position of the 
businessmen who feel that there is no good in regulation and that of the 
regulatory bureaucrats who feel that everything should be regulated to the 
fourth decimal point. 
Now let us go back and trace through that early period to learn how 
hard- it was for Americans to come to the point of accepting any regulation 
of business. 
I do not need to tell you that the colonists who came to America 
came, not only seeking religious freedom, but also because those colonists-
knew Europe and they knew about the economic and political regimentation: 
of Europe. They knew about the degree to which the crowned heads of 
Europe determined when men could enter a certain business or a profes­
sion ; they knew there was no hesitation in exercising those royal privileges 
in dictating the terms under which men could enter an industry-—whether 
it was the high-silk-hat business, or whether it had something to do with 
the necessities of life, made very little difference—it was all governed by 
autocratic rule. 
Regulation of business reached a climax in the 17th Century in 
France, when Colbert took it upon himself to have his personal representa­
7 2 ACCOUNTING INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 
tives visit the factories of France and inspect very carefully what was done 
in French industry. They were determined to make France a self-con-
tained nation; it was a part, if you please, of the old mercantilist idea. 
Colbert not only dictated what could be done in French industry; he even 
dictated the quality of things that could be manufactured. For example, 
textiles could not be made that were not of the highest qualities—textiles 
that wouldn't fade when washed. Professor Gay used to point out that 
Colbert overlooked the fact that there was a big market for textiles in 
Africa and other parts of the world where the natives who would have 
bought them never would have intended to wash them. But there was no 
choice left to the consumer; the consumer determined nothing of the sort. 
Now let us examine the attitude of the early American Colonists. 
Here we find a feeling that they wanted their freedom not only to worship, 
but to carry on business in their own way. It is true that we find some 
price regulation in the early colonial period—the regulation of the price of 
bread, the price of tobacco, and other things—but as soon as roads were 
made and markets developed, so that there was no longer the possibility of 
a corner on foodstuffs and other articles, all of that regulatory legislation 
disappeared. 
I was interested in the discussion at the morning session about Thomas 
Jefferson. He was quoted to the effect that "that government is the best 
that governs the least." There isn't any doubt about the fact that Thomas 
Jefferson believed that, and he believed it to the degree that he was willing 
to fight for it. And yet, I am not so certain but that if Thomas Jefferson 
were alive today and gave us a new definition of laissez jatrey it might be 
somewhat like the definition of liberty, given by the Dutchman to the 
Englishman during the Early Colonial struggles in New York. It will 
be recalled that a Dutchman told an Englishman that liberty was that 
privilege which gave the Englishman the right to straighten out his arm 
until it touched the Dutchman's nose, and there it should stop, and that if his 
arm wasn't quite straight when it touched the Dutchman's nose he had 
better not try to straighten it. 
I have a feeling that if Thomas Jefferson were alive he would give 
us a new definition of laissez jaire; it would be, I believe, that a businessman 
should have that kind of liberty that does not infringe or impinge upon the 
liberty of his fellow businessman. I can remember very well the first time 
I ever drove an automobile down High Street and encountered the first 
traffic light. Frankly, I admit to you that when I saw that traffic light I 
had the kind of vision we see in the funny cartoons. My vision was of 
portions of the Declaration of Independence. My reaction was, "Why 
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should I be stopped?" Now, when I come to a crossing I express a few 
silent prayers for the presence of that traffic light; it is my salvation. But 
the first time I drove a car down the street I resented it, because I was in 
a hurry that morning anyway and I did not like it. 
So it does seem that there is a new definition needed of the regulation 
of business. If anybody imagines that business, with its new and complicated 
pattern, is the business of the type that existed when Thomas Jefferson 
went on record the way he did, he is very much mistaken. I give Jefferson 
credit for having enough intelligence, if he were with us today, not to 
accept the interpretation that many people are now putting on his laissez 
faire doctrine. 
I indicated at the outset that there is an outstanding Supreme Court 
decision in this country that gives us the dividing line between all that early 
emphasis on no regulation and the period in which we began the regulation 
of business. That Supreme Court decision is Munn vs. Illinois. It was 
handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1877. I em­
phasize that because I dare say that if one will take down ten books from a 
library shelf that deal with that Court decision one will find the date of 
that decision given as 1876 in many if not most of them. Do you know 
why many books have that date wrong? It was a most natural error. 
That decision was held by the United States Supreme Court for thirteen 
months after the case was argued. Let me trace some events that explain 
why this great delay on the part of the Supreme Court. 
In the first place, Munn vs. Illinois went through the Supreme Court 
of Illinois twice, and both times the Illinois Supreme Court was divided 
on the issues involved. They could not come to agreement, even in Illinois 
where those grain elevators were located. The farmers were up against 
it because, as an aftermath of the Civil War, currency depreciated and high 
prices resulted. Then with the depression following the panic of 1873, 
prices of agricultural products were ruinously low. They had to burn corn 
for fuel in Illinois, Iowa, and other middle western states because the corn 
did not bring enough to pay the freight to ship the corn out and pay for 
the fuel shipped back. We must bear in mind that such economic conditions 
in Illinois naturally made them feel keenly about the regulation of railroads 
and grain elevators. And yet their farmer legislators worked a long time 
before they could agree upon a law, and when that law was brought before 
their own Supreme Court that body could not agree that the State of Illinois 
had the power to regulate grain elevators as proposed in the law. The 
Illinois Supreme Court argued the matter and disagreed. They waited 
until they had another election in Illinois and new judges were elected. 
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Then they re-argued the issues completely, and the court divided again. 
Then the case went to the United States Supreme Court, and the U. S. 
Supreme Court divided. If you go back and read the language of the 
United States Supreme Court in Munn vs. Illinois you will see that the 
Court says, in essence, 'We have held this case as long as we have because 
we realized we were taking a very important step, and we were not at all 
certain that this was the step that we should take.' That is the essence 
of the reason why the United States Supreme Court held back the Munn 
vs. Illinois decision for thirteen months after the case was argued. 
As I have indicated, that case had to do with grain elevators and rail­
roads. Well, if there is any industry under heaven that anybody would be 
willing to admit, right off without any argument at all, should be regulated, 
it is the railroad. Of course that case hinged on the grain elevator, but 
they tied it in to what they called the gateway of commerce, and its rela­
tionship to the railroads was shown to be a very vital one. 
Thomas Jefferson never heard a locomotive whistle. Thomas Jef­
ferson died in the middle 1820's. Incidentally, he was a man at least fifty 
years ahead of his time, and yety the very long period of time which he felt 
would elapse before the United States would be settled as far as the 
Mississippi River shows that he had no conception whatever of the economic 
significance of steam transportation. 
If we take 1830 as a rough date for the beginning of the American 
railroad, let us again contrast America and France. All the railroads in 
France were laid down from Paris, just like the spokes in a wheel, and no 
French railroad was laid until very careful surveys were made by French 
engineers. The railroad had to be justified either on a commercial basis 
or a military basis, and we found in World Wa r I that they had done a 
pretty good job on that score. 
Now let's look at America: W e had absolutely no regulation of rail­
road building; anybody could build a railroad if he could get enough 
capital to do it, and then when we built one, a second road was built parallel 
to it. 
It reminds me of the man who bought a razor. The dealer said, 
"There is the best selling razor I have," and the customer took it home 
and tried to shave with it and couldn't. He went back and said,  " I am 
sorry, I can't use this. Didn't you tell me this was the best razor you had? " 
"No," said the proprietor,  " I didn't tell you any such thing. I said it was 
the best selling razor I had; I have sold so many of those razors that I have 
my sales talk standardized, so I know what I told you. Now to be per­
fectly frank and honest with you I don't believe it was ever intended that 
anybody should shave with that razor." 
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I want to say to you in all seriousness that in too many instances 
that second parallel railroad that was laid down in America was not laid for 
transportation purposes. It was used as a lead pipe against the first road, 
and cut-throat competition was threatened if the first railroad did not buy 
the second one at "a satisfactory price." Some of those roads were so closely 
parallel that the locomotive engineers could have exchanged a plug of 
tobacco (and you know in those days they used a lot of that) without ever 
leaving their cabs! One keen observer of that period said: "Railroads were 
built out into sections where nobody lived and from that point on out to 
where nobody cared to go." That is the way we built many of our railroads. 
It is very important in tracing the government regulation of business 
to observe that although our railroads began operation about 1830, we did 
not give the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to grant or refuse 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the building of an 
interstate carrier until the year 1920. In other words, our American rail­
roads were almost a century old before we ever gave the Interstate Com­
merce Commission that power, and curiously enough beginning with 1917 
we were tearing up more railroad mileage every year than we were laying. 
A very fine example of waste! Not until most of the horses were stolen 
out of the barn did we act and put a padlock on the door. That is the way 
we handled the railroad building program in this country. 
Then we came to the Civil War. Abraham Lincoln wanted control 
over the railroads; he had a tough time getting it. The Congressional 
debates on the bill that gave Abraham Lincoln the power to take over the 
railroads show that many Congressmen who voted to give Lincoln that 
power felt the need of apologizing for their votes, and that the power 
was voted only as a war measure, not as anything desirable. 
After the war was over, in the year 1868, a resolution was introduced 
in the House of Representatives that you and I, looking back at this time, 
would consider superfluous if not crazy. That resolution read: "Does 
Congress have the power to regulate interstate freight rates and interstate 
passenger fares?" Curiously, when they looked around for a committee 
to which they could refer this resolution, they didn't have a Committee on 
Railroads. That looks as though they hadn't been thinking about regulat­
ing them very much. They referred it to the Committee on Canals. The 
Committee on Canals went over the resolution carefully, and citing the 
Constitution said that Congress did have the power to regulate interstate 
passenger fares and freight rates, "but that the Committee did not believe 
such regulation was necessary." 
In 1866 somebody introduced a bill into the Iowa Legislature to 
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regulate freight rates, and it was referred to the Attorney General to see 
whether the legislature had the power to regulate freight rates. The 
Attorney General went into the matter carefully and issued a long and 
labored report, much of his conclusion being printed in italics. He main­
tained that the Iowa Legislature had no power whatever to regulate 
railroads. The Iowa Supreme Court, in 1869, handed down a decision 
(which I haven't time to discuss with you) which was of the very same 
tenor. 
Now please note that in 1874 the Legislature of Iowa passed one of 
the most rabid pieces of legislation that was ever printed on railroad rate 
regulation. If I had that law here tonight, it would stand up on that table 
like a book, possibly, without any binding on it. So you know it must have 
been a very elaborate piece of legislation. The reason it was so elaborate 
was because they figured out every rate between all possible stations in Iowa 
on every commodity from asbestos to zinc, and they had the exact rates to 
be charged, following a strict distance tariff principle. I mention the 
matter in which the legislature itself undertook this early regulation because 
I want to refer to the methods of regulation a little later. 
One could draw also on the experiences of Wisconsin and other 
agricultural states and find similar attempts to regulate the carriers. I t 
wasn't very long, however, before the people of the Middle West saw that 
these rigid state laws did them no good. They all had a commodity that 
had to go to the seaboard markets. What good did it do them to try to pass 
a law regulating intrastate commerce in Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois? 
They had to get their grain back to Baltimore and New York, and that 
required interstate commerce. If we trace the history of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, such names as Windom of Minnesota, Cullom of Illinois, 
Regan of Texas, and McCleary of Iowa stand out. In one day in Congress 
some thirteen different bills introduced for Federal regulation of the rail­
roads received inspiration and support from Senators and Representatives 
from the Middlewest. 
But even when the Interstate Commerce Act was on the statute 
books it was not a very effective statute. Let us consider briefly the 20th 
section of the law which, as this group well knows, was on regulation of 
the accounting of the railroads. That is, it was supposed to regulate the 
carrier accounts. But you will remember that the Interstate Commerce 
Commission had some sharp differences with the Lake Shore Railroad on 
accounting practices. That road was tearing up light rails and putting 
down heavy ones and including it all in maintenance. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission asked for facts which would show how much should 
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be considered as maintenance and how much as extension of plant. You 
will remember that the Lake Shore Railroad refused to give the facts. It 
went to the Supreme Court of the United States and that court ruled that 
the 20th Section of the Law of 1887 was not mandatory, and that the 
Lake Shore was not compelled to furnish the information. 
Hence, control over railroad accounting had to make a new start after 
this Supreme Court decision. This was done in the Hepburn-Dollivar law 
passed in 1906, becoming effective July 1, 1907. I do not have time to 
analyze this law, but its control over rates was of little significance, judged 
by present-day regulation standards. From the point of view of account­
ing, it did not have anything of significance on depreciation. Professor 
Eckleberry, of this University, went into that carefully for a Master's thesis; 
he pointed out that there were as many rates of depreciation on railroads 
as Heinz has pickles, and we aren't even yet dealing with the subject of 
depreciation in the way with which we must if we are to have intelligent 
and effective and helpful regulation of business. 
We have put the cart before the horse in much of our regulation 
because we have made requirements which assume effective accounting 
control when we have not had it. In Massachusetts, in granting early 
railroad charters it was stipulated in these charters that when the Massa­
chusetts railroads had made 10 per cent they had to turn the rest over to 
the school fund. Horace Mann was a great educator and did much for 
the schools of Massachusetts, but it does not appear that he received any 
financial assistance from Massachusetts railroads. Apparently, Boards of 
Directors of Massachusetts railroads never sounded the alarm when they 
had earned 10 per cent and turned the remainder into the School Fund. It 
seems strange that regulation of profits should ever be attempted with no 
regulation whatever of accounting. 
Turning attention now to the depression years of the 1930's under 
Roosevelt, let us take a look at more recent developments of regulation. 
Here we see not only the regulation of public utilities, but we see under 
the NRA an attempt to regulate all sorts of business activities. 
You will remember, of course, that when the Supreme Court was 
called upon to pass on the NRA, it was a unanimous Court that said it was 
unconstitutional—liberals, conservatives, all said it was unconstitutional. 
Why was it unconstitutional? 
Because it did not provide sufficiently definite standards by which 
business was to be regulated. I used to belong to a volleyball class here at 
Ohio State and also in Cambridge. These were fine groups of men and 
we had a lot of fun, but, you know, we made the rules as we played. We 
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had no standards for the game other than those we made during the pro­
gress of the game. Of course it was bedlam making the rules and revising 
them as we played. We cannot do that in business. The Supreme Court 
ruled in the NRA case that the Congress had to be definite, and that the 
Congressional mandate did not provide, as it should have provided, suffi­
ciently definite standards to be followed by those who were to enforce the 
law. 
We seem to be getting around to this: the legislatures cannot legislate 
unless they do so strictly and explicitly; and yet they cannot possibly legislate 
strictly—and it is no reflection on the legislatures to say this, for there are 
at least two good reasons why they cannot. In the first place, the men who 
make up the legislature cannot possibly be experts in all the different areas 
in which it would be normal to regulate business; in the second place, even 
if they were, legislative remedies alone would be too rigid. The legislature 
is supposed to meet once in two years—down South they are so afraid of 
legislators they will permit them to meet only once in four years. But with 
a legislature attempting to regulate business directly, the result is arigid and 
inflexible law for an unforeseen business situation which may change 
radically within a very short time and obviously the legislation no longer 
fits the problems involved. 
We seem, therefore, to be confronted with the stubborn fact that we 
must have an intelligent analysis of what is to be regulated; we must have 
certain standards by which certain administrative agencies can be guided, 
and those administrative agencies are expected to introduce enough flexibil­
ity into their procedures so that they may take into consideration the new 
situation that arises and yet, at the same time, follow some fundamental 
principles in applying the rules of conduct to business. 
That naturally raises the question: What of the future of regulation 
of business? 
You would know from what I have already said that I do not expect 
to see less regulation of business in a postwar world. We would have 
had an increasing degree of regulation of business if Franklin Roosevelt 
had never appeared on the scene. Careful students of business history know 
that. They know that regulation was overdue for a good many areas. 
Now, the important thing is to work out some sort of pattern that will 
enable us to be both intelligent and effective in doing the kind of funda­
mental work which is necessary before really satisfactory regulation can be 
achieved. Many of the problems that need to be regulated today are 
economic and business problems. But we will never have satisfactory regula­
tion unless we apply to these problems economic and business solutions. 
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A political solution will not serve; it is not that kind of problem, and the 
•sooner we recognize that, the sooner are we going to be in a position to set 
up the kind of administrative agencies that can do the job. 
Let us not fool ourselves about the difficulty here. It will be difficult 
to get these administrative agencies up to the level of responsibility and 
efficiency which will be necessary if they are to do their jobs as they should 
be done. I am highly pleased by some recent Supreme Court decisions 
with regard to these administrative agencies, and I am referring especially 
to one that was handed down on March 16, involving the natural-gas 
industry. There the Supreme Court went on record to the effect that, in 
regulating the rates, and also the rate of return, they were not going to 
be meticulous in holding these administrative agencies to some particular 
formula of valuation. That may eventually call for a revision of the Ohio 
Law. I do not need to tell you the emphasis that the Ohio Law puts 
on reproduction valuation as a rate base. Apparently, the Supreme Court 
is not going to be too fussy about that. 
At any rate, that is an interesting decision and of great interest to 
accountants, because it seems to promise somewhat more of a future to 
accountants than it does to valuation engineers. 
If these administrative agencies deserve to have more discretion, ap­
parently the Court is willing to give them the green light. If that is true, it 
is up to us to try to improve the administrative agency. I want to close 
with the thought that we will not get any better administrative agency than 
we are willing to create, and there the public has a very heavy responsibility. 
I maintain that these administrative agencies are as important as the courts; 
in some respects I believe they are more important. 
I was very much interested in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement in 
the Driscoll Case, handed down in 1939. I feel that it indicates fairly 
clearly what is likely to be a more general belief as time passes. He said, in 
that case, in speaking of utility rates and rate of return, that these are 
not questions for which a lawyer's training and a lawyer's experience offer 
us any solution; that if the solution is found to rate-making and to what 
constitutes a fair rate of return, it must come from the men who have 
studied finance, economics, and related lines. 
I have no doubt in my mind that that is where the solution does lie. 
If I am having serious eye trouble, I want to go to an eye specialist who 
knows how to doctor the eyes; I do not hunt up a corporation lawyer. 
And it seems to me that it is no reflection on the courts—indeed it seems 
to me a compliment to the courts—that they are willing to say: Here is a 
problem of business regulation that must be turned over to those who 
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understand the problems of business and understand the issues involved. If 
our administrative agencies are made up of such men, it will promise much 
real progress in the regulation of business. 
The courts stay at home and tend to their business; they do not go 
around hunting up these jobs of deciding these matters. If the businessmen 
and representatives of able administrative agencies can get around a table 
and discuss frankly and openly the problems they have to settle, and if they 
will reach a real solution, it will never need to go up to the courts. 
So I close with this thought: American business has become very 
complex, so complex that the businessman must recognize that he must 
have regulation of the other fellow in order that he may enjoy his rights. 
It is precisely the same sort of thing that we have in traffic regulation or 
anything else, and because we must have this regulation in order to work 
together in a satisfactory way, then the businessman's own salvation is not 
in blind opposition to government regulation of business but in what I call 
an intelligent attack on the problems of the regulation of business. 
In too many states the term of the Governor expires at the very same 
time that the terms of members of a number of these administrative agencies 
expire. That is vicious; it encourages a governor to campaign on a plat­
form that will pledge to his supporters places on these administrative 
agencies. There ought to be a staggering of those terms, and the men 
on those administrative agencies ought to have longer terms than do the 
governors. Moreover, the members of the administrative agencies ought to 
be paid salaries comparable to the courts themselves because their great 
importance to the public demands it. Then we could begin to attract better 
men to these administrative agencies, and when that is done we will not 
have so many cockeyed rulings with regard to some important matters 
of business, and businessmen will begin to realize that some of the men 
on regulatory agencies understand business problems. 
I see no other hope for the future regulation of business! I see no 
cessation of government regulation. There is going to be more of it. Our 
only hope is to make it more intelligent and to make it more effective. I 
have tried to show you that control by direct legislation cannot do it. Th e 
courts cannot do it. It is no reflection on them to say this. Moreover, 
they do not want to do it. 
How are we going to do it? 
We must do it through the flexible, intelligent, and creative type of 
body that we are now calling the administrative agency. Careful students 
of these administrative agencies will look forward in the hope that, in a 
number of states, the governors will be stripped of some of their powers 
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to control these agencies. Probably the trend of the times showing increas­
ing public faith in administrative agencies was registered in the attitude 
toward various bills for the reorganization of some of the Federal agencies. 
You will remember that Congress was unwilling to give the President of 
the United States control over a number of those agencies. That refusal, 
in my opinion, is fundamentally sound. It does not matter who is President; 
such a proposal is wrong. The President cannot possibly deal with these 
problems, and not until the public wakes up to the fact that these problems 
call for a kind of regulatory body that must be encouraged and built up, 
and for which the public will have respect, will we have a satisfactory 
solution to the problem of government regulation. 
If we can develop such regulatory bodies, I will risk the guess that in 
the long run many businessmen who are now complaining most bitterly 
against some of this regulation will be ready to say that these administrative 
agencies are approaching the problem in a sane and an intelligent manner. 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
By JOHN R. WOOD, JR., C.P.A., 
Time, Incorforated, New York, New York 
It is a pleasure to open this fifth and final meeting of the Institute 
on Accounting. I think this has been a very interesting series of meetings. 
Yesterday we had four talks, all on major policies; they really developed 
into major economic policies as well as accounting policies, which we as 
accountants should be interested in. I think it is a credit to those who 
planned the program that their choice of subjects was such that it gave the 
speakers the opportunity to broaden their talks to reach into these things 
which are so interesting to us today, because we are still thinking and plan­
ning the future of our American way of life, the same kind of thing that 
we are all fighting for, and we want to see that we come out with the right 
result after we win the victory. 
Today, instead of discussing our national economic problems, we are 
just going to be accountants talking shop. This is good, right-down-to-
earth material, and it takes in the kind of problems that we run into every 
day on our own jobs, and I am sure you are going to find these talks, too,, 
very interesting. The topics are very closely related—the "Control and 
Allocation of Labor Costs Under Abnormal Conditions," and the "Control 
and Allocation of Expenses Under Abnormal Conditions." 
I wrote to Russell Willcox and asked him about that word, "ab­
normal," in each title. I said that I was in the University here in years 
which were "abnormal"—1929-1931; and in 1935, which was "abnor­
mal," as we thought at that time; and I think that 1940 was abnormal in 
a way; and this is 1942, and I think it is very abnormal—I hope it is. So 
I think Russell has run on to something which can serve him as a title 
for all the rest of the Institutes that there may be. This is good for any 
year that he may want to run it, so what we are going to have now is the 
1942 edition. 
We are going to change the procedure just a bit; Mr. Howell has a 
plane to catch and after his address we will have the questions and then 
he will have to leave us. 
The first speaker is Mr. Harry E. Howell. He is in constant daily 
touch with the topic he is going to talk to us about; he is the Controller of 
the Grinnell Company of Providence, Rhode Island. He had his formal 
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education abroad; he is a Certified Public Accountant in the State of Rhode 
Island and a member of the Bar in the State of Massachusetts, and is the 
National President of the National Association of Cost Accountants. Dean 
Weidler told me last night that he is the only man who has been the 
President of a National Association of Cost Accountants chapter on three 
different occasions. It is a great pleasure to introduce Mr. Harry E. Howell. 
THE CONTROL AND ALLOCATION OF LABOR COSTS 
UNDER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS 
By HARRY E. HOWELL, C.P.A., 
Controllery Grinnell Co. Inc., Providence, R* I. 
Until May I it might have been difficult to present a paper on the 
subject of proper accounting for the unusual, but not necessarily abnormal, 
labor costs which we now encounter, but it is no longer difficult. On May 
I, N. A. C, A. Bulletin, Volume 23, and No. 17, contained a "tentative 
statement on accounting for excess labor costs" that so completely states 
the problem and the principles underlying its proper treatment and the 
preferable accounting cost practices in regard to it that little more can be 
done than to review and substantially quote from the excellent report which 
was prepared by Dr. Marple from material gathered by the National Re­
search Director of the National Association of Cost Accountants. 
In the latter part of 1940 it became evident that there were some 
new costs coming into business in relation to labor, and we were very 
much interested in them. So much so that early in the spring a question­
naire was prepared and sent around the country to find out just what was 
being done in an accounting way with these labor items. 
The results of that survey were published on August 15, 1941, in 
N. A. C. A, Bulletin, Volume 22, Number 24, and I refer you to both of 
these bulletins because they are authoritative in showing what the condition 
was in 1941 and the way in which we are treating it now. In Dr, Marple's 
report I believe the sound basic principles which will enable us to handle 
any of these costs are set forth. 
It was interesting to note last August the tremendous confusion in 
regard to handling this subject: 263 questionnaires were analyzed; of those 
we found that 122 concerns were taking all of these costs and including-
them in their inventory valuations; 7 8 of them were excluding them; and 
63 of them were picking them up on some normal or arbitrary basis,, 
part of them going into inventory and part being charged off. 
It was very interesting to me to analyze those companies that had 
charged these costs into inventory, and to find that the likelihood that they 
would be so charged was three times as great where there was an actual 
cost system as where there was a standard cost system. This seemed to me 
to imply that the decision was not made so much on principle as on ex­
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pediency. In other words, the type of system determined how these labor 
cost items were handled. 
Now the problem that presents itself is probably more clearly seen in 
the handling of overtime pay, night premium pay, and in training costs. 
Again your Chairman's remarks on "abnormal" are very sound, because 
all of us have known that in good times and bad we have run certain units, 
certain departments, on a consistent overtime basis. It has been wise to do 
so to conserve the capital expenditure in that particular unit or to get a 
greater utility out of the remaining investment. In such cases, that over­
time, that night premium is a regular part of the operation and should be 
comprehended in the regular costs. 
It is common, for instance, in foundries, no matter how low you are 
running, to have the cleaning and the grinding done after the melt is over 
and usually with the night shift, and quite often you have to pay a premium 
of so many cents an hour or a certain percentage to have the men work. 
It is quite customary in processing, such as galvanizing, lacquering, where 
you have a very small unit, to run that unit, even in depression times, 
twenty-four hours around the clock in order to get the maximum utility of 
the capital investment. Those costs are regular and usual and should 
be picked up in the same way that you would pick up the regular labor 
cost. The costs that we are chiefly concerned with today are those which 
may be attributed to the additional volume we are getting, either as the 
result of direct war contracts or indirectly as the result of the boom increase 
in business arising from the war. The question in regard to their treatment, 
the fundamental one, it seems to me, is the problem of when they shall 
be absorbed. Shall we charge them off into the current period, thus put­
ting them into the profit and loss statement, or shall we bypass them 
temporarily from the profit and loss statement by including them in inven­
tory valuation and having those costs appear as an element of inventory 
in the balance sheet? 
When you first look at it you say: Well, these are costs of the pro­
duction department. It is true there are a few that are not. For instance, 
you are having to pay overtime in your accounting departments and you 
don't think twice about it; you undoubtedly charge that additional cost 
off to expense, along with the original labor charge. But when we come 
to overtime or premium time in the shop, the first thought that we have is, 
Well, these are production costs—and we try to spread the production cost 
to the product and include it in the inventory, because we feel that is where 
these additional charges should go. 
Well, that reasoning is not necessarily correct. There are some 
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exceptions, in good cost accounting, to the rule that all costs incurred in the 
production department shall be included in the inventory valuation. In 
the first place those concerns that are running on a basis of absorbing their 
fixed overhead on the normal capacity basis have made it the practice of 
charging off under absorption of fixed overhead. Likewise, those who are 
running standard cost systems have regularly charged off, and not included 
in inventory valuation, the losses reflected in their rate and use variance 
accounts for material and for labor. They have realized that those are 
•excess costs, unusual costs, costs that might have been controlled and have 
not added to the value of the inventory, and they have written them off. 
Another exception is the fact that at the end of the year, or during 
the year, you have examined your inventories, and re-priced them, revalued 
them. T o some extent that involves a correction of steps that you have 
taken during the year to include in inventory costs which you now realize 
should not be there. This, it seems to me, gives some recognition, possibly 
not very clearly, to a principle that I hope to see developed in regard to 
inventory valuation—namely, that the increase in cost was not recognized, 
or would not be recognized by a potential customer; he wouldn't pay any 
more for it because you were inefficient or because you happened to do his 
job during an overtime period. It certainly seems that, in repricing your 
inventory on the basis of market or recoverable value, you are applying 
that principle, and that if we apply it in this particular case it may solve the 
problem of what to do with these overtime and premium charges, at least 
on regular business where our customers will not pay us for the added 
cost. 
Now, these overtime charges come under a group of costs which we 
normally treat in our standard cost accounting as variances which should 
not be included in the cost of production in the valuation of inventory, and 
if you examine costs of that kind you will find that they possibly fall in this 
group: that they are costs which you did not have at the beginning of the 
period and possibly will not exist at the end of the period. Such costs 
as, for instance, temporary inefficiencies of labor—when you set your 
standard you did not have them, you did not comprehend them, and you 
hope that at the end of the given period they will not be there. And if we 
find costs of that kind, we usually treat them as something that is a cost 
of the current profit and loss period, and therefore we charge them off and 
do not include them in inventory. 
I think you may find that upon such an analysis you can justify 
the charging off of overtime premiums and other excess labor costs, rather 
than including them in inventory valuation. I believe that we have to 
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recognize the fact that because items can, for cost ascertainment purposes, 
be allocated to products, that does not necessarily mean that, because we 
have done it, such total of cost must be carried forward in the balance sheet 
as part of the inventory value. 
W e have seen the efforts which have been made to eliminate price 
profits from inventory—last-in-first-out, and all of the other methods that 
were designed to prevent the inventory valuation from upsetting the current 
profit and loss statement. A similar problem, it seems to me, is involved 
here. Inclusion of these costs in inventory, while inventories are steadily 
rising, has the effect of by-passing these excess costs out of the current profit 
and loss statements and to that extent you are over-stating the profit and 
you are paying out good cash money in taxes—on unrealized paper profits 
in inventory. 
I realize that we have not brought the Internal Revenue Department 
to this point of view (although the Treasury Department has recom­
mended inventory reserves), but I feel that if we clearly set these costs out 
as special expenses, unusual expenses—if enough of us do it and enough 
of us argue about it—we may find some relaxation of the rule that inventory 
shall be priced at actual cost. In any event, tax accounting is not necessarily 
a criterion of good accounting, and regardless of how we may later have to 
adjust them for the tax people, we should keep our own accounting records 
on sound, clear principles, so that we know what we are doing. 
It seems that if we do include these costs in our inventories, thus 
over-stating current profits, we are building up inflated values in the in­
ventory. Then, in a post-war period, when it will be very difficult to 
maintain ceiling prices which will recover these costs, we are faced with 
deflation of the inventory, with heavy write-downs of our assets, and with 
heavy losses on what sales we do make. 
Even if the overhead cost per unit is reduced by the added volume that 
you are getting (and that has been advanced as an excuse, with the argu­
ment: W e will charge these labor costs in and they will be offset by the 
reduction in fixed cost per unit due to the added volume), I feel that it 
would be better not to hope that increases in labor costs and reductions 
in overhead costs per unit will offset each other, but to segregate both. 
Then if it is true that you get a fixed overhead credit in the variance 
account, permit it to offset the excess labor debit variances in the profit 
and loss statement, but don't trust that somehow they will offset each other 
in the inventory account. 
Now if we go on the principle that the question as to whether or not 
these costs shall be included in inventory shall depend upon whether or not 
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they are realizable in the sales price, it may clear up the handling under 
one or two situations. Let us first take the case of a firm with government 
contracts: If you have a government contract that provides for reimburse­
ment on a cost-plus basis, or on cost with a fixed fee, or if you have a 
government contract at a flat price, but in the setting of the flat price you 
estimated costs which included running at an overtime rate, or the running 
of night shifts, which comprehended that you would have these excess 
costs, I see no reason, in view of the fact that the sale is made and the 
selling price ascertained, for not including those costs in the costs provided 
in that contract. That, it seems to me, is a justification for including those 
costs in the inventory and carrying them in the contracts in process or work 
in process inventory. 
Now there are some sound reasons for making the fullest possible 
distribution of costs on government contracts. If we take many of these 
excess costs and lump them in the accounts so that they are part of our 
general cost, we may have some difficulty justifying our showings on 
government contracts; they may appear to show far greater gross profits 
than is actually the case. I think we have got to be ready—not only for the 
sake of proper reimbursement, but also to show our good faith in the 
handling of government contracts and the fact that we have not made 
excess profits—to distribute the cost to the greatest possible extent. It may 
appear that there is some conflict in principle there, but I don't think there 
is, if you follow two thoughts: first of all, the thought that there is not 
one cost for all purposes; that it is possible to have a cost for estimating 
that is different from the cost for inventory valuation; and it is possible to 
have ascertainment of cost of the product, carrying it through maybe to the 
point of including costs of distribution—selling, "warehousing, freight—and 
all sorts of items that can logically be applied to that product, and arrive at 
a cost which, while it is a satisfactory cost as a cost ascertainment result, 
still has nothing to do with the cost that you would use for inventory 
valuation. 
Similarly, if you follow the principle that we may include in inventory 
these costs of which we are sure of reimbursement, then it seems to me 
that the handling of government contracts and the inclusion of those costs 
which you know are reimbursable is proper and logical. 
However, the situation is considerably different where you are manu­
facturing for stock, where the goods are not sold, where it is impossible to 
ascertain the price at which you will be able to sell them. In that case 
you will have this problem of carrying forward, to future periods, losses, 
excess costs, which should be charged off in the current period. You have 
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the problem of inflating the inventory; you have also the problem now of 
the fact that price ceilings may be established which will cut the margins or 
fix the margins so that you have no hope of recovering these excess costs in 
the selling price. 
It seems to me that the price ceilings established by O P A give us an 
opportunity to use them as a basis for setting new standards of cost, and we 
know that when we set standards of cost we endeavor above everything 
else to arrange our accounts so that the variances from that standard are 
shown up separately. If an OP A price ceiling is established based on 
normal operation, and normal operation does not comprehend overtime 
and premium allowances, as it probably does not, then the management 
is entitled to see the extent to which their regular gross margin is being 
cut into by these unusual items. It probably may bring about efforts to 
control it, to minimize it and to restore the gross margin, not by raising 
the sales price, which cannot be done, but by controlling these costs. If 
the accountant charges such costs to inventory, the management does not 
see the effect until the sale is made, and quite often that is a long time 
later, and too late to do much about it. 
There are one or two points in regard to the allocation of overtime 
that involve some problems. Where you do not charge such costs off im­
mediately, but you are going to include them in the cost of some job or some 
product going through the shop, the question is whether it is advisable to 
collect them against a specific job, or how would you charge them? It is 
the old question that you had in peacetime; that the particular job was 
forced over into overtime wasn't the particular fault of that job, but the 
management decided to push it into the overtime period. If the manage­
ment has the decision, it seems to me it puts it into an embarrassing position, 
particularly if it has both government and non-government jobs, and must 
charge the overtime worked specifically to some job. It seems to me the 
government auditors might very well take the stand: well, you could have 
done government work during the normal hours and done your own work 
during the overtime hours. 
Th e facts again seem to determine it, and this may seem to state it 
very simply, but the result of the questionnaire in August showed this: not 
so much the fact that, once the program was understood, we couldn't apply 
sound principles, but the fact that many accountants had not realized the 
importance of this problem and they had not segregated these excess costs 
so that they could be looked at, studied, and treated separately. They had 
been blanketed into the overhead, or blanketed into the direct labor cost. 
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Similarly, with the allocation of overtime: if we can set up the over­
time, see where it was and how we did it, it should not be too difficult to 
determine how to handle it. A job may be figured to be done in overtime 
in the first place, as is many times the situation, both on construction jobs 
and in your shop, in order to meet a difficult time schedule. You may 
figure the only possible way to do it is on a sixty-hour schedule, and nat­
urally you figure that you have got to pay for 70 hours of labor under 
most wage laws today. The same situation applies on construction; they 
tell you that you have to work seven days a week, two shifts; you naturally 
figure in your costs the excess cost of running beyond the normal forty 
hours. If you are working on a contract that requires compliance with 
the Walsh-Healy Act, and you know that you have to work ten hours a 
day, then you know that you have to figure on eleven hours, regardless 
of how many hours the man works during the week. 
T  o the extent that overtime work is comprehended in figuring the 
job in the first place, and presumably reimbursement will be made, and is 
comprehended in the selling price, it seems to me that the overtime can very 
well be charged to that job. But if there was no such plan, if it just 
happens that the production schedules broke in such a way that some jobs 
unfortunately lap over into the overtime period, and some luckily stay in 
the normal period, the fairest way to compute the cost to government, 
to private jobs, and any other jobs you are working on, is by pro-rating over 
all production, preferably as a special loading on labor, not as part of the 
burden rate. 
There have been one or two interesting things develop in regard 
to the way in which these abnormal labor costs have been recorded, and you 
realize that if they are not recorded properly, if they are not recorded so 
that they clearly stand up, our treatment of them is confused. Many 
companies treated their additional cost as part of the direct labor pay roll. 
Other than the fact that the Wage and Hour Law makes it necessary to 
show the premium hours separately, there would have been no way of 
telling what the breakdown of the pay roll was as between pay for hours 
worked and pay for premium hours. 
In the first place there is a possibility of error in such a procedure. 
Moreover, you have lost control of the important element, at least to the 
extent that it is controlled through accounts. In the second place those who 
distribute costs on the basis of direct labor have introduced an element 
into their direct labor base which causes very serious distortions, and in many 
cases it makes it difficult to obtain reimbursements from the government. 
I know that on construction jobs particularly, they don't look kindly upon 
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the reimbursement of the total pay roll, including overtime and premium 
hours plus your overhead rate—that is, your construction overhead rate, 
plus any other charges that you may have. What happens is this: your 
normal pay roll may be reimbursed to you at pay roll cost, plus workmen's 
compensation and public liability insurance, plus social security tax, plus a 
per cent for superintendence, use of tools and various other construction 
overhead items—but if you try to collect that on the premium hours, 
it will be disallowed. O n premium hours they will pay you only pay roll 
cost, plus workmen's compensation and public liability insurance, plus social 
security tax; so that it is wise, it seems to me, not to introduce these items, 
upon which the overhead allowances may be different, into the direct labor 
base. 
Other companies have charged excess labor cost in the burden, and 
the only objection to that practice that I see is that, in the first place, you 
lose track of the item; and in the second place, you embody it with a group 
of costs which may be distributed on a basis which is not applicable to this 
particular cost. It may go into some group that is distributed on the basis 
of material, or production hours—all sorts of bases which, if they happen 
to be the right ones for distributing this particular excess labor cost, would 
be pure coincidence. It seems to me that we should charge excess labor 
costs to a separate group of accounts and clear them through separate 
variance accounts, so that we can analyze them, and in clearing the variance 
accounts we can study them and determine the proper bases for doing it. 
Now it seems fairly clear that these costs are now important and large 
enough to warrant correct treatment, and this would imply the following: 
First, proper segregation of the charges, and non-inclusion of these charges 
in the cost of hours worked. That is not in your straight labor costs, or in 
your burden, but in separate cost accounts, and clear through separate 
variance accounts. 
Second, proper distribution as a separate cost element based on the 
nature of the item and the ascertainment of the correct basis of distribution. 
And third: After such distributions are made where they are necessary 
for cost determination, the application of sound inventory valuation prin­
ciples to determine whether or not such costs should be carried into the 
inventory account, or instead charged off to current profit and loss. 
If we use these rules, let us examine a few items in addition to pre­
mium overtime hours, night-shift premiums, already discussed. They seem 
to fall into two groups: first, payments to labor in addition to normal rates; 
and second, payments for services on account of labor. 
In the first group we have as a first item, wage advances. That is> 
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where the base rate itself is changed. You may wonder why there should 
be any thought that that will be treated in any other way than as a direct 
charge to the cost of the job, as part of the direct labor, but you may know 
that in many contracts the wage rate is set and established and you cannot 
obtain reimbursement unless you get all sorts of approvals. A construction 
contract often states, for example, that the rate of wages shall be as 
established in October 1941, in Cook County. It may happen that you 
may have a union agreement which expires on November 15, and which 
must be renegotiated with a wage increase. There is nothing you can 
do about it. The union isn't going to hold up its territorial agreement 
merely because you happen to have one job, so that you have the problem 
of attempting to get the proper contracting officers to accept the addition, 
which is proving to be very difficult, or immediately agreeing to the ar­
rangements which you made with your union, and thus having an excess 
cost which is not reimbursable. 
It seems to me that, in those cases, it might be a good idea to set that out 
as a separate cost and show it as a separate deduction from the gross profit 
margin. Certainly you are misleading the management if you include 
it in inventory valuation; they think that that is recoverable money. If 
you want to show that you think it might be recoverable, and don't want 
to charge it off, it would be a more complete disclosure if, instead of carry­
ing it in inventory, or contracts in process, you carry it as a contingent 
claim—contingent account receivable. 
On regular products you have a problem, in regard to wage advances, 
that seems to me to be very important. 
We know that, regardless of price ceilings, selling prices are not neces­
sarily directly related to our costs. They are related to competition; they 
are related to what consumers will pay. Now we have, it seems to me, 
two types of wage advances going on at the present time. One of those 
wage advances arises from the action of unions of certain skilled groups 
who are compelling an increase in labor rates. Those are the ones which 
receive a tremendous amount of publicity. On the other hand, there is 
a group of wage increases which in some cases is being voluntarily given 
by concerns. When they have been compelled to raise the wages of 
a small group they have seen it wise and expedient to voluntarily raise the 
wages of those who are less articulate. 
Now there is a great mass of wage increase involving, let us say, 
non-union people—office people, salesmen, a whole multitude of people 
who are not craftsmen in some organized union—and what we have to 
consider very carefully is whether or not the wage that we are talking 
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about is in the nature of a permanent raise, a re-adjustment of the share 
that labor is going to get out of this thing, or whether it is a wage which 
we can look upon as being one that has been compelled by circumstances 
that will correct themselves. 
W e heard a speaker say yesterday that they were going to have to 
pay $750 a month to somebody who was worth $300. I think I would 
look around a couple of weeks and see if we could find somebody we know 
is worth $750, but fundamentally, that chap who is not worth $750 is going 
down to $300 sometime. On the other hand, we have seen a situation 
where we have had, in some industries, clerical workers in the offices at 
$12 and $14 a week who are now getting $16, $18, and $20, and it might 
be wise to figure that that is going to be a permanent increase in our costs. 
I cannot—nobody can—lay out any particular principles for the 
handling of that situation except these: that when a wage adjustment is 
made we should not immediately assume: Here is our new rate of wage, 
we will put it in our pay roll account and distribute it along with all the 
rest of the wages. I think that it would be very wise to temporarily set it 
up in a special variance account so that we can look at it, so that we can see 
how much of it is of the type that we must bear for a long time, how much 
of it is a type which is arising purely out of this emergency, where it is 
more or less of an increase not economically justified and obtained under 
duress, if you want to put it that baldly, and to what extent it is going to 
affect our regular peacetime production costs when the war is over. It seems 
to me that, where we realize that we are going to have it as an adjustment 
of base level of wage, we must understand that it is going to be with us for 
a long time. This is true, for instance, of some of the payments over 40 
hours required under the Wages and Hours Law. In such cases, we probably 
should readjust our costs, pricing of our inventory, notify our manage­
ments that there is a cut in the gross margin, and that there isn't much that 
can be done about it. However, management will probably come back 
and say: The OPA outfit set a price ceiling and they have not given us 
an allowance for this. 
I ask you gentlemen to consider this: You have been living under 
price ceilings all your life—the only difference is that the government is 
setting them now. Either you have had the price ceiling set for you by 
competition, or if you are a big enough frog in the puddle you have set 
it for your competition. What you have done was this—you did what 
was done in the depression: If you figured the cost of an article as $ 1, you 
went to your sales organization and said, "You have to sell this for $1.10." 
They said, "We don't have to do any such thing. John Jones is selling it 
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for 90^ and if he can do it we can". So they would go out and sell it for 
$.89, and you would have to take out the margin of profit, set up a 
standard cost and go ahead and try to get in line with that cost. 
That can be done. It has been done, it can be done, and should be 
done. I like to feel that, under the price ceilings established by OP A, 
you men who are running cost accounting systems will take this opportunity 
to reinstate in full vigor the control of costs which that system will give 
you. Take the price ceiling, not as something to be complained about, but 
as a challenge from a competitor, and break down and reduce your costs. 
There has never been a greater necessity for controlling waste and extra­
vagance than now. If we can make the cost of these products lower, if we 
can make the expenses of the government in the prosecution of this war 
less, the tax burden will be less; there will be less drawn out of us. 
It is very poor psychology to assume that we can have no control over 
costs; that we must always get out high production with so much waste. 
Up to the time when the price ceilings were established on non-war 
products as well as war products, it was easy for management and for the 
cost accountant to excuse himself for not doing his full job; it seems to me 
today there is no excuse whatsoever. If you are working on government 
jobs with flat prices or cost-plus-flxed-fee, you have made certain commit­
ments, and the estimates which you made in making those commitments 
should be taken into your cost system and used to control and to see that 
there are no wastes or expenditures beyond those which you originally 
estimate. 
On the other type of products, which you are selling in the open 
markets under price ceilings, it seems to me that first of all we should 
endeavor to sell below the price ceiling, which merely establishes a maxi­
mum. We are not doing this country or ourselves any good if we try to 
use the ceilings as an excuse for raising prices. In the second place, we 
can take those price ceilings and say: Here is a standard already created 
for us and we must control and conform our costs, and find savings and 
curtail inefficiencies so that we can live under the price ceiling. There is 
nothing new about it; you have all done it before many times, and some 
of the greatest advances that have been made in cost reduction or in get­
ting more production from a given cost have been made by the compulsion 
of a price ceiling set by your competitor, and that same compulsion exists 
today with a much more important objective in sight at the end. 
Along with wage advances, as an element of abnormal costs, we have 
guaranteed day rates to learners, and that is an extremely heavy cost in 
many industries. While you may still have these men on piece rates, or 
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you may have established quotas to be produced for a given flat rate, 
nevertheless you just cannot get people to work unless they are guaranteed 
a certain flat rate, and that rate quite often will run, during a training 
period, 50 per cent, 40 per cent, 30 per cent of the total pay roll, and the 
problem is: what to do with it. 
A further matter of arbitrary decision of the management is that of 
determining that this particular job will be done by a green hand and this 
one by an experienced hand. It seems unfair that the charge should 
be made not because of the intrinsic need of the product itself, but because of 
the decision of the management. I think we can use the same principles 
which would be followed if we had originally comprehended an extensive 
training program to perform a government job. We would know that our 
costs were going to be reimbursed, or that our flat price would include such 
an allowance. It is proper to segregate that cost. Thus we can see what 
it is, and apportion it to the job on which we are going to get reimbursement. 
But where there is no specific reimbursement, where we are working 
on government and non-government work and it is scattered through the 
organization, and our loss of help to war industries has been heavy and we 
have to train new people, it seems to me that that is a general cost of doing 
business. First of all it should be segregated so we know precisely what it 
is, and then it should be figured as a labor loading charge, which we should 
try to recover on new jobs and new figuring. But again I do not believe 
that it should be charged into the inventory. 
We also have another unusual labor cost, and that is retroactive wage 
adjustments. Quite a number of those are going through. Ordinarily we 
can charge those back and treat them in the same way that we did the 
original pay roll, and there isn't much against that, except this one thing: 
Quite a number of contracts, as I said before, state the rate of pay and you 
cannot assume that, merely because you have been compelled to retro­
actively raise wages, you are going to get reimbursement. It is the first 
duty of the accountant, it seems to me, to set up the retroactive wage ad­
justment in a separate series of accounts so that we can see what it is. 
Second, the apportionment cannot be done in a blanket manner. Assuming 
that the firm is going to be reimbursed, the accountant has got to study 
the contracts to see if they provide reimbursement. If they do not auto­
matically require reimbursement, it seems to me the retroactive wage 
adjustment should not be charged directly into inventory. If you want to 
show it as an asset it should appear as a contingent account receivable. Then 
when you get an adjustment to the contract, permitting you to charge it, 
you can clear it through that account and put it back in inventory; if you 
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don't get it, the management has been put on notice that here is something 
which is a contingent asset, and you can charge it to profit and loss imme­
diately. 
A similar situation in regard to abnormal costs arises on the usage of 
labor. We are seeing a continual growth of inefficiencies. Some of those 
are controllable, some could have been controllable if the cost man had 
adjusted his system so that the production man could have used it. But 
the primary job was to get out production and since the cost man approached 
the production men with variances measured with cost accounting micro­
meters, the production men naturally tossed them out. Xhe cost man who 
was smart enough to adjust his system so that he measured his variances 
with a foot rule or a yardstick, in big totals and long term trends, has 
received and will continue to receive very respectful attention. But to the 
extent that labor costs arising from inefficiencies are not controllable, it is a 
dangerous thing to include those costs in your inventory, particularly if 
you wouldn't expect the customer, on your regular production, in peace­
time, under ordinary competitive conditions, to reimburse you for your 
inefficiency as compared with your competitor. And that situation is far 
worse now, because when you start to sell those products again in the 
postwar period you will have fierce competition, and it seems a correct 
point of view would be to charge those costs off. 
In the second group of abnormal expenses and labor costs—and I am 
not trying to make an all-inclusive list, I am merely trying to point out there 
are so many of them that they warrant special treatment—are those I have 
included under the heading of labor service cost. A couple of them are 
regular and usual. The reason I mention them is because the treatment 
of them in many situations is, to my mind, not sound—for example, that 
treatment of workmen's compensation and public liability insurance, which 
in many concerns buries these items in some manufacturing overhead, and 
distributes them on some basis which does not do such an accurate job as 
distributing the items on the only sound basis; namely, the pay roll. It 
seems to me that we should run separate cost accounts which will enable 
us to distribute workmen's compensation, public liability insurance, social 
security taxes, as a labor burden rate directly to the pay roll cost. That, 
incidentally, would be on the pay roll dollar, including the premium dollar, 
because, as you know, you pay so many cents per hundred dollars of pay 
roll regardless of whether those were for hours worked or premium hours. 
Now we have a number of other labor service costs that are running 
into real money. Among these are the cost of pay roll preparation including 
all the deductions, and the carrying of war savings bonds, group health 
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and accident insurance, and compliance with the government requirements-
for pay roll. In some situations, you can put the pay roll department 
out on the job on location and recover the cost. You can then charge the 
costs into contracts in process, because you know you are going to be re­
imbursed for them. Where that is not the situation, and you have a single 
pay roll department for labor working on war and non-war jobs, the 
costs are getting so heavy that I question whether it is proper to include 
them in some general overhead which is deducted from gross profit, or 
which is used as a blanket-plan overhead rate. I think that it can be' 
segregated and possibly distributed to departments of costs on the basis of 
so much per man, which might be much more accurate than on pay roll 
dollars. 
Another cost that we have that is increasing tremendously is the cost 
of identification—tags, badges, finger printing, checking into personnel 
departments before hiring men, etc. That is running into a very heavy 
cost. It seems to me that management should know what it is; it should 
be clearly segregated. Again, the same principles of applying it to the 
product and carrying it into inventory, which would require, certainly,, 
recognition of the principle that we are going to be reimbursed for it, should 
be clearly understood. Again it probably should be distributed on a per 
man basis rather than per hour or per dollar. 
Well, as I have said, this Bulletin of May I brought this whole 
problem into focus, stated the problem, and stated some of the underlying 
principles. If it is possible to draw any conclusions at this time, I would 
say this: that these things are extremely important in amount; they are 
extremely important in their effect on costs; they are extremely important 
in their effect on inventory valuation; they are important now and many 
of them are going to be with us permanently. It is, therefore, the same 
job we have always had, as cost accountants, in regard to any cost of that 
type: First of all, to isolate it and segregate it so that we can look at it; 
and second, study it to see what caused it, what its effects are; and third, 
apply a sound principle of allocating it, if it has to be allocated, and sound 
principles of inventory valuation to determine whether we should charge 
it off in the current profit and loss period or by-pass it into the asset account 
and treat it as an asset. 
In doing this and in working with these labor costs, I think it is 
important that we do not perform the act of the dog sitting on the cactus. 
It means a lot of work for us; we are liable to feel that all of these things 
are impositions placed upon us by pressure groups; we are liable to approach 
the work in a critical and non-cooperative attitude. Now it is true that 
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cost men are not supposed to have any great influence in the handling of 
labor, but on the other hand you men who have tried to install incentive 
plans, piece-rate plans, or even your ordinary pay roll methods and the 
handling of paychecks, know that you can cause much irritation by a care­
lessly thought-out plan, one which upsets the men or makes them feel 
that they are being treated rather discourteously. With one small error 
of that kind you can upset the work of industrial relations departments, 
and all of the house organs and other morale builders that you can think of. 
I do suggest that, in the handling of these accounts and their reactions: 
on labor, we realize this: that, as is so evident now, while this war is going 
on, the greatest asset we have is man power. We don't want to> be too 
short, too ill-considered in our criticisms of our man power. If we fee] 
ourselves inclined to criticize labor, just remember your feelings in regard 
to some of the boys here on the campus, two or three years ago, with their 
curious clothes, their funny habits, their jitterbugging, and all the rest of it. 
I listened so many times to the viewers-with-alarm saying that our youth 
was decadent, that they weren't like we and their grandfathers were. 
They have proved in the last four months that they are just as good and 
probably better than their forefathers; they have done a fine job. I think 
it is true al$o of labor. We don't want to let the surface things that get 
the publicity fool us; underneath they are sound, they are fine, they are 
doing a splendid war job. 
When this war is over, the thing that is going to make business able 
to meet the shock of a depression, if it is able to meet it at all, is not reserves, 
even if they are funded, and it is not the plant full of fine machinery. It is 
just one thing: it is man power, trained man power, skilled man power, 
cooperating man power that believes that the free enterprise system can 
work, that they want it to work, and that under it they will have reasonable 
security and the full freedoms to which they are entitled after they have 
given respect to the rights and the freedoms of their fellow citizens. 
CHAIRMAN WOOD: Thank you very much, Mr. Howell. Mr. Howell has 
asked to be excused from the questions because of the fact that he must make 
a plane. I would suggest that we hold our questions and see if Mr. Russell does 
not come close enough to permit you to adjust questions which, you may have 
now to something that Mr. Russell may touch on. In that way we will try to 
cover the points that you may have. 
If that doesn't happen I am sure Mr. Russell will be glad to try to answer 
a direct question even though it may be on the phase of the subject covered by 
Mr. Howell. 
MR . HOWELL: I wish to say that I am sorry to miss the discussion, and if 
any of you want to start an argument by mail, I will be glad to carry it on. 
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CHAIRMAN WOOD: Mr. Russell's topic is a little broader than Mr. Howell's 
topic, "Control and Allocation of Expenses Under Abnormal Conditions." 
Mr. Russell is a Certified Public Accountant, a member of the American 
Institute of Accountants, and a resident partner of Lybrand, Ross Brothers and 
Montgomery, of Detroit, Michigan. He was graduated from Worcester Poly­
technic Institute and attended the Harvard Business School of Administration 
through 1916. During the first war he was in the United States Navy, doing 
cost inspection work. Later he joined the Philadelphia staff of Lybrand, Ross 
Brothers and Montgomery. 
CONTROL AND ALLOCATION OF EXPENSES UNDER 
ABNORMAL CONDITIONS 
By DONALD M. RUSSELL, C.P.A., 
Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, Detroit, Michigan 
This topic, the control and allocation of expenses, is one which suggests 
many different things to many different people. Entirely different pictures 
come to the minds of persons who may be operating standard cost systems 
and to those operating actual cost systems, to those dealing with commercial 
work, to those dealing ioo per cent with Government contracts, and to 
those operating mixed commercial and Government production, to those 
starting new enterprises and to those having long established experience 
in cost standards and cost records. However, as was brought out in 
our meeting yesterday, we are all getting on somewhat common ground, 
due to the control of all of our economic life which has been assumed by the 
Government under these abnormal conditions. 
Under the Executive Orders of the President (No. 9001, issued 
December 27, 1941, and No. 9127, issued April 10, 1942), Government 
officers have received very broad powers, both to re-negotiate contracts 
and to audit the books and records of all contractors and sub-contractors 
engaged in defense work under contracts entered into since September 8, 
 t n a  t o u  r
*939> s  o  consideration of this topic is quite necessarily directed 
first to the Government interpretation of cost problems under war con­
tracts. 
I would like first to raise one or two questions which are of general 
accounting interest—the effect of the Government's definitions of cost 
and the Government's.conception of fixed fees upon the general financial 
statements and their effect upon the determination of realized income 
available for dividends, to be reported to stockholders in the annual reports 
of corporations. 
Financial Statements: We know that under the Government defini­
tions we are permitted to include in cost, not only the usual manufacturing 
costs and expenses, but also a part of selling, administrative and general 
expenses. Ordinarily, selling, administrative and general expenses have 
nothing to do with inventory valuation; to put them into the inventories 
is to defer a part of these expenses to a future period. How do we stand 
if we value our inventories according to the Government definitions, from 
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the viewpoint of being consistent with last year, and from the viewpoint of 
determining realized income? 
It is very well to say that perhaps we can put these elements of cost 
into the inventories and then take them out again for the financial state­
ments, but that may be a very difficult thing to do, particularly if we are 
required or desire to keep costs by individual parts. Some of the contracts 
call for parts' costs as well as total contract costs. I would suggest, in 
preparation for handling this question, that it would be a good idea never 
to lose sight of the total gross cost put into a Government contract, even 
though we bill out our costs every month on public vouchers. We may 
need to know the total gross costs, cumulatively, at every closing date, 
because we may wish to make an estimated adjustment to convert Govern-
ment-interpreted cost back to what we usually think of as cost. If this 
adjustment is made it will probably have to be done by the use of an 
-over-all or an approximated percentage. 
I think it would be well, also, in handling these contract costs, to 
remove from the contract cost accounts items which are temporarily in 
dispute and put them into a suspended cost account. That will serve two 
purposes: it will focus our attention upon doubtful items, and also, it will 
help us to keep the billings current. I believe some companies already 
have run into difficulties in. having to make repeated analyses of open 
balances in contract cost accounts because of the differences between what 
they have charged into those accounts and what they have been able to 
"bill up" on public vouchers with the approval of the Government auditors. 
Therefore, I think it would be distinctly helpful to segregate disallowed 
items by classes in a suspense account for the purpose of keeping the record 
clean and keeping the unbilled balances current. 
I am speaking about inventories as the proper term to describe unbilled 
costs on Government contracts. From some points of view perhaps the 
unbilled balances are accounts receivable. Under conditions where the 
Government takes title to all of the material immediately upon disburse­
ment of the funds, it may be that the costs incurred immediately become 
accounts receivable. However, in many cases, and particularly in smaller 
concerns acting as subcontractors, they must continue to handle these 
accounts as inventories, even though they are having to adopt Government 
interpretations of cost. 
If a portion of selling, administrative and general expense is to go 
into inventory, what is the proper treatment for the offsetting credit? 
One method is to charge items directly out of selling, administrative 
and general expenses or to short-cut those accounts. If that is done, our 
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selling, administrative and general expenses appear to be very much smaller 
than in the preceding accounting period, because part of them have gone 
directly over to the Government costs. Another method is to show the 
distributed amount in the selling, administrative and general expense 
section of the income account, as a special credit. Another way might 
be to show inventories of selling, administrative and general expenses at 
the beginning and end of the period, or to put into the income account 
the increase or decrease in the inventory of selling, administrative and 
general expenses includible in costs under the Government definitions. 
All of these methods, however, result in getting that credit into the 
net income account, and reporting it as true income for the period; that 
is, income available for dividends. I suggest that we might give consider­
ation to the procedure of crediting the item to a deferred account in the 
balance sheet and later adjusting that account by transfers to the credit of 
cost of sales proportionate to the transfers of the inventories to cost of sales. 
The reason why that idea appeals to me, at least theoretically, will 
be shown also by considering the nature of the fixed fees. We get into the 
idea of thinking of fixed fees allowed under cost-plus contracts as being the 
income or the profit from those contracts. As a matter of fact, the fixed 
fees have to include most of what we usually call selling expense, and a 
considerable share of what we call administrative and general expenses, and 
under the interpretation of T.D . 5000, the fixed fees usually have to 
cover interest which we ordinarily class as an "other deduction" in our 
income accounts, and also has to cover the federal income and excess profit 
taxes. Thus, the fixed fees really are closer to the gross income in our 
profit and loss statement than they are to net income. 
Government contracts provide for many ways of billing or collecting 
these fixed fees. Some of them provide that we may bill them proportion­
ately to the public vouchers. In that case we may spend 50 per cent of 
our total cost for materials in the first month or two of the contract, and 
immediately bill to the Government and collect our fixed fee. If that 
fixed fee is then taken into the income account directly, it appears that we 
are anticipating the realization of- net income. W e are probably taking it 
into our income account too early. Under these circumstances should not 
the fixed fees also be credited when billed to a deferred account in the 
balance sheet? The transfers of fixed fees plus the transfers of the credits 
for distributed selling, administrative and general expenses, at such times 
as shipments are made, would result in the recognition of realized income 
in a manner consistent with commercial practice. Of course, some con­
tracts provide that the fixed fees may be collected upon shipments; that is 
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more in step with commercial practice, and there perhaps would be no 
occasion in that type of procedure to use a deferred balance sheet account. 
We should bear in mind, all through this talk, that, while I am basing 
most of it upon the Government procedures for cost-plus-fixed-fee con­
tracts, our fixed prices are all subject to re-negotiation, and when we come 
to re-negotiate, the definitions of cost and the definitions of allowable 
profits are going to be the definitions of costs and fixed fees under the cost-
plus-fixed-fee procedures. 
Negotiated Flat Charges: We find frequently that negotiations have 
been made to avoid determining actual cost by using flat charges; for 
example, flat charges for purchasing and clerical expenses on construction 
contracts where general overhead expenses are not usually allowed. Flat 
charges may be applied to toolroom orders in lieu of actual material, labor, 
overhead and profit, or we may find management fees for operating a 
Government-owned plant. If the amounts are incidental and no profit 
is intended, they may be credited to the expense accounts for which they 
have been substituted. If significant in amount, however, it appears that 
the distributions of expense should be based upon the gross amounts of 
expenses incurred. The resulting difference between the flat allowance 
and the actual cost of the service rendered should be closed direct to profit 
and loss. Section 26.9 of T.D . 5000 provides that no loss on another 
contract shall be included in cost. Neither should the frofit, if any, be 
credited to cost. This procedure would, moreover, furnish information 
as to the adequacy of the negotiated flat rates for use in subsequent negoti­
ations. 
Standard or Normal Costs: Particularly where commercial work is 
continued along with war work, the contractor will be fortunate if he 
already has in operation long-term standard costs. It would be most unfor­
tunate if concerns which have developed, over the years, reliable cost 
standards and standard costs should abandon them now. 
The added volume of operations results in decreased fixed costs per 
unit of commercial product. From the point of view of the cost standard, 
this should be recognized as an abnormal and temporary condition, and 
the standards should not be revised downward for this reason. As pointed 
out by Mr. Lawrence Downie at the N.A.C.A. convention in 1940, such 
reductions in costs, if permitted to reduce frices of commercial products, 
would result in price structures that would be ruinous to the particular 
industry after the termination of the emergency period. The variances 
should be analyzed in such manner as to segregate the component variances 
due to performance or changes in prices from those due to increased volume. 
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The volume factor is bound to result in favorable variances on commercial 
work which represent additional profit due to sharing the actual fixed or 
stand-by costs with the supplementary Government work, and this par­
ticular credit variance is a profit that belongs to the contractor. The 
Government also profits on its work by being charged a smaller share of 
the fixed costs on its contracts than it would sustain if it did not share the 
fixed charges with commercial work. If standard costs are applied in 
costing the Government work, the credit variances due to volume in excess 
of standard which are applicable to the Government work must be credited 
to the Government. 
One exception may be noted, however, to the principle that savings 
from lowered costs on commercial activities due to increased total volume 
belong to the contractor. In the case of plant facility construction contracts, 
it is the theory of the Government that none of the fixed charges for the 
contractor's general expenses are to be included in the construction cost. 
That is another way of saying that the other operations of the contractor's 
business must continue to stand a normal overhead, it being assumed that 
the general overhead would have been incurred anyway, even if there had 
been no construction contract. This applies to executive salaries, corporate 
taxes, and most of the items we usually classify as administrative and 
general expenses. This exception appears to be imposed even if the other 
operations of the contractor have been discontinued by Government edict. 
The theory is that the contractor will make his profit on the supply contract 
to be performed after the construction has been completed. 
Government auditors, usually, will agree to the temporary use of 
either standard costs or normal burden rates to expedite current reimburse­
ments, and subject to later adjustment to actual costs. I believe it will be 
possible to arrange for such adjustments on an annual basis on a long-term 
contract. The correction factors, undoubtedly, will need to be applied in 
some detail to achieve a reasonably accurate apportionment. It is doubtful, 
for example, that the apportionments between commercial work, fixed-price 
contracts, and cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts can be made on a factory 
over-all basis; the variances from normal burden rates, undoubtedly, should 
be departmentalized and traced back to the original charges to the limits 
of reasonable expenditure for clerical expenses. The variances should be 
related to the total costs incurred rather than to the charges billed 5 that 
is, credit variances should be disposed of with due regard to inventories. 
In the absence of an elaborately developed standard cost system, with 
a completely established procedure for the analysis of the numerous factors 
which cause variances, it would appear that any standards or normals in 
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use which result in unusually large variances on the war contract work 
should be promptly revised. The variances must be disposed of to the 
satisfaction of the Government auditors; if they are so great as to appear 
to destroy the reasonableness of the first cost computations, a great deal 
of difficulty with the Government auditors undoubtedly will result. Any 
computation for the disposition of the variances will be less accurately 
distributed than the first computations, otherwise the cost accounts would 
be entirely rewritten. This situation must be avoided by close attention to 
the variances incurred from month to month. 
Direct and Indirect Expenses: In the Government's prescribed 
treatment of expenses, there is greater stress laid upon the determination 
and segregation of direct expenses than has been customarily used by in­
dustry. Government auditors dislike distributed indirect expenses and 
much prefer a large basis for distribution and low percentages of overhead. 
Under this point of view, the greatest possible proportion of the total pay 
rolls should be disposed of by direct charges; upon occasions the auditors 
have even gone to the extreme of requesting that executive salaries be 
charged direct. This general principle is not contrary to the best accounting 
practice; in fact, most cost accountants will agree that distribution of 
expenses from their sources is to be preferred, wherever possible, to the 
pooling of expenses and distribution of the lump sum. The commercial 
rule that "direct expenses" may be treated as "indirect" if the costs of 
treating them as "direct" are unreasonably high, and if the difference in the 
end results is immaterial as compared with the clerical cost involved, should 
still prevail. 
Under Section 26.9 of T .D . 5000 there are three tests of "direct" 
expenses: 
1. They must be "properly chargeable" directly to the cost. 
2. A detailed record must be kept by the contractor of all items of a 
similar character. 
3. No item of a similar character which, is properly a direct charge to 
other work may be included as a part of any indirect expenses pro­
rated to the contract. 
As the contracts uniformly refer to good accounting practice as the 
standard of accepted allowances of cost, we must rely upon that to interpret 
the first requirement that the items must be "properly chargeable" directly 
to the cost. There appear to be at least two approaches. The first is 
adequately described by the term "causal responsibility," as used by Mr. 
Harry Howell in his paper at the St. Louis N.A.C.A. convention in 1940. 
This approach is at the source of the expenditures; the other is at the 
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receiving end and is the test as to what extent the contract received 
benefit. We must ask as to each item: 
1. Did the contract cause the expenditure to be made? 
2. Was the existence of the contract responsible for the expenditure? 
3. Did the contract receive all of the benefit from the expenditure? 
If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative and the tracing 
of the causal responsibility or benefit is complete as to the particular contract 
standing alone, the expenditure is a direct charge. 
"Indirect" expenses are those of joint benefit to several contracts or 
lines of product and those expenses incurred for the business as a whole 
which are of some benefit to the Government. They exclude all expenses 
which have a direct causal responsibility or benefit to only one contract, 
and they exclude those expenses incurred for the business as a whole but 
which by Government definitions are unallowable elements of cost because 
they benefit only the corporate entity and do not benefit the Government. 
The Comptroller-General of the United States has the final word, and 
his opinions show a strict interpretation of what is "related to the contract.5* 
If no relation can be traced, the expenditures apparently fall within the 
class, "contemplated to be borne by the contractor." Every item to be 
included either in "direct" expenses or in distributed "indirect" expenses 
must have, in some degree, a relation of causal responsibility or of benefit 
to the contract. 
In the revision of any cost system to meet the requirements of account­
ing for war contracts, the importance of adequate departmentalization 
of the plant can hardly be over-emphasized. If the Government production 
is in a completely separate plant, all of the expenditures at that plant have a 
direct relation to the contract, and there is little difficulty in proving the 
right to reimbursement. If the work must be carried on in a plant with 
commercial work, the greater the extent to which the Government work 
can be segregated in departments devoted 100 per cent to that purpose, 
the smoother the arrangements will work. 
One difficulty arises before production begins in a plant where direct 
labor is the usual basis for overhead distribution. The same difficulty also 
is likely to arise towards the end of the contract period after production labor 
has been discontinued. Several months may elapse during which executives, 
engineers, purchasing agents, production-planning men and others may 
spend a great portion of their time on a new Government contract. Under 
the usual distribution of expenses, no charges could be made to the contract, 
because there is no productive labor on which to base the distribution. In 
this situation, those men, and all men of their service classification, should 
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be requested to make daily time reports, so that the directly related services 
may be charged directly to the contract. Moreover, special cost studies 
should be made to determine burden rates to be added to the direct charges 
for their salaries, for these men use desk space, heat, light, elevator service 
and other services. Such special burden rates can well be computed by 
establishing the building or buildings in which the work is done as cost 
centers' and arriving at a distribution of the total building costs based upon 
the pay roll for the entire building. 
The requirement that if certain items customarily treated as overhead 
expenses are singled out for treatment as direct charges, then all items of a 
similar character must be so treated, causes some difficulties. It is a proper 
requirement. In practice, it has to be administered with reason, and 
frequently the resident auditors will agree that while many items have the 
same account classification in the books of account, they differ even within 
that classification, and there must be a residue that cannot be charged direct 
and which may be included in the distribution of the "indirect" expenses. 
Segregation of Selling Exfenses: Some concerns still carry, in their 
general accounts, two general divisions of expenses: manufacturing and 
commercial. The commercial expense controlling account is unsuited to 
present conditions whether operating fixed-price or C.P.F.F. contracts. 
This account should be divided into two accounts for adequate control: 
( i  ) selling expenses, and (2) administrative and general expenses. As 
each of these groups, ordinarily, will contain certain unallowable expenses 
for Government contract accounting, it would be desirable to segregate the 
unallowable expenses under each classification in separate controlling ac­
counts. All four accounts should be closed directly to the profit and loss 
account for general statement purposes, but the two representing expenses 
allowable for Government contract accounting will be available for com­
puting the necessary cost distributions. For cost accounting and Govern­
ment inventory purposes, the allowable administrative and general expenses 
account may be distributed, as suggested in T.D . 5000, directly to contracts, 
on the basis of total manufacturing and installation costs incurred for the 
accounting period, i.e., usually the current month. The contracts, of 
course, include all commercial, fixed-price and C.P.F.F. contracts or 
orders. Another method might well be to distribute to both manufacturing 
and selling operations on the basis of total pay rolls under these divisions 
for the month. The allowable selling expenses, also, according to T.D . 
5000, may be distributed directly to contracts and orders, either on a basis 
of sales completed during the period, or total manufacturing and installation 
costs during the period. If the total pay roll method has been used for the 
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distribution of allowable administrative and general expenses, the allowable 
selling expense plus its pro rata portion of the distributed administrative 
and general expenses would be transferred to general manufacturing for 
further distribution. 
Sales Branches: Many concerns being converted entirely to war 
production have extensive selling branch organizations. Attention is 
invited to the wording of T.D . 5000, which lists among the items which 
are excluded from the cost of performing a contract or subcontract the 
"expenses, maintenance and depreciation of excess facilities (including idle 
land and building, idle parts of a building, and excess machinery and equip­
ment) vacant or abandoned, or not adaptable for future use in performing 
contracts or subcontracts." If branch plants are adaptable to and are being 
converted to war use, it appears that the expenses, maintenance and 
depreciation of such facilities should be included in the allowable selling 
expenses and distributed with other expenses of a general nature over all 
of the production of the concern. 
Idle Plant Facilities: Aside from the problem of selling branches, we 
may have manufacturing facilities which are clearly to be excluded in our 
distribution of expenses. It appears evident, in addition to the quotation 
just given, that in respect to all permitted distributions of indirect expenses, 
all elements of expense therein must be "properly incident to and necessary 
for the performance of the contract," or again, from paragraph (j) in 
Section 26.9 of T .D . 5000, "all items which have no relation to the 
performance of the contract or subcontract shall be eliminated from the 
amount to be allocated." The wordings of these definitions, and the 
published opinions of the Comptroller-General indicate that losses of the 
contractor, as distinguished from costs and expenses of the contractor in 
connection with facilities needed for the contract or of present or future 
benefit to the Government, are not contemplated to be includible in 
Government costs. In other words, it does not appear that the Government 
intends to underwrite or subsidize the fixed charges which the contractor 
may have as a result of his capital investment in plant assets not suitable 
for war use any more than it subsidizes the small concern that may be 
forced by war conditions to go out of business. If it becomes necessary, 
as a part of the conversion of a plant to war use, to place certain machinery 
and equipment under tarpaulins out in the yard until after the emergency, 
such machinery should be segregated in the accounts and its carrying 
charges should be omitted from the cost computations. If, on the other 
hand, the machines can be converted to war use, and are expected to be so 
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converted, they constitute stand-by equifment} and the carrying charges 
should be claimed in the overhead distribution accounts. 
Depreciation and Amortization Allowances: One question that arises 
is whether we are bound to the same depreciation allowances permitted by 
the Treasury Department. Every case, of course, stands by itself. If our 
depreciation for tax purposes is based on corporate cost of the assets, and if 
our tax return rates of depreciation, applied over the years, have resulted 
in net asset values that are fairly representative of the remaining useful 
lives of the assets today, there would appear to be no reason why the same 
computations permitted by the Internal Revenue Code should not be ac­
ceptable for cost purposes. 
It appears to be generally recognized, however, both by the Treasury 
Department and the business public, that many depreciation schedules, 
particularly those resulting from cumulative computations over a long 
period of years, have become quite distorted from present facts. During 
the 10,20's many concerns were over-generous in depreciation allowances, 
and sometimes these rates were even carried through the depression years. 
For the past six years or more, the Treasury Department has been con­
sistently reducing the allowed depreciation rates, in many instances basing 
the allowances upon the idea that the accumulated reserves should not be 
allowed to rise above some set limit, thus obviously understating depreci­
ation allowances currently, to even up for too generous allowances years 
ago. 
It appears to me that a contractor finding himself in this position with 
the Treasury is entitled to a fresh start when dealing with the War 
Department or the Navy Department. The costs determined for Govern­
ment contracts may run but a short period relative to the lives of standard 
equipment converted to war use. The contractor is entitled to recover 
whatever is the actual cost due to wear and tear, obsolescence, and other 
factors during the period of his contract. If a contractor had written 
his property account down to one dollar, or if all of his property had become 
fully depreciated, there would be no question of his right to restate his 
property accounts in order to compute the depreciation sustained on the 
war work. By the same rule, he should be permitted a fresh start if his 
asset and depreciation reserves are materially out of line with the present 
useful condition of the property. Tax-wise, since income taxes appear 
to be here to stay, a taxpayer gets his depreciation either in one year 
or another, but the period of the war contracts will, we hope, not be 
sufficiently long to guarantee the contractor this protection. 
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Is accelerated depreciation an allowable expense element in war work? 
T.D . 5000 provides, as an allowable element of cost, that, "In making 
allowances for depreciation, consideration shall be given to the number and 
length of shifts." 
Th e E.P.F. and D.P.C. contracts for Government financing of plant 
facilities provide options to the contractors for purchasing the facilities at 
original cost less allowances for depreciation after the termination of the 
emergency. • These option clauses quite uniformly state the following 
annual depreciation rates (which are higher than rates usually used under 
normal conditions) to be used in determining the recovery purchase prices 
under these contracts: 
Per Cent 
Buildings and improvements 5 
Machinery, equipment, furniture and fixtures 12 
Portable and durable tools and automobiles 50 
Section 8.2404 of the Navy Department regulations for the "Pro­
curement of Naval Supplies" includes the following comment concerning 
accelerated depreciation as an element of the cost of supplies: 
Where plants are operating on two shifts, the depreciation rate may 
reasonably be 150 per cent of the normal rates for a single shift. Where the plant 
is operating on three shifts, the depreciation rate may be extended to 200 per cent 
of the normal rate. 
Quite obviously, then, we have official sanction for the frincifle of 
accelerated depreciation. 
Several points may well be borne in mind on this question: 
1. The combined costs of maintenance and depreciation should be 
considered together. Excessive wear and tear may be made good during 
the accounting period by excessive expenditures for repairs and mainten­
ance. 
2. If the normal rates previously in use for the depreciation computa­
tions included a substantial allowance for obsolescence, supersession or 
inadequacy, a considerable amount of additional wear and tear may be 
experienced before any adjustment of the rate is in order. For example, 
if a machine could be used for 20 years on a wear and tear basis, but 
because we expected to want a larger or better machine in 10 years, we 
were using a 10 per cent rate instead of 5 per cent, then the machine can 
receive double the use without warranting any increase in the rate of 
depreciation. The 10 per cent rate then becomes 10 per cent for wear and 
tear rather than 5 per cent for wear and tear and 5 per cent for inadequacy, 
with no increase in the total charge to cost. 
3. The same machines may have quite different life histories in the 
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hands of different owners. Some factors to be considered, other than the 
mere number of hours of machine use, are ( i  ) the frequency of inspection 
of the condition of the machines, (2) the speed-up over the designed r.p.m., 
(3) possible overloading in excess of the designed load, (4) the use of 
unskilled operators, and (5 ) rapid deterioration when ordinary maintenance 
is omitted due to the pressure of production. 
What about amortization as an element of cost? This question 
may be of great importance to a contractor if the emergency plant facilities 
have been provided with the contractor's own capital, particularly if he 
operates under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. It has been clearly shown 
to be a policy of the Government not to permit special amortization of 
emergency plant facilities as an element of cost. This policy was explained 
a year or more ago to be, (1) an effort to prevent inflation by keeping 
down the prices of the things the Government had to purchase that would 
be made in special war plant facilities, and (2) an effort to prevent alleged 
mistakes made in World Wa r I, whereby the Government, by paying prices 
for supplies, which prices permitted the contractors to recover their capital 
investments, made so-called "gifts" to industry of valuable plant facilities. 
The Administration developed the so-called tax-compromise idea, 
whereby contractors were permitted amortization for tax purposes, thereby 
recovering a part but not all of their capital investment through a reduction 
in taxes, but were not allowed recovery of special plant investment in excess 
of normal depreciation in the price of their products sold to the Govern­
ment. This tax compromise was enacted into legislation in Section 124(1") 
of the Revenue Act of 1940, which required Certificates of Government 
Protection and Certificates of Non-Reimbursement to put teeth into the 
policy. This section proved, however, to be such a bottleneck to the war 
production program that it was repealed. 
How does the situation stand today? Evidently we have fallen back 
upon the general provisions of law and Government contract regulations. 
It should be recalled that prior to the advent of O.P.A., the War and 
Navy Departments considered amortization of special facilities a proper 
element of cost and they established a procedure for guaranteeing such 
protection by special negotiation. It is noted also that Section 8.2404(c) 
(8) of the Naval Regulations for the "Procurement of Naval Supplies" 
provides that amortization may be allowed as an element of cost where the 
purchases of special machinery and equipment have been approved in advance 
by the Navy. 
Th e Treasury Department opposed the enactment of the amortization 
sections of the Internal Revenue Code on the argument that the ordinary 
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depreciation, obsolescence and loss of useful value provisions gave the 
contractors ample right to recover the full costs of their investments for tax 
purposes. The difficulty there was that the deductions could be taken only 
after the event of the loss had taken place, and that current allowances to 
provide against the probability of the loss were denied. Treasury interpre­
tations of the word "obsolescence" as an allowable element of cost under 
T.D . 5000 express the same view. 
It is presumed that the auditors for Government contracts are still 
influenced by the same policy which brought about the enactment of Sec­
tion I24(i)  . It may be that many contractors can recover all they consider 
necessary by means of accelerated depreciation. There may be instances, 
however (such as, for example, a shipyard constructed with private capital, 
the use of which for the entire period of the normal wear and tear life 
of the assets may be very problematical) where the actual cost to the 
contractor will not be determined unless an amortization allowance is 
included. The burden of proof, undoubtedly, will rest heavily upon the 
contractor; however, a claim should be made and a cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contract should not be closed until the facts are determined, even if it is 
necessary to hold the matter open until after the emergency to obtain a 
retroactive view of the facts. 
Bases for the Distribution of Manufacturing Exfenses: Section 26.9 
of T .D . 5000 states that distribution on the basis of direct labor charges will 
be satisfactory, but that other bases may be used, depending upon "all the 
facts and circumstances." If better methods have been in use they should 
be continued. Special cost studies may frequently be required in order to 
produce evidence to the Government auditors that rates used for handling 
charges, floor space computations for departmental distributions, or power-
plant schedules long in use are accurate under present operating conditions. 
The established methods may be sound in principle, but, in view of the 
frequent ^departmentalizations, reclassifications of expenses and conver­
sions from commercial to war production, such established methods or 
schedules may very likely need review. 
If the interpretations of direct and indirect labor are modified by the 
considerations previously discussed, the larger amounts classified as direct 
labor will require prompt reduction downward of normal departmental 
burden rates. 
If service department costs (for example, power expense) has been 
distributed in two parts, (1) charges for fixed or stand-by costs allocated 
on a designed capacity or "ready for use" basis, and (2) charges for the 
variable factors of the service department costs—-that is, the service actually 
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used basis—there would appear to be every reason to continue this practice. 
The facilities inherited by the converted plant may bear little relation to 
the facilities that would be redesigned and installed today. Nevertheless, 
they are the actual facilities in use for the war production. The distribu­
tion of the total fixed service department plant investment costs should 
be revised according to present department utilization and the present 
machine requirements, but it would appear to me, under the actual cost 
theories, no segregation for capacity in excess of present needs would be 
required. In other words, the Government may have inherited a power 
plant which is not well designed or not economical for the use being made 
of it today, but the total actual costs may be applied. 
"Reasonable" Expenses: Somewhere in every Government contract, 
there will be found the word "reasonable" in relation to allowable expenses. 
The interpretation of this word has been a shock to many executives. Ap­
parently the interpretation is very different under a peacetime free enterprise, 
competitive economy, wherein a court may consider that compensation 
in excess of $1,000,000 a year is not unreasonable for top executives of a 
giant corporation, because of the competition for men of such caliber, as 
compared with a wartime, planned and "total-war" economy, under which 
citizens are being drafted regardless of personal abilities for military service 
at $21 per month. 
I understand that the Navy and the Air Corps have established upper 
limits of $25,000 a year for executive salaries to be included in costs; that 
the Navy regards $9,000 a year as the top salary for field construction 
work; that the Ordnance Division of the Army requires special approval 
for salaries in excess of $12,000 a year; that bonuses are permissible only 
to the extent of 10 per cent upon salaries up to $3,000 a year, and that 
bonuses to executives are considered to be "not related to the contract" and 
"expenditures to be borne by the contractor out of his fees." Such limita­
tions are not entirely new, as, I believe, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 
limited executive salaries, in the costs of contracts entered into by the 
Maritime Commission, to $25,000 a year. 
W e encounter similar interpretations of the word "reasonable" in the 
allowed per diem rates for traveling expenses. These rates, as permitted 
by the Air Corps, were $10 per diem for executives and $6 per diem for 
others, until late in 1941 when they were increased to $15 and $8, 
respectively. 
The War and Navy Departments also insist upon the advantage of 
the Government rates (generally 60 per cent of commercial rates) on 
telegraph services. Each contractor must clarify his position with respect 
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to this ruling. In certain instances, arrangements have been made to have 
separate invoices submitted by the telegraph companies for services on the 
Government contracts, and these invoices are paid directly by a Government 
Disbursing Officer after certification by the contractor, and they are thus 
excluded entirely from the contractor's accounts and costs. Under a Navy 
Department ruling, the 60 per cent limitation on telegrams applies only 
on "direct" charges and does not apply to telegrams included in "indirect" 
expenses prorated to a contract. 
Contractors should protect their rights under their contracts in respect 
to all arbitrary limitations of expenses, by written protest or notice. In 
order to expedite current settlements, such excess expenses should be omitted 
from the expense distributions by segregation into an unallowable or 
Suspended Expenses Controlling Account, supported by detailed schedules 
for future reference. Needless to say, such controlling accounts should not 
be used in computations of inventory valuations, and they should be closed 
into the profit-and loss accounts at each closing date. A permanent record 
should then be retained for future reference. 
It is only fair to state that the Government, on cost-plus-fixed-fee 
work, does permit the inclusion of certain costs which a commercial cus­
tomer might consider unreasonable; e.g., the cost of training employees 
in the necessary skills to perform their work, the cost of spoiled and wasted 
work, reworks, advances in labor and material costs due to general price 
trends, and other items which, under the theory of "actual cost," are 
directly related to the contracts. 
"Personal" Exfenses: The opinions of the Comptroller-General 
have disclosed a very restricted interpretation of the term "personal" ex­
penses. For example, the cost of a chauffeur's license paid for an employee 
to permit him to drive in connection with his employment, the costs incurred 
by a contractor for employees while they were traveling on company 
business to assist them to obtain birth certificates required by federal regula­
tions for admittance to other plants on business for their employers, and 
similar expenditures to assist them in filing questionnaires with draft boards, 
have been held to be personal to the employees and unrelated to the Govern­
ment contracts, even for inclusion indirectly in general overhead expenses. 
It does not seem to me that a classification of "personal" expenses as 
unallowable expenses is sound, since the motivating force behind these 
expenditures, when made by the contractor, is the performance of the 
contract, and, moreover, Section 26.9 of T .D . 5000 specifically permits 
many "personal" expenses such as welfare expenses, pensions, traveling 
expenses, and, one might add, even pay rolls. 
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Contractors should not only reserve their legal rights by written notices 
to the contracting officers in connection with disallowances such as these, 
but they should make active protests, written and oral, so that interpretations 
may, if possible, be brought more into line with the usual business practices 
that were in the minds of the contracting parties when the contracts were 
signed. 
CHAIRMAN WOOD: Thank you very much, Mr. Russell, for your very 
interesting talk. Are there any questions on either Mr. Russell's or Mr. Howell's 
talk? 
M R  . STARR: Mr. Chairman, I was just wondering what would be the 
proper handling of the increased labor cost, due to the rise of the cost of living 
index? Quite a few of the contracts have a basic labor rate as of a particular 
date, and to that they add the change in the cost of living index. Should that 
be a normal or an abnormal cost? 
M R  . RUSSELL: YOU refer, I suppose, to escalator clauses. There are several 
types of those contracts. Sometimes the increase is entirely unrelated to the 
contractor's own costs, but you refer to the case in which the escalator clause is 
tied up to the proof that the contractor suffered an increased cost. Personally, 
 don't think that requires special accounting treatment in pay roll and labor 
accounts; I think it does require statistical study, in order to arrive at a sufficient 
basis on which to convince the auditor that the statistical method, under the 
escalator clause, is sound; but I do not think that it calls for any segregation of a 
part of the pay roll into a special account. 
Incidentally, I have heard a few interesting comments about that. One 
rumor is that the escalator clauses are generally to be renegotiated out of contracts; 
another is that, in inquiring as to the type of audit which trie Government would 
require under an escalator clause, the answer was made that an escalator clause 
would require fully as detailed an audit as is required for the passing of public 
vouchers. If that should come about, the mere existence of an escalator clause 
in a fixed-price contract would be subjecting that contract to a complete audit 
by the Government auditors. That is one reason, I imagine, why they are 
contemplating taking them out. 
M R  . DAVERIO: Could you cite me a ruling by some authoritative source 
which approves a charge of some kind for use of fully depreciated items? 
You said it might be well to give consideration to the fact that, because 
during former years we over-depreciated some of our assets, we ought to charge 
the Government for the use of those facilities which are now fully depreciated 
and which are now being used on Government contracts. 
M R  . RUSSELL: I don't think you will find any ruling from the Comptroller-
General that will support that; the question is very much, in the air at the present 
time. 
M R  . DAVERIO: Being tax-minded, my thinking runs this way: Suppose 
you attempt to charge the Government $10,000 for depreciation on fully de­
preciated assets under the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, you pay your income tax 
on that particular income; if you are in the 95 per cent tax bracket, you pay 
95 per cent to the Government in taxes, and retain only $500. The Comptroller­
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General, three or four years from now, may say that the $10,000 charge was 
not a proper reimbursable cost item, and require you to refund that amount to 
the War Department. You would then have to file a claim for $9500 tax refund, 
which you may or may not be able to recover upon. It therefore seems to me 
you might be involved in a pretty dangerous situation unless you could get some 
kind of approval ahead of time. Maybe we shouldn't call it depreciation, maybe 
we ought to call it rent or some kind of item like that. 
The thing that confuses me is that, even though the Government agrees to 
reimburse you for "costs," your books will not reflect any depreciation on fully 
depreciated assets. 
M R  , RUSSELL: I think you will have trouble unless there is a very marked 
differential. That is, I think if your books are far out of line that you should be 
able to get relief. 
M R  . DAVERIO: YOU can appreciate the danger. 
M R  . RUSSELL: Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN WOOD: I think you know, probably, that our accountant, who 
spoke here last year, has just about finished, I believe, and ready to issue, for the 
WPB, a new Regulation on Costs in Government Contracts. It is not intended 
directly to supersede T.D. 5000, but I am sure it will have an important bearing 
on it. 
DR . TAGGART: I may say that it is just off the press; I received my first 
copy the day before I came here. 
CHAIRMAN WOOD: Have you any comment that you could give us on that, 
Dr. Taggart? 
DR . TAGGART: The only comment I have is that it is very carefully 
drawn to agree with T.D. 5000, down to the last dot of an i and cross of a t; 
it is simply what you might call an expansion or explanation of T.D. 5000; it has 
been passed around to all the Departments of the Government which might 
conceivably be interested, and they have all gone over it with a fine-tooth comb, 
and I think it probably will be a thoroughly reliable guide to the contractor. 
However, whether the Treasury Department will agree to be bound by it, I 
hesitate to say. 
CHAIRMAN WOOD: I have one question I would like to ask, Mr. Russell. 
Did I understand you to say that your cost on your regular commercial work 
should not be reduced because of the increased volume of work that is being done 
by the plant as a whole? 
M R  . RUSSELL: I said that it would be very dangerous if such a reduction 
found its way into the price structure of the commercial product, from the 
standpoint of the situation in industry after the termination of the emergency, and 
that the volume variance resulting in the commercial work really belonged to the 
contractor. 
CHAIRMAN WOOD: That is a debatable point, I am afraid. 
Are there any more questions? 
QUESTION: Mr. Howell referred to a Bulletin of May in his talk. Is that 
a National Association of Cost Accountants Bulletin? 
CHAIRMAN WOOD: Yes, for May, 1942, I believe. 
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DAVIS, H  . H., Vice President, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 
DECKER, LEO J., Treasurer, Shawnee Pottery Company, Zanesville, Ohio 
DEERING, JOHN J., Manager, Arthur Young and Company, New York City 
DICE, CHAS. A., Professor, Department of Business Organization and Economics, 
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 
DICKERSON, WILLIAM E., Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Ohio 
State University, Columbus, Ohio 
DITSLEAR, JOHN HOWARD, Assistant Accounting Department Head, Farm Bureau 
Cooperative Association, Columbus, Ohio 
DOEHRLE, H. M., Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery, Detroit, Michigan 
DONALDSON, E. F., Associate Professor, Department of Business Organization, 
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 
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DRAKE, JOHN F., Lindsay Wire Weaving Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
DUNDON, ROBERT T., Office Manager, Columbus Stove Company, Columbus, 
Ohio 
Duis, H. GLENN, Certified Accountant, Portsmouth, Ohio 
EBENHOCH, LEONARD G., Cost Accountant, Ace Engineering Company, Colum­
bus, Ohio 
EBERLE, ELMER ANTON, Accountant, Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery, 
Detroit, Michigan 
EBERLY, D. R., Arnold, Hawk and Cuthbertson, Dayton, Ohio 
ECKLEBERRY, GEORGE W., Professor, Department of Accounting, Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio 
EDWARDS, HARRY R., Office Manager, F. and R. Lazarus and Company, Colum­
bus, Ohio 
EGGIMAN, NORMAN R., Assistant Professor, Department of Business Administra­
tion, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 
ELLENBERGER, E. P., Supervisor, Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery, 
Cleveland, Ohio 
ESSIG, ROBERT R., Accountant, Ernst and Ernst, Youngstown, Ohio 
EVELEIGH, C. F., Eli Lilly and Company, Indianapolis, Indiana 
FISHER, DON A., Administrative Assistant, Department of Liquor Control, Col­
umbus, Ohio 
FLEIG, W. J., Instructor, Department of Accounting, Ohio State University, 
Columbus, Ohio 
FOSTER, J. T., Assistant Manager, Ernst and Ernst, Columbus, Ohio 
Fox, GLENDON O., Accountant, Robert N. Lloyd, CP.A., Dayton, Ohio 
FRANKE, NORMAN, Controller, Gilmanton Salesbook Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
FRANKLIN, CARL M., Assistant to the President, Ohio State University, Colum­
bus, Ohio 
FREY, HAROLD A., Professor of Marketing, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio 
FROWNFELTER, R. S., Auditor, Warner and Swasey Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
FURRY, VIRGIL L., Accountant, Columbus Coated Fabrics Corporation, Colum­
bus, Ohio 
GAM MEL, O., Accountant, Locke Machine Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
GATTNER, C. C  , Accountant, Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clinger, Columbus, 
Ohio 
GABRLE, R. H., Certified Public Accountant, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Com­
pany, Cleveland, Ohio 
GETZ, HOMER, Cost Accountant, American Rolling Mill Company, Middletown, 
Ohio 
GEPHART, W. L., Price, Waterhouse and Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
GLENN , D. W., Manager, Ernst and Ernst, Columbus, Ohio 
GRIFFITHS, H. HARRIS, Warner and Swasey Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
HABER, D. P., Treasurer, Lowe Brothers Company, Dayton, Ohio 
HAGERTY, JAMES E., Professor Emeritus, Department of Social Administration, 
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 
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HAMBLETON, THOMAS F., Principal Examiner, Federal Home Loan Bank Ad­
ministration, Columbus, Ohio 
HAMMONDS, I. O., Supervisor, Ernst and Ernst, Youngstown, Ohio 
HARRIS, M . CONNER, Accountant, Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery, 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
HARTZELL, DAVID, Arnold, Hawk and Cuthbertson, Dayton, Ohio 
HATCH, CLAYTON D., JR. , Warner and Swasey Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
HAWK, J. A., Partner, Arnold, Hawk and Cuthbertson, Dayton, Ohio 
HAYES, H . GORDON, Professor, Department of Economics, Ohio State University, 
Columbus, Ohio 
HECKERT , JOSIAH B., Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio 
HEUSEL, RALPH D,, Treasurer, Associated Public Utilities Corporation, Colum­
bus, Ohio 
HICKS, ERNEST L., Accountant, Arthur Andersen and Company, Columbus, Ohio 
HILLIARD, T  . C  , Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, University of 
Akron, Akron, Ohio 
H I T E  , LESTER E., Chief Accountant, Shaw-Barton, Inc., Coshocton, Ohio 
HOCHADEL, R. J., Comptroller, National Electric Coil Company, Columbus, Ohio 
HODGEDON, F. J., JR.  , Certified Public Accountant, Cleveland, Ohio 
HOFFMAN, J. MARION, Battelle and Battelle, Dayton, Ohio 
HOOCK, O. M., Cost Accountant, Lennox Furnace Company, Columbus, Ohio 
HOOPER, A. W., Assistant Comptroller, Miller-Jones Company, Columbus, Ohio 
HOPKINS, LEONARD L., Accountant, Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clinger, 
Columbus, Ohio 
HOWE, H  . W., Assistant Comptroller, H.C. Godman Company, Columbus, Ohio 
HOWELL, HARRY E., Grinnell Company, Inc., Providence, Rhode Island 
HUGHES, J. T., Certified Public Accountant, Columbus, Ohio 
HUNTINGTON, C. C  , Professor, Department of Geography, Ohio State Univer­
sity, Columbus, Ohio 
HUNTINGTON, MRS. C. C  , Columbus, Ohio 
ISENHART, R. F., Local Audit Supervisor, Columbia Engineering Corporation, 
Dayton, Ohio 
JACKSON, B. F., Price, Waterhouse and Company, Detroit, Michigan 
JACKSON, ERNEST F., Cost Accountant, American Rolling Mill Co., Middletown, 
Ohio 
JAHN, ARTHUR C  , Public Accountant, Columbus, Ohio 
JANSSEN, HAROLD H., Graduate Student, Department of Accounting, Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio 
JENCKS, W, B., Scovell, Wellington and Company, New York City 
Jucius, M . J., Assistant Professor, Department of Business Organization, Ohio 
State University, Columbus, Ohio 
KALLANBAUGH, G. S., Director—U. C. Division, Ohio Bureau of Unemployment 
Compensation, Columbus, Ohio 
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KAUFFMAN, J. H.  J Certified Public Accountant, Columbus, Ohio 
KEIL, FRED, JR.  , Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Toledo, Ohio 
KEIRN, P. L., Accountant, General Tire and Rubber Company, Akron, Ohio 
KELLER, JOHN G., Partner, Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clinger, Columbus, 
Ohio 
KELLER, LAWRENCE D., Certified Public Accountant, Columbus, Ohio 
KEM, MYRON S., General Accountant, Dayton Rubber Manufacturing Company, 
Dayton, Ohio 
KESKE, H . A., Comptroller, Lamson and Sessions Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
KIESSLING, JOHN R., General Auditor, Wright Aeronautical Corporation, Lock-
land, Ohio 
KIMBALL, MILO, Assistant Professor, Department of Business Organization, Ohio 
State University, Columbus, Ohio 
KING, BERNARD L., Accountant, Owens-Illinois Glass Company, Toledo, Ohio 
KINZIG, V. E., Auditor, Dayton Power and Light Company, Dayton, Ohio 
KNAPP, C. HOWARD, Vice President, Clyffside Brewing Company, Cincinnati^ 
Ohio 
KNAPP, JESSE, Certified Public Accountant, Portsmouth, Ohio 
KNAUFF, PAUL N., Assistant Auditor, Ohio Leather Company, Girard, Ohio 
KOHLER, E. L., Editor '^Accounting Review," Washington, D. C. 
KOVACHY, EDWARD M., Fenn College, Cleveland, Ohio 
KRAUSS, E. L., Junior Cost Accountant, Federal Glass Company, Columbus, Ohio 
KRTJMPF, W. A., Southwestern Publishing Company, Cincinnati, Ohio 
KUEHNFOLD, R. C  , Warner and Swasey, Cleveland, Ohio 
KUHNLE, H . C  , Vice-President, F. J. Heer Printing Company, Columbus, Ohio 
LAMBERT, K. E., Arnold3 Hawk and Cuthbertson, Dayton, Ohio 
LANE, W. D., Arnold, Hawk and Cuthbertson, Dayton, Ohio 
LANG, FRANK, Statistician, Farm Bureau Insurance Company, Columbus, Ohio 
LANGDON, ELMORE C  , Partner, W. E. Langdon and Son, C.P.A.'s., Columbus, 
Ohio 
LANGDON, W. E., Partner, W. E. Langdon and Son, C.P.A.3s., Columbus, Ohio 
LAPP, ARNOLD W., Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, University of 
Toledo, Toledo, Ohio 
LEIS, R. O., Ernst and Ernst, Columbus, Ohio 
LEY, J. W., Assistant Professor, Department of Business Organization, Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio 
LINEK, EMIL J., Assistant Auditor, Columbia Engineering Corporation, New 
York City 
LLOYD, ROBERT N., Certified Public Accountant, Dayton, Ohio 
LUCAS, R. G., Arnold, Hawk and Cuthbertson, Dayton, Ohio 
LUTZ, R. H., Accountant, Columbus Coated Fabrics Corporation, Columbusr Ohio 
MARSH, W M  . F., Partner, Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania 
MARTIN, JOHN C  , Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clinger, Columbus, Ohio 
MASON, BURTON B., Certified Public Accountant, Columbus, Ohio 
MAUGHMER, E. C  , Accountant, Ohio Farm Bureau, Columbus, Ohio 
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MAYNARD, H . H., Professor, Department of Business Organization, Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio 
MCCORMICK, ARCHIE B., Staff Accountant, Keller, Kirschner, Martin and 
Clinger, Columbus, Ohio 
"MCCOY, JAMES, Instructor, Department of Accounting, Ohio State University, 
Columbus, Ohio 
MCLEOD , STUART C  , Secretary, National Association of Cost Accountants, New 
York City 
M C N E I L L  , JOHN W., Instructor, Bowling Green State University, Bowling 
Green, Ohio 
MERCHANT, JAY F., Accountant, Marble Cliff Quarries Company, Columbus, 
Ohio 
MERTZ , B. J., Comptroller, Buckeye Union Casualty Company, Columbus, Ohio 
MESSINGER, FERD R., Staff Accountant, Konopak, Hurst, and Dalton, Toledo, 
Ohio 
MICHALSKE, W M  . F., Secretary, Union Club, Cleveland, Ohio 
MILLER , HERMANN C  , Professor, Department of Accounting, Ohio State Uni­
versity, Columbus, Ohio 
MOORE, JOHN B., Konopak, Hurst and Dalton, Toledo, Ohio 
MOORE, JOHN R., Assistant Accountant, Ohio Farm Bureau Corporation, Colum­
bus, Ohio 
MOORE, V. J., Partner, Meaden and Moore, Cleveland, Ohio 
MOTT , G. E., Accountant, Moore Enameling and Manufacturing Company, 
West Lafayette, Ohio 
MOUCK , GEORGE M., Professor, Department of Accounting, Fenn College, Cleve­
land, Ohio 
MYERS, CAPT. W. L., Field Superintendent, Kroger Grocery and Baking Com­
pany, Atlanta, Georgia 
NEUBER , W., Auditor, Liquidation of the Guradian Trust Company, Cleveland, 
Ohio 
NEWELL , C. C  , Assistant Auditor, Buckeye Steel Castings Company, Columbus, 
Ohio 
NISWONGER, C. R., Assistant Dean, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio 
OGILVIE, H  , B., Public Accountant, Columbus, Ohio 
OSBORN, FRANK A., Public Accountant, Columbus, Ohio 
PARK, LEONARD, Resident Manager, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company, 
Cleveland, Ohio 
PARKER, EVERETT, Certified Public Accountant, Columbus, Ohio 
PARNELL, J. R., General Accountant, American Rolling Mill Company, Middle­
town, Ohio 
PATTON, DON J., Auditor, Dobeckmun Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
PFLUEGER, JOSEPH A., Auditor, American Lutheran Church, Columbus, Ohio 
PITCHER, JAMES, Battelle and Battelle, Dayton, Ohio 
POTTS, WILLIAM B., Chief Accountant, Armstrong Ice Company, Columbus, Ohio 
PRATT, H U G  H S., Ronald Press Company, New York City 
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PROBASCO, KENNETH N., Accountant, Farm Bureau Cooperative Association,. 
Inc., Columbus, Ohio 
PULLING, ROBERT C  , Chief Accountant, Ohio Department of Liquor Control, 
Columbus, Ohio 
RAY, E. E., Professor, Department of Accounting, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio 
RAYMOND, RUSSELL J., Accountant, Owens-Illinois Glass Company, Toledo, Ohio 
REED, T  . D., Wideman, Madden, and Company, Toledo, Ohio 
REINHART, RAY, Vice President, Bane-Ohio Corporation, Columbus, Ohio 
RENSE, MARY, Assistant, Department of Accounting, Ohio State University,, 
Columbus, Ohio 
REYNOLDS, RALPH J., Vice President, Summer and Company, Columbus, Ohio 
RINEHART, LOWELL S., Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,, 
Columbus, Ohio 
ROBB, JOHN H., Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clinger, Columbus, Ohio 
ROSE, DALE E., Partner, Campbell, Rose and Company, Toledo, Ohio 
RUGGLES, J. H., Accountant, Inland Manufacturing Division of General Motors-
Corporation, Dayton, Ohio 
RUGGLES, C. O., Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard Univer­
sity, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
RUSSELL, DONALD M., Partner, Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery, De­
troit, Michigan 
RUTHERFORD, JOHN M., Supervisor, Ohio Fuel Gas Company, Columbus, Ohio 
SALLADAY, JOHN R., Auditor, Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clinger, Columbus,. 
Ohio 
SCHELLENGER, H . K., Director, News Bureau, Ohio State University, Columbus, 
Ohio 
SCHNEIDER, EDWARD, Bookkeeper, Citizens Coal Company, Columbus, Ohio 
SEARLES, C. K., Dean, College of Business Administration, University of Toledo, 
Toledo, Ohio 
SELLERS, GEORGE C  , Ernst and Ernst, Columbus, Ohio 
SHEERAN, J. W., Assistant Treasurer, Smith Agricultural Chemical Company,, 
Columbus, Ohio 
SHERWOOD, ROBERT M., Accountant, Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery, 
Detroit, Michigan 
SHONTING, DANIEL M., Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, Ohia 
State University, Columbus, Ohio • 
SHOCKCOR, J. C  , Chief Accountant, Lennox Furnace Company, Columbus, Ohio 
SHOTWELL, JOHN, Comptroller, United Aircraft Products, Inc., Dayton, Ohio 
SHRIVER, OTTO R., Public Accountant, Springfield, Ohio 
SHRYOCK, RUSSELL W., Junior Accountant, Commercial Motor Freight, Inc.,. 
Columbus, Ohio 
SITES, MAURICE D., Accountant, Owens-Illinois Glass Company, Toledo, Ohio 
SMITH, HARRY T., Staff Accountant, Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clingerr 
Columbus, Ohio 
SMITH, MASON, Partner, McKinsey, Kearney and Company, Chicago, Illinois 
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SPEES, LEWIS S., Senior Accountant, Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clingex, 
Columbus, Ohio 
SPRINGER, GEORGE A., Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clinger, Columbus, Ohio 
STARR, ABNER J., Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery, Cincinnati, Ohio 
STEEB, CARL E., Business Manager, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 
STEISS, CARL W., Supervisor, Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery, Cleve­
land, Ohio 
STEMPF, VICTOR H., Touche, Niven and Company, New York City 
STEVENSON, ROBERT K., Controller, Beckett Paper Company, Hamilton, Ohio 
STONE, IRVING J., Secretary-Treasurer, Stone Grill Company, Columbus, Ohio 
STONER, LELAND S., President, Ohio National Bank, Columbus, Ohio 
SUTER, RAY M., Chief of Benefits, Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensa­
tion, Columbus, Ohio 
TAGGART, HERBERT F., Director of Division of Accounting, Analysis and Re­
view, Office of Price Administration, Washington, D. C. 
TAYLOR, EARL X., Auditor, Jeffrey Manufacturing Company, Columbus, Ohio 
TAYLOR, JACOB B., Director, Deprtment of Liquor Control, State of Ohio; Pro­
fessor, Department of Accounting, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 
TAYLOR, JOHN C  , Supervisor, Ohio Fuel Gas Company, Columbus, Ohio 
TENFORDE, E. E., Assistant to Auditor, American Rolling Mill Company, Mid­
dletown, Ohio 
THOMAS, L. E., Accountant, Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clinger, Columbus, 
Ohio 
TOBIN, L. M., General Sales Agent, Comptometer Company, Columbus, Ohio 
TRACY, PAUL A., General Auditor, Central Ohio Paper Company, Columbus, 
Ohio 
TREMMEL, F. J., Assistant Treasurer, Surface Combustion, Toledo, Ohio 
TROXELL, JAMES R., Auditor, Brush-Moore Newspapers, Canton, Ohio 
ULLRICH, WILLIAM A., Certified Public Accountant, Dayton, Ohio 
UNTHANK, E., Accountant, Inland Manufacturing Division of General Motors 
Corporation, Dayton, Ohio 
VENSEL, HARRY B., Major, United States Army, Fifth Corps Area Exchange 
Service, Columbus, Ohio 
VAN ROSEN, URBAN F., Fenn College, Cleveland, Ohio 
WALL, WALTER D., Lecturer, Department of Accounting, Ohio State Univer­
sity, Columbus, Ohio 
WANGRIN, R. A., Columbia Engineering Corporation, Columbus, Ohio 
WEAVER, HARRY O., Factory Accountant, Dayton Rubber Manufacturing Com­
pany, Dayton, Ohio 
WEIDLER, WALTER C  , Dean, College of Commerce and Administration, Ohio 
State University, Columbus, Ohio 
WEISS, LOUIS C  , Partner, Ernst and Ernst, Cleveland, Ohio 
WELSH, WILLIAM B., Columbus, Ohio 
WEYMAN, E. H., Auditor, American Rolling Mill Company, Middletown, Ohio 
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WHITE , GEORGE R., Owens-Illinois Glass Company, Toledo, Ohio 
WILKENLOH, W. E., Price, Waterhouse and Company, Cleveland, Ohio 
WILLCOX, RUSSELL S., Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Ohio 
State University, Columbus, Ohio 
WILLIAMS, DONALD E., Junior Accountant, Keller, Kirschner, Martin and 
Clinger, Columbus, Ohio 
WILLIAMS, E. H., Ernst and Ernst, Youngstown, Ohio 
WILSON, R. E., Certified Public Accountant, Zanesville, Ohio 
WILSON, R. V., Certified Public Accountant, Cleveland, Ohio 
WOEHILE, HAROLD, Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery, Detroit, Michigan 
WOLFE, PAUL, Accountant, Kline Manufacturing Company, Columbus, Ohio 
WOLFE, T  . S., F. J. Heer Printing Company, Columbus, Ohio 
WOOD, JOHN R., JR. , Time, Inc., New York City 
YAPLE, WENDELL E., Senior Accountant, Keller, Kirschner, Martin and Clinger, 
Columbus, Ohio 
YODER, LOWELL C  , Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Baldwin-
Wallace College, Berea, Ohio 
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